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Rosita Di Peri and Daniel Meier  
 
At the start of the Arab uprisings, Lebanon was facing a critical political situation: In January 
2011, the Lebanese government collapsed after Hizbullah and its allied ministers had made the 
decision to resign. This act was the result of tension between the Shi’a Islamic party Hizbullah 
and the March 8 coalition on the one hand and the rival March 14 coalition, led by al-mustaqbal, 
the Saad Hariri-led Sunni party, on the other. One of the bones of contention between the two 
coalitions was the United Nations’ Special Tribunal for Lebanon charged with investigating the 
2005 assassination of then–Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The subsequent indictment of four 
Hizbullah militants required approval by the state, but the Shi’i party was ready to do everything 
in order to preserve its image, including overturning the government led by the late Hariri’s son 
Saad. In June 2011, when the Arab uprisings spread across the Middle East and North Africa, 
Lebanon formed a new cabinet headed by Sunni politician Najib Mikati and dominated by 
Hizbullah. This small country in the Middle East was facing internal power struggles and seemed 
oblivious to the development of regional events.  
 
In early 2011, however, simultaneously with the country’s turbulent political events, several 
protests broke out in numerous cities in Lebanon. The protesters adopted the slogan of the 
Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, “the people want to topple the regime”, but changed it slightly 
to “the people want to topple the sectarian regime” (Lebanon Wire 2011). The protests succeeded 
in bringing out only a small number of participants. They lacked strong coordination and 





2011). During the summer of 2015, after a period of relative calm, the eruption of popular 
protests over the halt in garbage collection and of protesters calling for greater accountability of 
sectarian leaders echoed the protests in the region at large and gave a glimpse of the internal 
damage the Syrian crisis had caused. Besides the rift between the two main political coalitions, an 
even wider crack has opened up within a vivid civil society whose mobilisation spread because of 
a growing distrust of political leadership and produced a profound crisis in the political system. 
There are numerous internal and external hazards, but so far both the system and the society has 
managed to adapt.  
 
In the field of social sciences, the 2011 protests in Lebanon (and Lebanon in general) did not 
make for “marketable news”. Moreover, in the post-uprising period, scholars and analysts have 
increasingly focused on the regional dimension and attempts to find links and connections 
between the events of different countries and tried to understand why nobody was able to predict 
such major political changes. The role and the impact of the domestic dimension and the specific 
local features were strongly overlooked. The spasmodic need to find common explanations of the 
paths and trajectories of states in the Middle East has concealed the role of domestic politics, 
actors, and local decision making. One of the most investigated topics at the regional level has 
been the sectarian issue by means of a broader culturalist reading of the social and political 
process in the Middle East under the label of the whole region’s “sectarianization” (Abdo 2013; 
Byman 2014). According to these scholars, a never-ending conflict between Sunnis and Shia was 
simply a “natural” consequence of this state of affairs. This view has unfortunately become an 





the same time, considering the role of domestic politics and actors to be irrelevant and giving 
room to pervasive geopolitical analysis.  
 
This argument is of particular consequence to the case of Lebanon. Most of the analysis of that 
period, especially after the beginning of the civil war in Syria, has focused on Hizbullah’s 
involvement in the war (Alagha 2012; Alagha 2014; Spyer 2012), the Syrian refugee problem 
(Knudsen 2014; Dot-Pouillard and Pesquet 2015), Lebanon’s broader regional context 
(Heydemann 2013; Osoegawa 2013), or the role of the movements/parties that could affect the 
region’s geopolitical circumstances – for example, Hizbullah, Salafist movements, Palestinian 
refugees, etc. (see Omayma 2008; Salloukh 2013; Rabil 2014). The impact of the war in Syria 
and more generally of the regional turmoil on Lebanon, however, is only a lens through which to 
observe how the state and society may adapt in order to cope with this situation (Di Peri 2014; 
Meier 2015b).  
 
At present, the political scene in Lebanon is characterised by many constraints: a political 
vacuum caused by an inability to find agreement on the election of a new president; social 
mobilisation for waste management, which calls into question the accountability of decision 
makers; political bargaining between the two main political coalitions about the problems relating 
to the influx of Syrian refugees; and any other issue that can be politically divisive. All these 
constraints have revealed a picture of a country that cannot be reduced to being a mere proxy of 
Iran or Saudi Arabia. By contrast, the internal debate, the vitality of Lebanese political life, the 
multiplicity of its actors, and the variety of its topics – from women’s rights to election laws – 





of resilience” (their capacity to face the many dangers threatening the country) goes to the heart 
of the questioning that led to this volume. How do the various sectors of Lebanese society 
manage external and internal threats, and how did this management – which can sometimes 
appear chaotic and uncontrolled – result in a form of adaptation and resistance to the local and 
regional constraints?  
 
Assuming that the domestic dimension is crucial in order to understand the resonance and impact 
of external issues, this book provides an intimate picture of the country after 2011. The picture is 
based upon micro-transformations occurring inside Lebanese society (at different levels and from 
various starting points, including communities, social movements, and the Lebanese Armed 
Forces) or by reflecting upon issues that, even if they have a regional impact, are analysed from 
the perspective of their influence on the domestic sphere (Hizbullah, Syrian refugees, 
consociational system, etc.). Lebanon’s “exceptional” capacity to cope with a blurred and 
dangerous environment raises issues at the levels of identity, order, and the nation state. An 
examination of these issues forms the basis for the three main research questions in this book: 
What kind of identifications and identity resources do the actors’ practices reveal? How do 
political actors and social groups re-order interactions and norms in order to cope with recent 
changes? And how does Lebanon’s “nationhoodness” still make sense (or not) for actors with 
regard to their actions and state symbols?  
 
New lenses for old problems 
Thanks to empirically grounded research that delves into recent events, the book explores several 





perspectives on classical topics that include mobilisation, army, political movements, and 
refugees. At the core of those processes is the production of a collective identity that is currently 
affecting the entire region, which is worthy of exploration with respect to Lebanon as it covers 
most of the themes investigated in this volume. In so doing, we also acknowledge that Lebanon’s 
socio-political trend can shed new light on developments and dynamics in the region.  
 
The book’s chapters focus on the post-2011 era in Lebanon and question history, at many levels, 
by proposing lenses at different scales through which to read historical facts and sectarianism in 
order to reshape the boundaries of society. All the chapters’ narratives make sense and practices 
related to them for each case studied. The narratives can differ from the one to the next, they can 
have parallel discourses, or the practices can diverge. Furthermore, the facts on the ground will 
raise doubts about old categories, concepts, narratives, and common boundaries. To this aim, 
three main transversal “identity incubators” will be considered.    
 
First of all, there is what we call “identity in practices”. This label refers to personal, sectarian, or 
multiple belongings. Instead of identity, the notion of identification is more accurate to describe 
what we mean, as it underlines an ongoing process (Brubaker 2001). Beyond “sectarianism” (a 
term commonly used to explain the Lebanese context), social classes, regional belonging, and 
other identity factors play a crucial role, and class community (Picard 1985) may be useful to re-
assess the situation that some groups are currently facing.  
 
Secondly, there is a major issue that we identify as the “social order”. It links identity with norms 





mental spaces (of movement to carry out actions). The theoretical frame can be linked with the 
(b)ordering or re-ordering processes currently going on at different locations and levels of society 
(Meier 2015a) and regarded as a way for people to fix or re-arrange interactions in order to cope 
with a changing situation (Syrian refugees, socio-economic constraints, political vacuum, Salafist 
threats, etc.).  
 
The third “identity incubator” is the issue of nation fabrication – i.e. Lebanon’s “nationhood” – 
and therefore its failure in both Lebanon and the Middle East, as revealed by the Arab uprisings 
and underscored by many commentators since the rise of the Islamic State organisation 
(Cheterian 2014; Daguzan 2015). How does “identity in practices” refer or relate to the state? In 
which narrative or ideology? After 2011, what kind of relationship exists between the state and 
(communal, class, regional, civil, or military) society? What about the nation today in Lebanon? 
“Nationhoodness” requires an examination of how people recognise themselves in the nation 
state: through classical symbols of the state (army, welfare, borders, or other institutions) or 
through the existence of powerful actors able to provide alternative identity structures (Hizbullah, 
Islamic or non-sectarian belonging). 
 
The book is divided into two parts totalling seven chapters: “From identification to social 
(dis)order” and “From ordering to nationhood”. Each chapter incorporates the three “identity 
incubators” mentioned above that are strongly interrelated and ultimately serve to counter the 






From identification to social (dis)order 
The result of the Arab uprisings in Lebanon, especially after the outbreak of the war in Syria, is 
that they seem to have brought identities to the surface. At the levels of parties, groups, 
communities, neighbours, coreligionists, and others, the Lebanese have overcome many 
difficulties to transcend appurtenance and challenge old legacies. On the one hand, because of a 
sectarian reading of the regional context, the narrative of sectarianism has blocked the  “identities 
in practices” with the skilful use of rhetoric and repertoires. On the other hand, by contrast, it has 
offered a stimulus to re-think and re-imagine a new social dis(order). The upheaval inside and 
between the parties and communities, as well as the transformations in some regions and disputed 
border areas, have effectively brought to the foreground those processes that contrast with the 
catastrophic reading of the Lebanese context and shown, instead, its flexibility and adaptability: 
its “path of resilience”. This first part of the book, which resonates with the three “identity 
incubators”, mainly discusses these processes of resilience at many different levels. 
 
With a focus on the border regions, Lorenzo Trombetta argues that local actors in Lebanon have 
been playing a crucial role by ensuring the exceptional flexibility of the Lebanese system. By 
analysing three different cases, Wadi Khalid, Tall ‘Abbas and Marj al Khawkh, the chapter 
presents how communities struggle to maintain social order in the midst of a precarious status, 
adapt their social interactions, and adjust their physical, cultural, and political spaces. It also 
emphasises that the concept of class community, beyond pure sectarianism, is able to describe the 
process of an elaboration of (local or supranational) identities by Syrians and host communities 






Daniel Meier and Rosita Di Peri look at the Sunni community’s paths of transformation and 
adaptability and focus on the post-2011 era in particular. The identity-building process, which led 
to the consolidation of Lebanon’s Sunni community, especially after the end of the Civil War, 
and gave birth to the phenomenon of “Harirism”, was challenged by the assassination of Rafic 
Hariri in 2005. From this moment on, Sunni “identities in practice” have emerged and 
underscored the crisis of “Harirism” – an entirely unexpected development in Lebanon. This shift 
paved the way for the rise of radical Sunni movements, such as that of Sheikh al-‘Asîr between 
2011 and 2013. These movements display a clearly antisystemic stance capable of altering the 
social order, challenging the Sunni community itself.   
 
Another case of “identity in practice” is analysed by looking at Hizbullah, which is at the core of 
Francesco Mazzuccotelli’s chapter. Here, the focus on possible dissent inside the Shi’i 
movement, especially after its involvement in the Syrian war, shows how Hizbullah’s inability to 
listen to its internal disagreements can offer a fresh perspective to look at the party’s political 
dynamics. Hizbullah is not a monolithic bloc but composed of multiple identities that can 
challenge the internal and the external social order and simultaneously have an impact on the 
nationhood consciousness. 
 
From (re)-ordering to nationhood  
The second part deals with the process of (re-)ordering that is affecting Lebanon as it faces new 
challenges and problems and how this process relates to nationhood via narrative or ideology. 
Ways of belonging can sometimes be identified through social mobilisation at the start of and 






Myriam Catusse, Marie-Noëlle AbiYaghi, and Mariam Younes call attention to the concept of 
“sectarian shadow” as part of their reflection on identities during mobilisation. As a means to 
take distance with “identity in practices”, the “sectarian shadow” underlines the nonconscious 
categories of thoughts strongly marked by sectarianism that continue to shape the social order, 
even among antisectarian groups of Lebanese citizens. It highlights the difficulties of going 
beyond those norms that bind together and rule actors’ social lives in Lebanon.  
 
One of the ways that the citizens of Lebanon have found to express their collective belonging and 
their concern for nationhood lies in the popular empowerment of the national army. This 
institution, as Vincent Geisser clearly shows, functions as a symbol during times of trouble and 
deep uncertainty and a means to discredit political and sectarian actors. This return to the state is 
also shaped by a professional communication sector in the army that plays a role in identifying it 
as a guarantor of civility, situated far above the corrupt political scene and able to come to the 
defence of citizens and state borders. 
 
Another means to establish a link between social order and nationhood can be found in Estella 
Carpi’s chapter, which explores the effect of humanitarian technocracy on the welfare state 
system. She explains how welfare regimes have been experienced across Lebanon in the wake of 
internal and regional displacements. Thanks to the example of Beirut’s southern suburb in the 
aftermath of the Israeli bombing campaign in 2006 and the issue of Syrian refugees since 2011, 
she shows how the postwar internationalisation of local welfare has created a management crisis 





differing social orders and curb cohesion and feelings of seamlessness, which generally define 
nationhood. 
 
Finally, Are Knudsen’s study of Lebanon’s sectarianism in the face of the Syrian refugee crisis 
highlights the process of re-ordering national politics from another point of view. The lens of the 
state’s non-camp policy with respect to the more than 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
reveals the chaotic political scene. The polarisation regarding the war in Syria provides an 
original tool to assess the contradictory visions of nationhood in Lebanon. 
 
Towards new challenges 
Between 2011 and 2015, Lebanon experienced a severe political crisis, one of the longer and 
more delicate ones since the end of the Civil War. Instead of falling into a new cycle of violence, 
this small country in the Middle East showed a rare, somewhat “unexpected” flexibility and 
capacity to adapt, especially considering the turbulent regional environment. This flexibility, 
however, is not without consequences: As the analysis developed by this book’s various 
contributions points out, Lebanon, its institutions, and population have been directly affected by 
the transformations that occurred during this critical period. New protests erupted and new actors 
emerged to challenge the state and its institutions, while old confessional legacies have remained 
and become stronger. All these factors shape the boundaries of the identity fabrication process 
and their connections between the nationhood legacies, questioning the (re)production of the 
social order. This tendency is not something new in Lebanon, a country capable of reinventing 






However, despite the many ways that social actors have found to adapt to the challenging (local 
and regional) environment, Lebanon appears to be walking a tightrope. Its capacity to cope with 
several types of danger, which some describe as the power of the weak, can also be a trap, a sort 
of self-confident illusion. Playing with fire, as the sectarian leaderships seem to be used to doing 
by threatening and weakening state institutions as well as state legitimacy, may provoke 
unpredictable and unintentional results. While there is no doubt about the renewed or reproduced 
powers of the zu’ama (Kingston 2013; Cammett 2014; Salloukh 2015), the sprawling presence of 
sectarianism is something discussed by all of the authors in this book – whether in relation to 
garbage protests, the army, Syrian refugees, or humanitarianism – from the variable perspective 
of “identity incubators”. This lens has been adopted to shed new light on actors’ capacities at the 
scale of their daily life, in such changing times, as well as on the dynamic aspect of identity-
building processes. 
 
This volume has sought to illuminate a few visible (and some less visible) social processes at 
stake in Lebanon but concludes with the paradoxical result of mixed feelings: On the one hand, 
the state is constantly downgraded and its capacity to act threatened by powerful actors on the 
political scene. On the other hand, social actors seem to act as moral guardians of a sinking ship 
called Lebanon when they build new relationships between each other or with the old and new 
refugees. Many challenges remain and are immediately visible: electing a new president, setting 
up a new legislative electoral process, and more broadly re-legitimising politics in the eyes of the 
country’s citizens. But the highest priority may be a return to normality. When abnormal times 
become “normal”, what is taken for granted needs to be reshaped, rethought, and rebuilt together. 





views of the nation and the state around the same table. Thus, there may be an opportunity to 
reconfigure the Lebanese Republic after the end of the war in Syria. Sadly, in any realistic 
scenario, this will only happen after a slow return to sectarian “business as usual”, like what 
happened with the “national dialogue” gatherings after the popular protests of 2005 and the Doha 
Agreement in 2008. Therefore, the question is not whether another social movement will clamour 
for political leaders to be accountable or for the protesters to be represented in a new deal but 
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FIRST PART  






CHAPTER 1 ‘Willy-nilly we have to live side by side’: Relationships between locals and 




Lebanon’s social, economic, and political landscape is often described as one of the most 
unstable and fragile in the Middle East. However, since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 
the spring of 2011, this system has unexpectedly shown a remarkable capacity to absorb the 
effects of the crisis. The massive influx of Syrian refugees and the prolonged status of war in 
Syria have indeed exacerbated the pre-existent domestic political and sectarian tensions in 
various regions in Lebanon, but the country still appears to be far from the brink of a new 
nationwide “civil war” (Thränert & Zapfe 2015).i  
 
In contrast to the current narrative, I argue in this chapter that local actors in Lebanon – in 
particular those living in territories affected by the presence of Syrian refugees and physically 
close to war-torn Syrian areas – have been playing a crucial role to ensure the Lebanese system is 
exceptionally flexible (Trombetta 2014). There is a scant body of literature addressing the role of 
local factors in providing flexibility and longevity to the Lebanese system, especially at times of 
political and sectarian polarisation and the escalation of economic tensions. 
 
Some of the more recent texts focus on humanitarian faults – particularly related to health care – 
that the Lebanese system has discovered in the reception of refugees (Khatib & Scales 2013; 





it confronts the complexity of Lebanese political dynamics (Berneis & Bartl 2013). In particular, 
it analyses the official position regarding the conditions of refugees, the repercussions of the 
refugees’ arrival on the sensitive balance of the Lebanese political system, and the mobilisation 
of national institutions and the wider international community. Van Vliet and Hourani (2015) 
stress that the living conditions of refugees inside Lebanon, as well as host–refugee relations, also 
point to continuities between the geographical areas of resettlement and their socio-demographic 
compositions. Other works analyse the feelings of the Syrians and the Lebanese towards the 
territory in which they live, as well as Syrians’ perceptions of themselves as refugees in relation 
to citizens (Christophersen, Thorleifsson & Tiltnes 2013; Harb & Saab 2014; Saghiye & Shaykh 
2015). 
 
This study intends to contribute to the debate on the exceptionality of the situation in Lebanon, in 
contrast to the general tendencies currently at play in the region, which is afflicted by open 
conflicts that are fostered not only by regional and international rivalries but also by the outbreak 
of ancient rivalries at the local level. I intend to present here how communities struggle to 
maintain social order in the midst of a precarious status as they adapt their social interactions and 
adjust their physical, cultural, and political spaces.  
 
In order to assess the role of a vast array of local dynamics, I have questioned primary and 
secondary sources on the relationships between Syrians and their host communities in the light of 
the increasing tensions that have emerged from socio-economic, political, and sectarian rivalries. 
The sectarian factor seems to strain some communities even more, even though, in other cases, 





appears to help mend the wounds caused by economic difficulties through nepotistic/client 
systems of labour. 
 
The research reveals how, in many cases, the divisions among communities are recomposed in 
order for them to safeguard their common interests, which mainly relate to land resources and the 
maintenance of social peace (silm al ahli). Furthermore, local political and religious elites have 
been playing a crucial role in easing the tensions that have evolved over time as a result of socio-
economic disparities, diverse community belonging, and conflicting political and ideological 
affiliations.ii 
 
The exceptional Lebanese dynamics are also part of a wider framework of collective identity 
formation in the Middle East. The various communities in the region are now increasingly ready 
for action to compete for natural resources. Yet, their contrasts are portrayed as conflicts among 
disparate communities, allegedly with different identities that contradict each other. The 
juxtaposition of identities also occurs within Lebanese territories and is represented, on the one 
hand, by people who, like the Syrians, claim their belonging to “other” territories across the 
border, and on the other hand, by those Lebanese who rediscover their “Lebanesity” on this side 
of the border (Carpi 2015). 
 
Nevertheless, as I will try to show in this study, Syrian and Lebanese communities living side by 
side develop local (often supranational) identities that go beyond the border. I argue that the 
shaping of these identities is essential in order for these communities to adapt to the new order, 








This chapter is part of ongoing research that I started in Wadi Khalid between 2011 and 2012. In 
May and November 2011, and again in July and October 2012, I conducted several field 
assessments in the area, both as a reporter and as an INGO consultant. I was able to gather 
various kinds of information and perceptions from Syrian refugees, Lebanese residents, local and 
foreign humanitarian staff members, bus and taxi drivers, journalists, commoners, lawyers, 
representatives from local institutions (mainly makhatiriii), Lebanese military and police officers, 
and school principals. Most of the time, I collected information through informal conversations 
and a few semi-structured interviews. As for the secondary sources, I have turned primarily to 
monographs and articles focusing on local histories.  
From the outset, the question at the core of my investigation concerned the relationship between 
local Lebanese residents and newcomers originating on the Homs plain on the other side of the 
border. Owing to the extremely tight geographical and historical connections between 
communities spread along the porous border, Wadi Khalid can be considered a special case if 
compared with other Lebanese areas affected by the overwhelming presence of Syrian refugees. 
The outcomes of my preliminary inquiries regarding the relations between local residents and 
newcomers likely would not have been representative enough to be extrapolated into a trend on 
the broader Lebanese scale. I have therefore widened the geographical scope of my research and 
chosen Tall ‘Abbas in northern Lebanon and Marj al Khawkh in southern Lebanon as the other 






The fieldwork in Wadi Khalid was mainly conducted between 2012 and 2014, and I visited Tall 
‘Abbas and Marj al Khawkh over the course of 2015. Tall ‘Abbas and Marj al Khawkh provide 
similarities with as well as variations to the situation in Wadi Khalid. In all three I had the chance 
to carry out my fieldwork through local contacts established beforehand. Both Tall ‘Abbas and 
Marj al Khawkh are located quite close to the Syrian border but have a material relationship with 
the border that is very distinct from Wadi Khalid. The Syrian area just across the border from 
Tall ‘Abbas is different from the area that is on the other side of the border next to Marj Khawkh. 
The demographic pressure in these two areas also has different characteristics than in Wadi 
Khalid. The political and sectarian geography differs between the areas of Wadi Khalid, Tall 
‘Abbas, and Marj al Khawkh, as do the geographical origins of Syrians who have sought refuge 
in the three villages. 
 
  
Tall ‘Abbas, where history is back  
Tall ‘Abbas (literally: the Hill of ‘Abbas) is divided into two different areas: eastern (sharqi) and 
western (gharbi) Tall ‘Abbas. The two sides are split along the Ustuwan River. Around 3,000 
people (Feghali 2010, 91), mainly Orthodox Christians (91%), live in the town’s western part, 
whilst the eastern side is inhabited by fewer than 1,000 people (Feghali 2010, 3:89), most of them 
Alawis (65%) and Sunnis (27%). One-third of the population of Tall ‘Abbas – from both the 
eastern and the western sides – left the country during and after the civil war and now mainly 
resides in North and South America and in Australia. Like other villages on the ‘Akkar plateau, 
Tall ‘Abbas suffers from a lack of basic services for the population and perspectives for the 





other side of the border. Nevertheless, the official ‘Abbudiya border crossing is only a few 
kilometres away from the Hissa–Tall ‘Abbas crossroad.  
 
Demographic pressure is very high, as Syrians represent more than half of the current population: 
around 2,500 refugees out of 4,000 residents. The first Syrian families (Sunnis) arrived from the 
Homs region between 2011 and 2012. They entered Wadi Khalid and later moved around inside 
northern Lebanon. In 2013 the refugees who had reached Tall ‘Abbas settled in a cultivated area 
on the edge of western Tall ‘Abbas. A small landowner, a Sunni, rents out the land for almost 
$1,500 dollars per month, and every time the Syrian families struggle to bring in the agreed 
amount of money. The local communities, predominantly Alawite and Orthodox, seem to look at 
the Syrians with suspicion more for socio-economic reasons than for political and sectarian 
differences. Until 2014, although there were potential reasons for tensions because of the 
different political stances towards the Syrian crisis, the residents of Tall ‘Abbas were mostly 
afraid that newcomers would get work in the fields and increase the crime rate and security 
problems. “We are a small community here. We all know each other. We don’t know these 
Syrians. They say they are poor, but in their country they have houses and land. Do they want to 
expand here, too?” (Interview, Tall ‘Abbas, May 2015), asks a small landowner in western Tall 
‘Abbas. He tells of robberies attributed to the Syrians and brawls among refugees in the nearby 
camp. “The [Lebanese Army] is now deployed near the village. I feel safer now”, he adds.  
 
Since the beginning of 2015, the presence of the army in areas close to the refugee camps has 
increased the pressure on Syrians refugees. Many of them in Tall ‘Abbas have denounced the 





prevent refugees from leaving the camp to go to work, to get to hospitals, to reach the nearest UN 
office, or to get to the Syrian embassy in Beirut when they need to renew their papers. In many 
cases, Syrians in Tall ‘Abbas have been arrested at checkpoints or during army patrols. They 
have stayed at the army barracks for days without any formal accusation. They recount stories of 
violence and of physical and psychological tortureiv. 
 
For their part, a few of the residents in Tall ‘Abbas are complaining that the army came too late 
as they had been feeling under threat for a long time, “since the events (al ahdath) of [Nahr] al 
Barid [in 2007], when the terrorists took refuge here”.v In fact, the story here has a much longer 
thread than the one rolled out from the arrival of Syrian refugees in 2012. “I remember well 
when, at the beginning of the [civil] war, the Palestinians came here… here where we are now, at 
our place!” recalls the small landowner. “They entered the house; they killed my uncle with rifle 
butts and beat my mother. We escaped. Until 2005 we could not go back because the entire area 
was occupied by the Syrians”.vi Someone notes that Syrian people in the camp fled a military 
crackdown too, and that their houses were raided and in most cases destroyed. Many interlocutors 
in western Tall ‘Abbas reply: “So what? The Syrians must go to Beirut. They shouldn’t stay here! 
Why does our government always leave us to pay the bills? Where are our politicians? Why has 
the state forgotten us? Here we are in the trenches… we are now besieged and alone!”.vii 
 
In other cases, Christian residents in Tall ‘Abbas admit they “don’t want more Muslims here”. A 
relative of the owner of the land where the refugee camp is situated confirms that the sectarian 
factor could play a role in shaping perceptions. “We have no problem with our Syrian friends. 





we have the same rules of life… and sometimes we pray together.” In nearby Tripoli, violent 
armed clashes have resumed between the Alawi-dominated Jabal Muhsin and the Sunni extremist 
Bab Tebbaneh neighbourhoods, echoing the war in Syria.  
 
Despite this polarised context, in the area around the refugee camp in Tall ‘Abbas there has not 
been any noteworthy episode of sectarian tension between Sunni refugees and the local Alawites 
and Christians. “As long as they do not go away, what can we do?” asks the small landowner in 
western Tall ‘Abbas. “We cannot go to them and force them to leave…” The Lebanese Army’s 
discriminatory attitude towards refugees has already played a significant role in urging Syrians to 
leave. However, many Syrian interlocutors have repeatedly emphasised that “there are no 
problems with the Alawites” (as such) in the area. For instance, an Alawite doctor from the 
nearby town of Hissa is well-known inside the Tall ‘Abbas camp for seeing as many Syrian 
patients as he can. “We even make jokes with the doctor about the fact that we are Sunnis and 
he’s Alawite”, says one of the patients. Local political actors, representatives of the various 
Lebanese factions, expressed their intention to support reconciliation efforts in the area between 
Syrians and host communities. In the same vein, religious figures in Tall ‘Abbas – both 
Christians and Muslims – have continuously been in favour of the mutual understanding of needs 
and perceptions of the newcomers and the Lebanese residents.viii    
 
Wadi Khalid and its peculiar local identity 
Wadi Khalid (literally: the Valley of Khalid) is an area located at the northeastern edge of 
Lebanon, and it looks like a hand whose fingers are caught in the plain of Homs. Geologically its 





landscape of the ‘Akkar plateau. This represents an important element both of continuity between 
the Wadi and the Syrian lands and of discontinuity between the valley and the Lebanese 
territories. Even if the only formal access road to Wadi Khalid at present is from ‘Akkar, a 
traveller standing in Wadi Khalid can easily spot Homs’s suburbs and the Krak des Chevaliers in 
Syria, while his view over Lebanon is completely blocked by the mountains behind him. For 
centuries, this area has been almost entirely neglected by the various authorities that have ruled 
the region. The beginning of the 20th century was the first time that Wadi Khalid was mentioned 
as an area “in the north of Lebanon” (Sulayman 2013, 1:10-19; Raunier 2011).ix  
 
In June 2012 – after the arrival of the first massive waves of Syrian refugees in the area – eight 
places in the Valley were elevated to the status of municipalities (baladiyyat). Together, they 
subsequently formed the Union of the Wadi Khalid municipalities. At the same time, Wadi 
Khalid was granted the status of a Lebanese administrative autonomous entity inside ‘Akkar. 
Until the last decades of the 20th century, the Wadi was de facto left outside communication 
routes linking Tripoli to Homs through the ‘Abbudiya pass. For a long time, residents of the 
Wadi have been deprived of basic health services, too. Even the power grid and water are among 
the least efficient in all of Lebanon. During the first French attempt to draw a line separating the 
newly created Greater Lebanon and the rest of former Ottoman Syrian provinces from each other, 
there was no consensus among the Syrian and the Lebanese parts regarding the exact demarcation 
of the border in the Wadi Khalid area because of territorial continuity and the homogeneity of the 
two sides. In some cases, it was also difficult to say which local communities should be 






Traditionally in the Wadi there have been thousands of mixed families comprising both Syrian 
and Lebanese members. Only in 1994 did around 20,000 residents – mainly Sunnis – of the Wadi 
become naturalised as “Lebanese”. They were allowed to retain their Syrian nationality. In 2011, 
the first waves of Syrian refugees fleeing violence in the adjacent Syrian Talkalakh district 
reached the Wadi. At the end of that year there were around 3,500 new Syrians in the area. By 
2013 the number of newcomers would exceed 35,000. Most of them came from the entire Homs 
region, the northern Damascus countryside, and western Qalamun. Today, around 40,000 locals 
and almost 30,000 scattered Syrians populate the Wadi. From a political and sectarian 
perspective, there is no theoretical fracture between the two communities. Nonetheless and 
despite their common rural background, tensions rose as they competed in the same labour 
market sectors.  
 
Smuggling activity, the only one that in the pre-2011 context was able to offer shared 
opportunities of income, was blocked following the border closure. In fact, Lebanese authorities 
agreed to seal the border during the 2012–13 joint military offensive between the Syrian 
government forces and Hizbullah in the Talkalakh–Homs–Qusayr triangle. For the first time in 
decades, the police and the Lebanese Army began to appear en masse in the Wadi, and the old 
Muqaybla fort that the French had built during the time of the mandate was renovated and turned 
into a military command post. Against this background, locals in Wadi Khalid have complained 
about the chronic absence of the state and its institutions. “It is no secret that for decades we have 
used the services offered by the Syrian state, just a few steps away, because we were not assisted 
by Lebanon”, the mayor of Muqaybla said in May 2012. “We have never been considered 





forgotten and neglected.” This is the most common refrain expressed by local residents in the 
Wadi.x 
 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the arrival of Syrian refugees and their stay in an 
underdeveloped area have caused tension between communities. The rivalries between Wadi 
Khalid and Talkalakh are not sectarian but rather economic. Syrian workers offer a cheaper 
labour force for construction sites and agricultural fields; they receive support from UN agencies 
and international organisations; they drive up prices of domestic heating fuel (mazut); and their 
children reduce the available space in the few schools of the Wadi and slow down school 
programmes because they are accustomed to different curricula.xi Despite these difficulties, 
representatives for al-mustaqbal, which enjoys its most extensive base of support in Wadi 
Khalid, have repeatedly called on the local elites to keep tensions low and smooth out the 
differences with the refugee community. Some key makhatir expressed the same feelings when 
asked about the call from the national political leadership to defuse tensions.xii Lebanese and 
Syrians in the Wadi have not yielded to the temptation of resorting to violence, even when the 
Lebanese Sunni extremist Sheikh Ahmad al-‘Asîr arrived in Wadi Khalid accompanied by 
dozens of his supporters to address the crowd against the Syrian regime using explicitly sectarian 
arguments (Zu‘aytir 2012). It is a context in which both communities feel they have no choice 
but to stay together, and everyone tries to cope with the situation and improve their conditions. 
Some Lebanese have taken advantage of the presence of the refugees, while others complain that 
they are being penalised. Meanwhile, precisely because of the Syrian crisis, the Wadi seems to be 
receiving unprecedented attention from Beirut. In 2012, besides the arrival of the army, there was 





local schools received symbolic support from the Ministry of Education (UNHCR 2014). 
 
Marj al Khawkh, where continuity guarantees local peace 
Marj al Khawkh (literally: Peach Meadow) is a fertile plain on the eastern side of Marj‘ayun. The 
city is the capital of a district (qada’) that forms part of the Nabatiya governorate. The entire 
Marj‘ayun area is geographically connected to the Hula plain in Israel, and it is surrounded by 
Mount Lebanon in the north, Mount Shaykh/Hermon in the east, and Mount Amil, which lies to 
the west. Orthodox Christians represent a majority (42%) of 10,000 inhabitants registered in 
Marj‘ayun. Other relevant communities are Christian Catholics (19%) and Sunnis (17%), whilst 
the Shia are predominant in the area’s western and southern countryside (Feghali 2010). During 
the Ottoman reformist period in the second half of the 19th century, Marj‘ayun was elevated to 
capital of the district (qada’), but it remained cut off from the emerging axis of communication 
and commerce that increasingly had Beirut as its benchmark (Vulin 2000–01). 
 
As it happened for other many areas in the Ottoman provinces of the Levant, Marj‘ayun was de 
facto downgraded from centre to periphery during the territorial partition operated by France and 
Great Britain, a process started in 1916 and completed in the mid-1940s with the formation of the 
three national states of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. In this context, the city lost its geographical 
and socio-economic depth that for centuries had contributed to developing the region and giving 
prosperity to its elite. Since then, smuggling has been a routine activity for local traders to move 
goods and people across the mountain passes in the Hermon/Shaykh area 20 kilometres east of 
Marj‘ayun. The Arab–Israeli wars and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon (1978–2000) 





Israeli, Syrian, and later Iranian proxies. Fifteen years after the Israeli withdrawal, the Marj‘ayun 
area is still an incredible basin of human and water resources, as the Hasbani and Litani Rivers 
flow in its vicinity. Agriculture continues to be the sector that offers more job opportunities. 
There is a high rate of unemployment, and many young people have emigrated. At present, local 
development is entrusted to a few foreign INGOs and to Jihad al Bina’, Hizbullah’s development 
wing. They have close relationships with local and national institutions through the Marj‘ayun 
local council and the Ministry of Agriculture in Beirut (Vulin 2000–01). 
 
Since the early 2000s, dozens of Syrian workers coming mostly from the region around Idlib 
have been living in prefabricated houses and shacks on the edge of the city in the plain of Marj al 
Khawkh. Between 2012 and 2013, with the escalation of violence in Syria, particularly in the 
region of Idlib, many families joined the workers who had remained in southern Lebanon, and 
hundreds of other families, mostly from the area of Abu Dhuhur, east of Idlib, moved to Marj 
Khawkh. (IRIN 2013). At the end of 2013, this informal camp expanded and had about 90 tents 
in addition to the existing barracks. Later, dozens of other families joined the camp: Most of them 
came from the Idlib governorate, mainly from Sunni conservative urban and suburban contexts. 
Other refugees are originally from Aleppo and Homs, and from Mosul in Iraq. Many of them 
were previously hosted in camps in the Bekaa Valley. Overall, the demographic pressure in the 
Marj‘ayun area is not as high as in other places in Lebanon, and the informal tent settlement is 
located outside the inhabited area of Marj‘ayun. Even before the arrival of Syrian refugees from 
Idlib, local residents had complained about scarce attention to their local situation from the 
central authorities in Beirut. At the time of this writing, there have not been any registered 





political influence is increasing in the area, and the party has sent clear orders to its local cadres 
to spend time and effort to defuse the tensions and preserve social peace (as silm al ahli).  
 
In general, both the elite and the lower classes express an old feeling of being downgraded to the 
periphery. There is also a widespread feeling of being held hostage to external (armed) actors 
who have imposed their political and economic agendas on Marj‘ayun and its surroundings. The 
memory of the Palestinian militias passing through, the subsequent Israeli occupation, and the 
“liberation”, perceived as a gradual descent into Hizbullah’s arms, is still fresh.xiii Although this 
view is not often made explicit, the city of Marj‘ayun is feeling increasingly cornered by an 
overwhelming countryside. Inter-community rivalries existed in the area before the outbreak of 
the Syrian crisis, mainly between urban Christian elites and the rural Shia-dominated 
environment.xiv In this context, the growing presence of Syrians families from Idlib has raised the 
concern among some locals that – as it happened in the past – an alien community can settle and 
gradually grab slices of local political and economic power.xv Hizbullah is well aware of this 
dynamic and, as mentioned before, is doing everything possible to avoid creating tensions 
between host communities and refugees. The Shia movement intends to be perceived as the 
arbiter of local disputes and the protector of the interests of both locals and newcomers. For their 
part, Syrians workers in Marj al Khawkh just want to live in peace with their families and be able 
to work. “Politics does not interest us”, they keep repeating.xvi  
 
Mounting tensions, managing conflicts 
In order to analyse similarities and differences among the three cases under scrutiny and relate 





Wadi Khalid, Tall ‘Abbas, and Marj al Khawkh (rows) in an analytical framework based on 
different variables and quantitative data (columns).  
 
PUT TABLE ABOUT HERE 
 
Quantitative data refer to the demographic pressure mentioned above, while the variables are: a) 
the geographical continuity or discontinuity (historical ties between communities); whether the 
border is open or closed; b) the socio-economic homogeneity or heterogeneity; the sectarian 
enmity or affinity (sectarian Lebanese patchwork, sectarian belonging of Syrians); c) the 
political-ideological rivalry or friendship (political posture of host communities/political stances 
of Syrians). Each column shows levels of greys that indicate both of the level of animosity 




All three cases presented here are from peripheral districts that have been historically 
marginalised. Tall ‘Abbas and Wadi Khalid are in the newly formed ‘Akkar governorate.xvii They 
both have been left in a “state of deprivation” for a long time and have suffered from a lack of 
services of all kinds. The ‘Akkar plain is considered the second-largest fertile Lebanese land after 
the Bekaa Valley (Mouchref 2008, 4). Traditionally, agriculture is by far the leading sector in the 
province, and for centuries feudal landowners had connected to central authorities in Istanbul 
and, later, in Beirut, exploited local farmers. ‘Akkar was once again socially, politically, and 





political hegemony in the north of the country (1976–2005). Today, its remoteness from the 
capital continues to have an effect on its development. By contrast, the Marj‘ayun district 
enjoyed great fortune during the Ottoman era: It was a strategic hub between the coast and the 
hinterland, linking the main ports of Haifa, Tyre, and Sidon to Damascus (Vulin 2000–1). 
However, in modern times it has suffered the same fate as ‘Akkar and the Bekaa Valley, as 
national authorities mainly promoted Beirut as the major economic centre. Later on, Marj‘ayun’s 
potential growth prospects were undermined by the effects of the Lebanese civil war and the 
policies implemented by both the Israeli authorities (1978–2000) and local armed groups who 
have been the de facto rulers of the area since the end of the foreign occupation (Vulin 2000–1). 
After the July War of 2006, southern Lebanon benefitted from an increase in domestic and 
foreign investments for development projects, whilst ‘Akkar was almost forgotten. 
 
As shown by the data in the grid, geography plays a crucial role in stemming rivalries in the 
region of Wadi Khalid: territorial continuity, long-standing shared practices and traditions 
between cross-border communities, and – at least until 2012 – the porosity of the border between 
Syria and Lebanon all ensure that the territory and its inhabitants have an outstanding capacity to 
absorb the tensions. The same cannot be said for Tall ‘Abbas and Marj al Khawkh. In the former, 
up until 2011, the passage of people and goods through the border ensured constant contacts 
between Syrian and Lebanese nationals. Since the closure of the border in 2012, however, 
exchanges have decreased, which has deprived the local elites of an important tool to manage 
conflicts between refugees and host communities. On the other hand, in Marj al Khawkh, 
although there is no territorial continuity and the border has been historically perceived as an 





and Lebanese communities, primarily because of the low demographic pressure, which is much 




Despite the increasing exasperation expressed by Syrian refugees in Tall ‘Abbas and Wadi 
Khalid, inter-communal tensions in the area have partially been mitigated by a relatively 
homogenous socio-economical background. As the grid shows, the Lebanese and Syrians of 
Wadi Khalid share a common belonging to a rural environment, and for decades they have 
mostly lived off cross-border trades. Less homogeneous but not in conflict with each other are the 
socio-economic characteristics of Syrian refugees in Tall ‘Abbas, an area dominated by local 
communities comprising peasants, army soldiers, and low-income employees. Conflicts that are 
possible in the area of Marj al Khawkh, precisely due to different socio-economic backgrounds 
(rural vs. urban), are reduced by a moderate demographic pressure and by the fact that many 
Syrian families are headed by workers who have been living on the plain of Marj‘ayun since well 
before 2011. 
 
Political and sectarian factors 
In all three of the cases that I have investigated, local communities show little capacity to 
organise themselves as a civilian alternative to the domain of local political and confessional 
elites. In Tall ‘Abbas and Wadi Khalid, formal schools were established relatively late, compared 
with other Lebanese districts like Marj‘ayun. The high degree of illiteracy has hampered political 





families – have seen no personal benefits in fighting for the development of their poor farmer 
constituents (Mouchref 2008). For more than a decade, through their nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs), Hizbullah and other actors have been providing educational, health, and 
social services in southern Lebanon, whilst NGOs are almost absent from ‘Akkar villages, with 
the exception of a few small-scale projects limited to certain areas. This situation encourages the 
emergence of political and sectarian factors that play an important role in determining whether 
the level of inter-communal tensions increases or decreases. In the case of Wadi Khalid, sectarian 
and political homogeneity ensures a relative relaxation of relations, whilst in Tall ‘Abbas and 
Marj al Khawkh different religious affiliations and contrasting political and ideological positions 
regarding the Syrian crisis foster a rise in conflicts and tensions. 
  
Conclusion 
For a long time, the three local communities have been exposed to extreme socio-economic 
difficulties and felt that Lebanon’s national institutions had neglected and cut them off from any 
concrete support. Tensions rose when massive numbers of refugees fleeing Syria reduced the 
scarce local resources and services available in the areas. Not surprisingly, despite having mostly 
political and economic motivations, these tensions have also taken on a religious tint and 
exacerbated the sectarian polarisation. However, such political and sectarian fractures have been 
partially recomposed on the basis of shared socio-economic common interests. Moreover, local 
political and religious elites have played a decisive role in defusing these tensions caused by the 
influx of newcomers. The leadership of the main Lebanese political parties has also endorsed an 






On the other hand, especially after the new admission restrictions came into force at the 
beginning of 2015, the Lebanese central government has increasingly demonstrated a 
discriminatory attitude towards Syrians.xviii The latter, who have no real alternative, have thus far 
expressed a high capacity for endurance. Their cause has also been depoliticised because politics 
is seen as a threatening element that can only lead to ruin. On a broader level, although foreign 
and local donors – UN agencies, international and Lebanese NGOs – have intervened in the crisis 
with conspicuous efforts to reduce the contrasts, they have shown a lack of long-term strategies 
in response to the Syrian refugee humanitarian emergency. The refugees and the host community 
surveyed in all three locations have denounced the fact that for a long time most of the 
international organisations and UN agencies have intervened in the Lebanese areas affected by 
the massive influx of Syrians as if it was only a humanitarian emergency. Without taking into 
account that hundreds of thousands of refugees are forced to stay in Lebanon, the host 
communities and the Syrians must find ways of living together in the long term.  
 
In this sense, it seems crucial that collective local and supranational identities be rediscovered or 
artificially produced by those communities that are managing an increasingly crowded territory. 
It is still premature to draw conclusions or find long-term paths. However, it is conceivable that 
the construction of shared communal stories (whether based on supposed confessional 
homogeneities, political and ideological proximities, or mutual socio-economic interests) may in 
the future become a key instrument to consider the other (whether the refugees or the Lebanese 
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i Lebanese and international media have often resorted to scaremongering rhetoric depicting Lebanon, as Thränert & 
Zapfe (2015) write, as being “on the verge of a renewed civil war, with Hizbullah and Sunni actions that are fighting 
each other in Syria barely keeping a fragile calm within Lebanon’s borders based on the tacit agreement of all major 
Lebanese parties that a further spillover has to be avoided at all costs, making the state in the Levant a tense 
backwater of the war where fighters from both sides rest to recuperate.” 
ii See Hanf’s (1995) work on “ethnurgies”, the act of merging ethnicity with religion, of basically sanctifying 
differences, which served to further fuel domestic conflicts between different social groups. 
iii A mukhtar (pl. makhatir) is the chief of a city district. 
iv Interviews with the author, Tall ‘Abbas, July 2015		
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CHAPTER 2 The Sunni community in Lebanon: from “Harirism” to 
“sheikhism”?  
 





On August 15, 2015, Sheikh Ahmad al-‘Asîr was arrested at the Beirut International Airport 
while trying to flee to Nigeria with a fake passport. Even though all groups of the political 
class applauded the capture of the man wanted for his role in the bloody events that took place 
in Abra, near Saida, in June 2013, where 18 soldiers of the Lebanese Armed Forces lost their 
lives in a confrontation with al-‘Asîr’s partisans, the re-appearance of this icon of radical 
Sunni mobilisation underscored a deep sectarian divide among the Lebanese population. A 
family member of one of the soldiers killed expressed his concern about a double standard in 
the application of laws and security between Sunnis and Shiites. He was referring to the 
unsuccessful capture of a Hizbullah member accused of the assassination of former Prime 
Minister Rafic Hariri (Nader 2015). This particular event raises the issue of a major change of 
perception among the Sunni community in Lebanon; it also highlights a broader mindset 
according to which Iran and Hizbullah are responsible for the emergence of radical Sunni 
groups in the country and for the exclusion of a moderate political faction like the Hariri-led 





This change of perception becomes quite clear when one remembers that Sunnis represented 
the Muslims of Lebanon in the National Pact (1943), which gave the community a key role in 
the process of nationhood building. They were at the core of the state apparatus by virtue of 
them being granted the position of prime minister and several other key functions, including 
head of the Internal Security Forces (ISF). While their position as a community dwindled 
during the civil war (Kassir 1994), a major figure emerged during the post-civil war era: Rafic 
Hariri. As prime minister and a rich businessman with connections to Saudi Arabia, he 
became a point of reference among the community while promoting a policy based on the 
exaltation of Sunni belonging and founding al-mustaqbal party. This strategy very soon 
pushed Hariri to become the undisputed leader of the Sunni communityi and paved the way to 
the “Harirification” of Lebanese Sunnism. After the unification of the Sunnis in the aftermath 
of Hariri’s assassination in 2005, Sunnism inexorably started faced an erosion regarding its 
weight in Lebanese politics: The new status of the Sunni community in Lebanon became one 
of political, social, and economic marginalisation.  
In order to examine the recent transformation of Lebanese communities, with a focus 
especially on the post-2011 period, we will use the trajectory of Sunnism as a case study. Our 
hypothesis is that Harirism, a moderate socio-political phenomenon born with the political 
rise of Rafic Hariri in the 1990s, changed after his assassination, influencing the self-
perception as well as the perception of ‘the other’ disseminated among Sunnis in Lebanon. 
The period between the “Cedar Revolution” (Salti 2005; Safa 2006) and the Arab revolts of 
2011 has been crucial for the transformation of the Sunni community. The 2011 revolts in 
particular, even though they had no direct effects on the resilience of the Lebanese 
consociative system (Fakhoury 2011), contributed to modifying the positions of some 
Lebanese political actors from various communities. These actors, taking open stances 





communitarian spectrum (Di Peri 2014). They have also led the way towards the modification 
of the boundaries of some of the leading (particularly Sunni and Maronite) Lebanese 
communities that, assaulted by internal and external factors, are gradually questioning the 
very concept of “community”.  
After reflecting on the shifting boundaries of the term “community”, we delve into the 
problematisation of such a category by analysing two opposite dynamics: on the one hand, the 
transformation of “Harirism” after Hariri’s assassination; on the other hand, the recent radical 
upsurge in the Sunni community. We examine the latter by studying the mobilisation 
activities around Sheikh al-‘Asîr that took place in the city of Sidon (Hariri’s family 
stronghold) after 2011. 
The changing role of the concept of community in Lebanon  
Community is not a “natural” fact in Lebanese society; it is a social structure that embodies 
history, politics, and social actors’ changing interpretations of issues, including external and 
internal factors that have shaped its definition. In this sense, there is no unique definition of 
what a community is, although a useful distinction will avoid any confusion. Following 
Beydoun (1984), a community can be understood as a sectarian belief group, which makes it 
possible for us to talk about sects or religious communities. “Community” also encompasses a 
larger spectrum of social life, as it can be understood as a social group of belonging, a rather 
secular dimension of belonging that is equated with ethnic belonging. In historical terms, this 
process can be explained through the lens of its social function and its adaptation during times 
of changing political environments. In the Ottoman Empire, as a powerful force that binds, 
orders, and identifies people, community was defined as “millet”, which became “nation” 
during the 19th century and thus produced a collective consciousness of belonging. At the 





the Ottoman Empire, the Mutasarrifiyya system – under the protection of the European 
powers and following the “Règlement Organique” (1861), a form of communitarian division 
promoted by the Great Powers to pacify the Mount Lebanon area – brought the communities 
into politics and transformed civilian and religious institutions into political actors, which 
politicised collective identities by labelling them as “Maronites”, “Druzes” or “Sunnis”. 
During the time of the French Mandate in Lebanon (1920–43), the territory’s communities, 
rejuvenated and empowered within the new political design of a nation state, were shored up 
as political structures after independence (1943).  
It is interesting to note that the meaning of the term “community” has undergone an important 
shift in Lebanon, especially after the end of the civil war (1989). Before the war, the most 
common expressions to indicate the framework in which communities acted and lived were 
“communalism” or “communitarianism”.ii By contrast, the most used label after the war, 
particularly after the Hariri assassination in 2005, has been “sectarianism”. This semantic shift 
is not without consequence. If, before the civil war, community was considered to be at the 
heart of the so-called Lebanese consociative system (Lijparth 1969) that functioned, despite 
its limits and constraints, until the outbreak of the civil war (Dekmejian 1978; Fakhoury 
2009), the term “sectarianism” gradually emerged after the war, also because of the relevance 
it gained in academic debate. The publication of Vali Nasr’s book The Shia revival in 2007 
opened the way for the subsequent rise of the so-called sectarian rift (Norton 2015): the 
narrative of permanent clashes between the Sunnis and Shiites. This regional debate also had 
an important influence on Lebanon (Heydemann 2013; Salloukh 2013). However, interesting 
enough, Lebanon is not new to the debate around communitarianism, sectarianism, 
confessionalism, and so on (Makdisi 2000). The novelty of the sectarian narrative is that it has 
become pervasive, introducing itself not just in academic debates but also in the daily life 





If the term “community” used to have a neutral connotation, its evolution into sectarianism 
has clearly marked it in a negative way. This “sectarian hegemony” produces negative effects 
on at least two levels: on the one hand, it imposes itself as an all-encompassing meta-narrative 
able to explain all the regional phenomena; on the other hand, it reproduces the image of a 
fragmented region unable to cope with violent phenomena and pervaded by barbarianism (Di 
Peri 2016). According to this reading of the regional situation, which has important 
consequences for Lebanon, the domestic situation has been analysed by focusing especially 
on inter-sectarian tensions and on the effects of regional sectarian threats on Lebanon. 
However, in order to go beyond the logic of “sectarianism hegemony”, the communities, and 
the processes behind the production and reproduction of their identity, are the actors to 
examine, even if they have blurred borders and are internally fragmented or somehow 
marginalised. 
The ‘Harirification’ of Sunnism   
The assassination of Rafic Hariri was a shock for the country. From that moment on, the 
Sunni community, which since the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 (Zamir 1985) has 
played a vital role in the “country of the Cedars”, along with the Maronites, started to 
perceive itself as both socially and politically marginalised. However, this feeling is not new 
to the Sunni community: even before the outbreak of the civil war (Picard 2011), it had 
experienced a period of crisis at the political level with the loss of power of the traditional 
zu'ama and had no prominent figure or political party to reverse the situation (Johnson 1986).  
After the civil war, a new founding pact, the Taif Agreement, further legitimised the pivotal 
role of the Sunni community by putting it on an equal footing with the Maronite community 
at the expense of the Shiites. However, the defeat of the Sunni militias, the general 





Sunni zu'ama in a much weaker position than at the outbreak of the war. By contrast, the 
heightened communal identity and the retreat of the state gave Sunni religious institutions a 
central role in Sunni communal and political life, and the Maqâsid Society (a charity 
organisation) became a focal point for the community (Skovgaard-Petersen 1998). 
In the aftermath of the civil war, the pre-eminence of the Sunni community over the 
Maronites had a controversial and charismatic figure as a witness to the reshaping of its own 
narrative: Rafic Hariri. A native of Sidon, a Sunni stronghold in southern Lebanon, Hariri was 
a leading actor in Lebanese politics during the 1990s and helped to strengthen the idea of a 
“lay” Sunnism with a solidly entrepreneurial mindset. The construction of the narrative of the 
“new man” gave new visibility to the Sunni community, which found in Hariri a powerful, 
unifying leader. Hariri created a new socio-political phenomenon: “Harirism”. The term 
succinctly illustrates how Hariri gradually imposed himself on the Lebanese political scene 
through control of the Sunni community, so much so that, over the years, the identification 
between ‘Harirism’ and Sunnism became increasingly stronger. Broadly speaking, a 
“Harirification” of Sunnism was taking place. However, it should be emphasised that Hariri’s 
political strategy was (at least, initially) trans-confessional. The rhetoric of “newism” that 
Hariri proposed was rooted in his detachment from the traditional politics marked by the 
zu'ama and their systems of patronage (Naba 1999). Furthermore, in contrast with traditional 
Lebanese politics, Hariri decided not to insert himself directly into the political scene but tried 
to seek trans-confessional legitimacy through philanthropic works (Baumann 2012) and 
mammoth reconstruction projects. This posture allowed him to accumulate vast political 
capital to spend at the appropriate time (Bonne 1995).iii 
Very soon, however, Hariri realised that playing by these rules would not help him maintain 





1996, Hariri’s popularity grew thanks to strong investments in various public sectors, 
especially in the stronghold of Sidon but also in downtown Beirut. But the picture rapidly 
changed. The reconstruction projects included in the “Horizon 2000” programme were 
strongly criticised for not delivering on earlier promises: Primarily concentrated in Beirut at 
the expenses of other regions (Volk 2009), the projects were mainly focused on expanding the 
financial sector instead of the agriculture and industry sectors, and they favoured economic 
and urban infrastructures at the expense of human capital (Denoeux & Springborg 1998). 
Moreover, these plans were only partially implemented, and all in all they had a weak impact 
on the country’s real economy: Some of the profits went to the international companies 
involved in the reconstruction process; others were intended to finance the importation of 
materials; and still others went to cover the wages paid to non-Lebanese workers involved in 
these projects (Di Peri 2009). At the same time, the overall economic situation was 
deteriorating. Hariri’s economic policies led to the country becoming heavily indebted: Public 
debt rose from 20% to 42% between 1992 and 2000 (Nasr 2003). Lastly, in those years, the 
political climate and the manoeuvers of the so-called troika were characterised by strong 
confessional tensions that strengthened the consociative model instead of abolish it, as 
foreseen by the Taif Agreement (Kassir 2000). 
All these factors pushed Hariri to develop a different strategy than the one that had previously 
been adopted, namely to adapt to the “Lebanese system” by embracing the communitarian 
option. This process materialised in controlling the key institutions of Sunnism, such as the 
charity organisations (the Maqâsid Society being the first), and, through them, the religious 
leaders who guaranteed control of the election of the mufti, the most prestigious position in 
Lebanese Sunnism (Skovgaard-Petersen 1998). These manoeuvers included the ousting and 
weakening of all the Sunni leaders’ rivals and gradually pushed Hariri to build a family 





in contradictory way) the “calls” to identity and tradition: On the one hand, he used the 
rejection of the past, especially doing tabula rasa of Lebanese cultural heritage, to promote 
his mammoth projects with Solidere for the country’s reconstruction (Daily Star 2000); on the 
other hand, he exploited his ties with the past Sunni tradition, underlining his belonging to 
this tradition. His philanthropic activities, especially through the Hariri Foundation, soon 
became an instrument to generate profit but primarily to accumulate political capital for the 
elections (Becherer 2005). Philanthropy became way to secure old constituencies and 
constructing ever-larger political bases. This process of the “Harirification” of Sunnism 
culminated in Hariri becoming the de facto leader of the Sunnis with the building of the 
largest mosque in the centre of Beirut, a symbol of the return to tradition (Vloeberghs 2008). 
Hariri’s assassination marked a freeze in the process of “Harirification”, which had at least 
two effects: the incapacity of his successor, his son Saad, to preserve the political legacy of 
his father and the shifting of the ideological boundaries of Sunnism. This latter aspect will be 
analysed in the following section by looking at the case of the rise of Sheikh al-‘Asîr. As for 
the former aspect, it should be noted that Saad Hariri, because he lacks his father’s charisma 
and political resources, was unable to ride the wave of protests that followed the assassination 
and gave rise to the birth of the March 14 coalition and his al-mustaqbal Party (Choucair 
2006; Haugbolle 2006). Only the official establishment of the party, which already took place 
in 2007 but only materialised in 2009, prompted Saad Hariri to use the party, more than the 
financial empire of the father or his philanthropic activities, to rally the Sunni community 
behind him. This party logic, however, was far removed from Sunnism. As a result, Saad 
Hariri has failed in his attempt to complete a triple identification: the identification of the 
party with the leader, the identification of the leader with the community, and consequently, 
the identification of the community with the party.iv There were two reasons for this failure: 





logic that were in many ways alien to the Lebanese context,v and second, closely related to the 
first reason, Saad’s lack of leadership within this coalition, which was very fragmented and in 
search of its own identity.vi 
Looking at the evolution of the March 14 coalition led by al-mustaqbal, it is evident that the 
members of the Party have gradually lost contact with their basis and struggle to act as a 
credible partner within the Lebanese political system.vii At the same time, the coalition 
showed a willingness to undermine the institutions of the state as soon as they were no longer 
controllable or acting in its interest. 
One of the battles on which Saad Hariri and his party have lost credibility is its position 
against Hizbullah and its disarmament since Rafic Hariri’s assassination in 2005 and 
especially after the war with Israel in 2006. “Harirism” was based on the division of labour 
between Rafic Hariri and Hizbullah and concerned with mapping the future of Lebanon, while 
Hizbullah acted as a guardian of its past and created a mythology aimed at preserving the 
country’s historical identity and Arab dimension (Karl ReMarks 2000). After Hariri’s death, 
the two political coalitions’ struggle over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon – created to 
investigate his assassination – culminated in a corruption scandal when it was revealed that 
Saad Hariri had manipulated witnesses to finger Hizbullah as being responsible for his 
father’s death. This was one example of the end of pragmatism for Sunnism. Another example 
is the rise of the controversy between Saad and the Lebanese Army, a legacy of his father 
Rafic (Aziz 2011), which became evident on the “Day of Wrath” (January 25, 2011), when 
armed militants of the March 14 coalition were shooting in the streets of Beirut, targeting the 
Lebanese Army.viii One of the more evident consequences of this new form of Harirism is the 
loss of the aura of moderation and political pragmatism that had always characterised Rafic 





attitudes.ix This change in attitude engendered at least three consequences: First, Sunnism 
abandoned its moderate posture, which left space for the emergence of radical Sunni fringes 
that had been latent in Lebanon since 2011; second, the boundaries of the Sunni community, 
painstakingly held together through the process of “Harirification”, were frayed, which 
highlighted the difficulty of identifying a strong and unified leadership capable of affecting 
Lebanon at both institutional and confessional levels (Samaha 2013); and finally, the posture 
of Saad Hariri was a critical factor in Hizbullah’s decision to support the Assad regime in 
Syria and produced a new wave of sectarian claims that have increased the distance between 
the country’s communities (Aslam 2012).x Despite Saad Hariri’s brief return to Lebanon in 
August 2014, following three years of self-imposed exile after his government was toppled by 
a coalition including Hizbullah, Harirism seems to continue to be deep in crisis. As Ahmad 
Fatfat, a deputy of al-mustaqbal, declared, “the threat against Saad Hariri will remain as long 
as there are illegitimate weapons in Lebanon” – a declaration that clearly illustrates the 
perceived persistence of the threat of the Islamic Party for the Sunni leader and Hariri 
inability to produce a new political strategy (Daily Star 2014). 
The game changer in town: Ahmad al-‘Asîr as a new face of political Sunnism  
The transformation of the Sunni community is also palpable when it comes to the emergence 
of a new profile and means of mobilisation. Among the sect’s radical fringes, it is recognised 
that “most Salafists of all stripes have in some ways mobilised their community against 
Hizbullah and the Syrian regime” (Rabil 2014). Within this process of change and 
radicalisation among the Sunnis, mainly in the area of Tripoli (Rougier 2011; Gade 2015), the 
figure of Sheikh Ahmad al-‘Asîr emerged late in 2011 as an interesting Salafist preacher who 
managed to gather a local radical group of partisans around a small mosque in Abra, a suburb 





Future Movement: the support of the Syrian insurgents (Caillet 2012) and the denunciation of 
Hizbullah as a factor in the destabilisation of Lebanon. It is therefore necessary to focus on 
the mobilisation strategy that Sheikh al-‘Asîr followed in order to understand the kind of shift 
within the Sunni community at the double level of means of action and self-perception. We 
will see that, surprisingly, al-‘Asîr adopted a behaviour, a repertoire of action, and a general 
imaginary that refers to a minority sect. 
The social context in Saida in 2011, when al-‘Asîr started his mobilisation, is marked by the 
polarisation of the Lebanese political forces with respect to the Syrian crisis, as al-mustaqbal 
was facing Mustapha Sa’ad (a local ally of March 8) and Hizbullah militants in the city and 
its surroundings. The socioeconomic situation in Saida was already critical. Beneath the 
touristic reshaping of roads and streets in the old city, a process of pauperisation was affecting 
the majority of local inhabitants, mostly Sunni, because of a lack of investments, and it was 
slowly disenfranchising the local population at its fringes.xi Sectarian affiliation soon became 
the only common identity for inhabitants who perceived themselves as abandoned by the 
central power and instrumentalised by the main political parties. This is where Al-‘Asîr found 
fertile ground for his mobilisation based on resentment and a feeling of marginalisation. He 
was also able to capitalise on a frustration with the Shiites because of the political fight of 
early “May 2008 events” that saw a confrontation between Hizbullah and the March 14 
government led by Fouad Siniora. During these heady days, Hizbullah’s militiamen and allies 
sealed off West Beirut and stranded Walid Jumblat and Saad Haririxii in their houses, thus 
shedding a crude light on the Future Movement’s impotence against the Shi’i movement. In 
the following years, several attacks targeted senior security officers and political leaders, all 
of them coming from the Sunni community. Al-‘Asîr was able to play on sectarian honour 
and transform a political weakness into a sectarian threat. This link between sects, politics, 





We won’t accept this abject (haqīra) Syrian-Iranian tutelage (over Lebanon)! [...] 
Enough contempt for the Sunnis! Enough contempt for their blood, their security and 
the honour of their wives!xiii 
 
Manufacturing a sectarian reading of the situation, al-‘Asîr was able to mobilise anger and 
dissatisfaction to blame the pro-Syrian regime partisans identified with the Shi’i community. 
One way in which this strategy of sectarianising dissent from the Shia was built is quite 
apparent in the religious dispute that occurred with Mohammad Yazbek, a top-ranking leader 
of Hizbullah.xiv Sheikh al-‘Asîr sparked a religious dispute after claiming Yazbek had 
“insulted” Aisha, the mother of the Prophet, and thus he positioned himself as the defender of 
the Sunni community. This sensitive matter in a multi-sectarian society allowed him full 
media attention and the ability to reach a larger Sunni constituency, close to al-mustaqbal. By 
mentioning the Hizbullah weaponry issue, a classical topic of the March 14 coalition, he 
implicitly bridged sectarian and political dissent. The strength of al-‘Asîr’s posture lay in the 
powerful position of his Shi’i foe in the political game and in the brutality of the repression 
that the Syrian population, mainly Sunnis, suffered because of the Assad regime. The latter, 
defined as primarily Alawite, has been affiliated with the Shia since the onset of the Syrian 
uprising in Salafi circles, which pointed to an “evil alliance” between the two minorities in 
Islam: the Alawites and the Shia. This “natural” explanation of their political alliance helped 
Sheikh al-‘Asîr identify Hizbullah as an internal threat for the Sunnis of Lebanon and thus 
positioned his community as a victim and possibly as a gatekeeper of Islamic orthodoxy 
against deviant groups.xv The notion of the Sunnis as victims of Shi’i power was also fuelled 
by Miqati’s government, clearly oriented towards the March 8 coalition and pro-Hizbullah 
forces, which promoted its “dissociation policy” towards the Syrian uprising as a means of 





as an ideological way of masking Lebanon’s tacit agreement with the Syrian regime’s brutal 
policy.xvi By opposing such a policy, al-‘Asîr kept calling for the fall of the Assad regime in 
Damascus and the disarmament of the Shia-led Hizbullah (Abi-Akl 2012). 
The seriousness of this political context and the general environment of the Syrian uprising 
and Hizbullah’s political domination in the era after the signing of the Doha Agreement seem 
to be quite significant, as al-‘Asîr’s biography did not suggest his life would take such a 
radical trajectory. One should note that he was not a recognised cleric and was preaching in a 
small mosque located in a suburb of Saida. Moreover, his previous affiliation with Jamaa al-
Tabligh, a quietist religious movement that avoided any statements that could lead to conflict, 
was not really conducive to the gathering of radical partisans (Caillet 2012). In the meantime, 
among the opportunities that served al-‘Asîr well was the duration of his involvement in that 
mosque and his strategic opportunism in side-lining Saad Hariri’s Future Movement the 
moment the uprising started in Syria. His activism and his reputation as a Salafi figure grew 
during Ramadan in the summer of 2011 and secured him an audience. The economic situation 
in Saida also helped him to capitalise on discontent, as seen above. But most of all, Hizbullah 
was a very useful rival group, as it mobilised on the basis of religious affiliation, which al-
‘Asîr violently denounced. In sum, this Shi’i image of Hizbullah, built up as a foe and 
progressively as the group responsible for the Sunnis’ disempowerment and vulnerability, 
largely contributed to the forming of al-‘Asîr’s identity as a radical leader struggling to defend 
the Sunnis’ pride and honour in Lebanon. Thus he stood in stark contrast to Saad Hariri, who 
lacked the ability to unify the Sunnis. 
Built on his social capital as a cleric, Sheikh al-‘Asîr’s Salafi movement was closely linked to 
him as a person. In this sense, his movement was familiar with the classical Lebanese political 





1996). Between 2000 and 2003, Sheikh al-‘Asîr became known as a Salafist, as it seemed 
clear that he followed the doctrinal principles of Salafism (Caillet 2012). In the meantime, 
like other sheikhs, he wanted to promote an image of himself as a non-sectarian figure by 
showing his moderation in the media in order to reach a wider spectrum of the Sunni citizens 
he was primarily targeting. Nevertheless, the populist and radical dimensions of al-‘Asîr’s 
movement can be highlighted by examining the steps and repertoire of the kind of 
mobilisation he adopted (Meier 2015).  
During an initial period, al-‘Asîr organised demonstrations in support of the Syrian uprisings 
or against Hizbullah’s weapons, exacerbating the polarisation of the political spectrum with 
regard to the Syrian uprising. Mobilised via social media, the Sheikh al-‘Asîr movement grew 
in number and tended to radicalise its actions by organising a sit-in in Saida for one and a half 
months, blocking a main road and thus continuing its strategy of entrism, and raising the flag 
of the Sunni community threatened by Hizbullah’s weapons. He explained this new approach 
by making an analogy with the Arab uprising in Egypt: “Our movement is similar to the one 
on Tahrir Square in Cairo. But the difference is that here injustice is armed” (l’Orient le Jour 
2012). He also gave a definition of his protest as one that is intended to gather people from 
everywhere in Lebanon, as “all regions of Lebanon are hurt”. Al-‘Asîr clearly mentioned who 
hurt these regions: He identified the Shi’i movement of Hizbullah and used its “Resistance” 
label to show the contradictory nature of Hizbullah since it became involved alongside the 
Syrian regime. “You can live without bread or electricity but not without dignity. The 
Resistance party stole our dignity. From now on, we cannot accept this anymore” (l’Orient le 
Jour 2012). 
The second step was taken when another protest of the al-‘Asîr movement turned into an 





Hizbullah posters. The riots across the city of Saida resulted in several people injured on both 
sides and two dead among the al-‘Asîr militiamen (Daou 2012). Days later, al-‘Asîr displayed 
bloody images showing the faces of two of his partisans who were killed and a Hizbullah flag 
tarnished with blood, including sentences that read: “Hassan Nasrallah killed Ali Samhoun in 
Saida”, and “Hassan Nasrallah killed Lebanon”. This event signalled a process of 
militarisation of the movement that was visible when the Sheikh unsuccessfully tried to 
mobilise the Palestinian refugees from Syria in the Ain el-Hilweh camp in December in order 
to form a proper militia. In early 2013, he publicly appeared in military fatigues with an AK-
47 rifle in his hand during a strong protest against the presence of Hizbullah militiamen in the 
vicinity of his mosque in Abra (l’Orient le Jour 2013a). 
A third and last step was taken later during the spring of 2013. Against the backdrop of the 
Qusayr battle that saw the Syrian Army being backed by Hizbullah members against the 
insurgents of the Free Syrian Army, al-‘Asîr issued a fatwa for jihad in Syria. In April, the 
area close to his mosque in Abra became the stronghold of his movement with big screens to 
see him preaching and carpets in the street for Friday prayer. While Hizbullah’s General 
Secretary revealed the involvement of his militia in the Qusayr battle alongside the Assad 
regime, the Sheikh publicly displayed the forming of a new militia named “the Phalanges of 
the Free Resistance”, primarily dedicated to enrolling local volunteers to fight in Syria for the 
Sunni cause (Baaklini 2013). In June, several militiamen, clearly affiliated with al-‘Asîr’s 
group, took control of Saida for a few hours as a means to flex their muscle (Khalil 2013). A 
few days later, a violent clash erupted at an army checkpoint near Abra. It resulted in the 
killing of four soldiers and led to the intervention of troops that ended up dislodging and 





The effect of this disastrous end to the al-‘Asîr movement helped the al-mustaqbal movement 
officially distance itself from such extreme actions, although dialogue between Hizbullah and 
the Future Movement remains a challenge, particularly after Saad Hariri returned to Lebanon 
one year later. The disappearance of the Sheikh did not resolve the issue of the Sunnis’ 
feeling of marginalisation. Some of the radical fringes of the al-‘Asîr partisans went to Syria 
and joined Salafist jihadi groups like al-Qaeda.xviii However, in the light of the lingering 
political crisis affecting Lebanon, the majority of the community continues to see no reason to 
expect a significant change for the Sunnis in the foreseeable future. 
Conclusion 
Sunnism is currently being challenged by both internal and external factors. At the internal 
(domestic) level, the Sunni leadership’s confrontation with Hizbullah and its loss of 
credibility are the two main components of the crisis. At the external level, the regional 
transformations and the Syrian crisis have contributed to a change in the country’s 
confessional equilibrium. If, after the end of the civil war, the Harirification of Sunnism 
rested upon the creation of a unified leadership firmly in the hands of Rafic Hariri, the 
situation quickly changed after his death. The example of the mobilisation of Sheikh al-‘Asîr 
revealed a far less moderate and pragmatic face of Sunnism and pointed to a deep change in 
collective self-perception. This change is something new for Sunnism and one of the 
unexpected consequences of the Hariri assassination. As one of the historic communities of 
Lebanon for many decades, the Sunni community has been at the heart of the Lebanese 
political game, as evidenced by its centrality in the National Pact and in the Taif Agreement. 
However, after 2005, the Sunni community seems to be living – both politically and socially – 





and to tolerate its slow marginalisation within the country, which is also caused by the 
political rise of Hizbullah and to some extent, the “death of Harirism”. 
Another factor in the mutation of Sunnism in Lebanon is linked to the transformation of the 
balance of power in Lebanon. The Doha Agreement signed in 2008 clearly recognised the 
continuation of Syrian influence over Lebanon, manned by Hizbullah and its allies in the 
March 8 coalition. The context of the decline of the heirs to Harirism and the loss of its key 
influence over the state’s destiny opened the door to the emergence of several forms of 
radicalism, as had brutally come to pass in the Nahr el-Bared camp during the summer of 
2007. It became palpable in Tripoli during the confrontation between the rival suburbs of Baal 
Mohsen and Bab Tebbaneh after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, and later in Saida with 
the goal of targeting “Shi’i power” under the lead of Salafi Sheikh Ahmad al-‘Asîr. His 
movement appeared as a by-product of the local dynamics of social exclusion in the Sunni 
environment and regional dynamics marked by the polarising effect of the Syrian uprisings on 
the Lebanese political scene. The radicalisation of the al-‘Asîr movement and its violent 
repertoire of action gave voice to a deep frustration of some fringes of the Sunni community 
and highlighted a major transformation of Sunnis’ self-perception as victims and a threatened 
category within Lebanese society. In the meantime, the failure and the violent excesses of al-
‘Asîr radical trajectory as well as the spectre of uncontrolled violence affecting Sunni cities 
like Tripoli with the 2013 double car bombings, have probably contributed to a moderation of 
the internal political confrontation between the two opposite 8/14 March blocs.   
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i While not all the Sunnis identified with Hariri before his assassination, the wave of outrage following the 
assassination caused a reconsolidation within the community that is also expressed through the large 
participation in the event organised in Beirut on March 14, one month after Hariri’s killing.	
ii	All	these	terms,	including	sectarianism,	factionalism	and	confessionalism	are	the	European	translation	of	
the	Arabic	Tā’ifīya.	
iii One of the most interesting examples of this lack of political exposure is Rafic Hariri’s decision to push for the 
candidacy of his sister Bahia in 1992 in the district of Sidon instead of his own. Bahia had already been president 
of the Hariri Foundation, and with her candidacy Rafic Hariri decided to lay the groundwork for building a 
family dynasty.	
iv Obviously not all Sunnis identified with Hariri and his party. However, it should be emphasised, as they were 
the majority. 	
v Di Peri interview with a militant from the Communist Party, Beirut, November 2014.	
vi For example, the strong disagreement about Syria between Saad and Kabbani, the mufti of the republic. See 
Chirinne (2016).  
vii Di Peri interview with a Lebanese Maronite deputy, Beirut, December 2014.	
viii The protests were sparked after Hizbullah’s nomination of the new prime minister the Sunni, Najib Mikati, a 
move that brought the group one step closer to controlling the government. See Saghiyeh (2011).	
ix This is, in general, a legacy of Lebanese Sunnism, of how it was built from the days of the French Mandate to 
preserve its specificity from the influences of regional Sunnism. See Khoury (1987).	
x	See chapter 7.	
xi	Meier interview with Ahmad Beydoun, Beirut, June 2013.	
xii The leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, the prominent Druze movement, and the co-founder of the 
March 14 coalition, respectively. 	
xiii Quoted in Caillet (2012).	
xiv Ibidem.	
xv From the perspective of the Sunnis, Muslim non-Sunni communities have long been perceived as deviant. 
Thus Alawites, as well as Shiites, were designated with stigmatising labels as nosayris and metwalis, 
respectively. (Mervin, 2000).	
xvi By arresting Syrian opponents of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and bringing them back to Syria (Meier and 
Galeno 2012). 	
xvii While the LAF lost 18 men in this fight, no precise death toll was made public concerning the partisans of the 
Sheikh. The state’s silence on the final episode of Sheikh al-‘Asîr could be linked to Hizbullah’s involvement in 
this assault and the secrecy the party of God tends to favour in such security issues. See l’Orient le Jour (2013b).	






Rebordering the Lebanese Shi’i Public Sphere 
Francesco Mazzucotelli (Università di Pavia) 
 
Introduction 
On August 23, 2015, a group of young men from the disadvantaged neighbourhood of Khandaq 
al-Ghamiq, on the edge of Beirut’s central district, joined the street protests against the abysmal 
mismanagement of the garbage crisis that had erupted a few weeks earlier. Sparked by the 
overflow of landfills that had reached their limits to dispose of the city’s trash, the crisis exposed 
both the inability of the government to provide viable alternative options and the dismal 
consequences of the political gridlock that had crippled the country since 2013. The crisis also 
revealed the limits of Lebanon’s consociational system and the inability of the traditional power-
sharing agreements among elites to provide stability and governance (el-Husseini 2015a). 
 
The young men from Khandaq al-Ghamiq carried slogans and images that positioned them as 
working-class Shia, and they displayed the kind of political repertoire that is usually performed 
by or associated with supporters of Amal and Hizbullah. This unexpected presence elicited 
puzzlement and mistrust among protesters who were more closely associated with a bourgeois 
background and a liberal political discourse. After all, a concoction of class-based and sect-based 
cleavages had already marked the street protests in 2005 and prompted a perception of the Shi’i 
community as the threatening Other among demonstrators who otherwise portrayed themselves 
as being progressive and pluralist (Gahre 2007: 113–14, 140, 143, 152–3, 157–8, 196–8). The 





(“infiltrators”) and stigmatised as potential agents provocateurs who were trying to foment 
sedition and tarnish the polished image of the demonstrations.i Left-wing groups, on the other 
hand, tried to reach out to the Shi’i working-class protesters, realising that the latter had carried 
apparently sect-specific imagery because they could not conceive their self-identification 
otherwise. In fact, their presence on the streets was motivated by social and economic grievances 
and had not been prompted by any calls from their sect’s established political leaders. Several 
activists therefore saw a historic opportunity to start doing what the Lebanese left had only 
dreamt about accomplishing since the outbreak of the civil war: separating the working class 
from their loyalty to sectarian leaders and notables (Nakhal 2015). 
 
Not even the most enthusiastic activists were romanticising the Khandaq al-Ghamiq episode to 
the point of expecting Lebanon’s sectarianism to wane overnight. However, it produced one 
further example of the dysfunctionality of the sect-based clientelism, and of the increasing gap 
between an impoverished lower-middle class and the sectarian parties that pretend to represent it 
in the Lebanese political arena. Would Amal and Hizbullah have a weaker grip on a Lebanese 
Shi’i community that has often been portrayed as tightly knit and ideologically mobilised? Or 
will the summer outburst of dissatisfaction be reabsorbed into the consolidated narratives and 
practices of sectarian homogenisation? 
 
The “You Stink” campaign, styling itself as “citizen-led” and “anti-corruption”,ii made it a point 
of honour to slam all the major political actors in the country by deploying witty irony and 
sarcasm to convey the message that “everyone means everyone”, and no party was spared from 





politicians and sectarian leaders, especially as the party had craftily cultivated an image of being 
“different” and morally superior to other political actors through its anti-system rhetoric (Di Peri 
2014), while actually working mostly within the framework of the Lebanese political system? 
 
This chapter seeks to problematise perspectives on the Lebanese Shi’i public sphere, which has 
often been portrayed as substantially coterminous with Hizbullah, Amal, and other distinctly 
religious actors such as late Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. In this regard, scientific 
literature explored the notion of a Shi’i “Islamic sphere” (ḥālah islāmiyyah) (Harb 2005) or the 
existence of a “countersociety” project (Le Thomas 2008) in ways that seemingly mirrored 
Fraser’s notion of “counterpublics” (Fraser 1992). If we assume borders less as a territorialised 
function and more as communicatively generated semantics that associates spaces with societal 
meanings and mechanisms of legitimacy (Stetter 2008, 35–65), the bordering of this 
“counterpublics” has less to do with spatialised perimeters and more to do with a polycontextual 
system of symbols and with a monopoly of meaning. 
 
An analysis of the construction, reconstruction, and morphing of mechanisms of meaning and 
legitimacy, as well as the mechanisms of contestation, should therefore highlight a nonessentialist 
reading of identities, socially constructed practices, and political systems. Through an analysis of 
speeches and writings that were part of a public debate in the summer of 2015, this chapter looks 
at whether the “garbage crisis” highlighted the weakness of the consociational system and the 
stress symptoms in the hegemonic discourse of identity, meaning, and semantic bordering of the 
Lebanese Shi’i public sphere, as well as the potential rise of new political subjectivities that are 







Taken by surprise? Hizbullah and the garbage crisis  
 
The magnitude of the protests in the summer of 2015 and their autonomy from the established 
political parties came as a surprise to many actors and observers. Hizbullah’s earlier reaction to 
the August 2015 protests was loaded with mistrust and apprehension, particularly as the emerging 
phenomenon did not fit neatly into the binary narrative that the party has deployed over the past 
decade to frame regional and domestic events (Mazzucotelli 2014). On August 31, MP 
Muhammad Raad, a senior member of Hizbullah and head of the Loyalty to the Resistance 
parliamentary bloc, (Hamzeh 2004, 117) admitted that the party shared concerns and goals with 
the protesters but questioned “the identity of those who were leading the people in the streets”. 
Raad emphasised that the position of the party was “not adverse” to the fight against corruption, 
but he immediately added that Hezbollah was not going to endorse the protests “without knowing 
the program and the leadership” of the protest movement. Raad also asked “with whom and 
under which direction, and within which national vision” the anti-corruption campaign was 
devised, and whether those who wanted to address and fight corruption had explained their 
methods with clarity (Raʾi al-Yawm 2015). 
 
A few days later, however, an editorial in al-Binaʾ (the newspaper of the Syrian Social National 
Party) argued that Hizbullah was lending its support to the anti-corruption movement and noted 
that, despite the conspiracy theories and the inclusion of Hizbullah among the corrupt political 





editorial explained that the garbage crisis arose at a time of heightened sectarian entrenchment at 
the domestic and regional levels, and that this entrenchment was diverting attention from both 
living conditions and national interest. According to the editorial, both Hizbullah and the 
politically conscious segment of the protesters share an awareness of the “structural problems” of 
the Lebanese system, and of the necessity of a “fair and strong state” as a prerequisite to face all 
the internal and external projects aimed at weakening the entire country. The editorial praised the 
“cross-sectarian” nature of the protest movement and the refusal of its leaders to meet the former 
US Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. The main argument is interesting because it was one of the first 
attempts to reconcile the garbage issue with the traditional discourses on resistance deployed by 
Hizbullah and its allies.iv The protest movement is seen as a positive sign of the consolidation of 
Lebanese society, and in turn a solid society is viewed as a “strong solid incubator” of the 
resistance “in the face of guardianship projects on Lebanon” (Hammud 2015). 
 
A similar point was raised a few days later in an op-ed in al-Aḫbār, where again it was argued 
that the “real protection” of the resistance could only come from “the living forces in Lebanese 
society”. Hizbullah should stop its cooperation with political actors that are only interested in 
perpetuating their own power and should instead “get rid of the despicable sectarian system”. 
According to the article, the hope generated by the garbage crisis and the protest movement 
marked a breakthrough in a consociational system that has been dominated by the same 
muqāṭʿaǧī (feudal landowning) families not only for the past 40 years but since the Ottoman era.v 
Noting how the 2013 trade union protest (coordinated by Hanna Gharib) was eventually forced to 
resort to collaborate with sectarian leaders because of rampant clientelism in the public sector, the 





established parties to participate in the management of the rallies and eventually exploit them 
from within, as was the case during the 2011 anti-sectarian campaign. At the time of writing, the 
author noted that the protest movement had only just started, and that the litmus test would be its 
ability to convey to the general public the idea that political involvement does not necessarily 
depend on sectarian affiliation. Reaffirming the leftist argument that we saw earlier, the author of 
the editorial in al-Aḫbār argued that the “real victory” would be the day when the “sectarian 
kings” lose the ability to take “their masses” to the streets and use the threat of sectarian civil war 
at will (al-Awwur 2015). 
 
A few days later, an op-ed in al-ʿAhd (Hizbullah’s official newspaper) stated that while the 
garbage protests and the movement against corruption had legitimate roots and goals, the 
problems that the rallies highlighted required shared responsibility, and the ruling class was not 
the only side responsible for coming up with a solution. The article, which probably reflected a 
discussion inside the core of the party, argued that “the popular mobilisation occurred as a result 
of the accumulation of oppression and corruption in the government”, that its roots were 
“positive and legitimate” and its goals predicated on the legitimacy of its causes, and therefore it 
deserved support and endorsement (Hamadeh 2015). 
 
The magnitude of the protests eventually prompted Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to clarify 
Hizbullah’s official position in an interview. Nasrallah admitted that the party initially sat on the 
fence because, even though the claims of the protests were rightful, it was not clear what the 
leadership, the project, and the goals of the movement were. He added that any popular segment 





it”. Nasrallah stated his wish that the movement focus on “achievable political causes” and added 
that Hizbullah did not take part in it because the whole protest would have been depicted as “a 
Hizbullah demonstration” (Da7ye.com 2015). 
 
The tone and the content of Nasrallah’s interview prompted a website based in South Lebanon to 
wonder whether Hizbullah was ready to enter the protest movement and accommodate its 
requests. The article signalled the strained condition of the informal agreement that had allegedly 
delegated the management of the Shi’i community’s domestic affairs to Amal, while letting 
Hezbollah handle matters at the regional and international levels. According to the website 
(which is believed to be mostly critical of Hizbullah), the party was trying to absorb the civic 
movement through a strategy of entryism in order to deflect the corruption charges against its 
opponents and its controversial ally, Amal (Fadel 2015). 
 
Does this debate within the Shi’i community ever question the hegemonic role of Hezbollah and 
Amal? Over the past 10 years, intra-Shi’i opposition to Hizbullah (and the uneasy coalition 
between it and Amal) mostly came in the form of notable individuals, scions of traditional 
landowning families, religious clerics, and a few intellectuals related to the art scene in Beirut. 
The most influential among these figures were Ahmad al-Asaad (leader of the Lebanese Option 
Party and son of the late speaker of parliament, Kamal al-Asaad), Ibrahim Shamseddine (son of 
the late Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine and chairman of the Higher Islamic Shi’i Council), Ali 
al-Amin (former mufti of Tyre), and the late cleric Hani Fahs (el-Husseini 2015b). None of them 
appeared to have broad enough appeal nor was able to command wide enough popular base 





a “crack” in Hezbollah’s alleged “monopoly” on Shi’i political representation therefore appears 
to be problematic, especially when it is predicated on a simplistic portrayal (mirrored in Western 
mainstream media) of Beirut’s southern suburbs as being a Hizbullah stronghold (Deeb 2006a). 
The depiction of the contemporary Shia of Lebanon as a monolithic bloc primarily comprising an 
underclass that (out of desperation) is largely sympathetic to Hizbullah is also factually 
inaccurate and has been disproved by 15 years of historical and anthropological research into the 
diversity, fissures, contradictions, and multiple layers of identity within the Shi’i public sphere in 
Lebanon.vi  
 
It is true, however, that, since of the end of the civil war and the formation of a complex modus 
vivendi with Amal, Hizbullah has been trying to create, implement, and preserve its own cultural 
and political hegemony over the Shi’i public sphere in Lebanon, largely relying on the concept of 
resistance and political mobilisation that is based on pious commitment (iltizām) (Harb 2005). In 
this process, Hizbullah used a mix of societal pressure, spatial control, and increasingly isolated 
the dissenters’ to silence the opposition voices from within (Zaccak 2007).  
 
This process of silencing was mostly carried out under a low-profile approach, and cultural 
outlets like the Umam documentation and research centre in Haret Hreik were tolerated, possibly 
in order to project a benevolent image of Hizbullah and a compact image of the Shi’i 
constituency. This approach, however, was altered substantially in May 2015 when Hizbullah’s 
secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered vitriolic criticism of some Shi’i opponents who 






“The embassy Shia” 
 
Since 2012, the daily newspaper al-Aḫbār (which is often believed to be mostly sympathetic to 
Hizbullah) has been helping WikiLeaks disseminate allegedly confidential material, including 
loads of diplomatic cables (Daher 2015). Many of them supposedly show the involvement of the 
US embassy in a plan aimed at tarnishing the image of Hezbollah and creating a political, United 
States–friendly alternative from scratch within the Shi’i community. The cables published by the 
newspaper and shared by other outlets include references to almost all of the major Shi’i figures 
who oppose Hizbullah and its domestic and regional policy (Ayoub 2012a). These files are 
highly controversial and particularly problematic from a methodological point of view with 
respect to their authenticity, although some appear to be highly credible in terms of content and 
characters.vii  
 
The secret files allegedly disclosed by WikiLeaks allowed most of the anti-Hizbullah Shi’i 
personalities to be profiled and eventually to look like American tools or political opportunists 
vying for external support and even rejecting loyalty to their own constituency. Some of them, 
such as mufti Ali al-Amin, claimed to be representing the “silent majority”; others decried the 
purported neglect of their regions and asserted that support for Hizbullah was waning to the point 
that alternative lists for municipal elections looked feasible; former ministers allegedly tried to 
fashion themselves as reliable interlocutors (Ayoub 2012b). 
 
On May 24, 2015, on the occasion of the Hezbollah Day of the wounded of the resistance, 





them “traitors, agents, and morons” (Al-Arabiya 2015), which sparked an intense reaction across 
the web both inside and outside Lebanon (Ǧanūbiyya 2015). In an emotionally charged debate, 
anti-Hizbullah voices interpreted Nasrallah’s statements as an exposure of the increasing 
criticism of Hizbullah within the Shi’i community because of its taxing involvement in the Syrian 
civil war and alleged obedience to Iranian interests. According to the party’s critics, the words of 
the Secretary-General also signalled divisions and disputes that had previously been muted (al-
Rashed 2015). 
 
Many pan-Arab media outlets, which are generally critical of Hizbullah’s involvement in the 
Syrian conflict, have reiterated the argument of a domestic plunge in popularity and mocked the 
idea that “the path towards the liberation of Jerusalem passes through Homs and Qalamoun”, two 
areas where Hizbullah was heavily involved in battle. They have also provided ample coverage of 
critical voices on social networks. Most of the arguments on Twitter and on a dedicated Facebook 
page appear to chastise Hizbullah as “the soldiers of wilāyah al-faqīh” and for having supposedly 
betrayed the cause of pan-Arabism in the name of yielding to Iran. Other users defined the 
“embassy Shia” as the alternative that might save the Shia of Lebanon from “the dictatorship of 
Hizbullah” or styled them as the “real supporters of the oppressed, those who refuse iniquity and 
humiliation” (al-Ǧazīra 2015). With these words, they deploy the lexicon and tropes that have 
emerged as distinctive features of Shi’i political discourse in the past 40 years.  
 
A few commentators tried to engage in a more sophisticated analysis by arguing that “the 
promotion of the idea of the necessity of sectarian purity”, which reverberated from Nasrallah’s 





Lebanon (Mintash 2015). Others remembered how in the 2009 parliamentary election Shi’i 
opposition to Hizbullah and Amal was reduced to a few notables of feudal background and other 
marginal figures unable to make a breach, and therefore they defined the “embassy Shia” as 
“orphans of the March 14 coalition”. According to this line of thought, the coalition that has been 
Hizbullah’s main rival at the national level since 2006 failed to reach out to the Shi’i constituency 
and deliver an inclusive message based on a civic platform devoid of sectarian tints. In this way, 
Lebanon remained “the state of the sectarian parties”, each of which is vying for hegemony in its 
respective sect (Chebaro 2015). Hizbullah’s alleged “suicide” in Syria was also decried (Fawaz 
2015). An editorial in al-Mustaqbal (the newspaper of the movement led by Saad Hariri, an 
archfoe of Hizbullah) went as far as to define Nasrallah’s speech as a “takfīrī fatwa” that showed 
Hizbullah’s alleged “sectarian fascism” (Ossi 2015) and its nature of being “a state within the 
state”, reiterating a concept that had been deployed by earlier detractors (Abdul-Hussain 2009). 
 
A website based in South Lebanon hosted what appeared to be a sort of putative manifesto of the 
“embassy Shia”. It echoes the argument against the state within a state and the logic of sectarian 
statelets, the refusal to partake in “Arab civil wars” and in particular “to die for the sake of 
Bashar al-Assad”, as well as once again rejecting the doctrine of wilāyah al-faqīh (Barakat 
2015).viii This barrage of rhetorical devices was countered by argumentations comparable in tone 
on the opposing, pro-Hizbullah camp, whose commentators questioned the ability of the 
“embassy Shia” to “defend their alignment with America and the sheikhs of Riyadh and Doha” 
and challenged the legitimacy “of those who stand on a financial platform built by the Gulf, and 
do not represent a local or popular current”, even though they cling to an ideal image of moral 






Despite the vicious language used by the opposite sides, the arguments of the past few months 
have often seemed to be a tired repetition of slogans that have been hurled across Lebanon’s 
political arena for almost a decade. The speech delivered by Hassan Nasrallah against the 
“embassy Shia” highlighted an increasing nervousness in a highly tense scenario at the domestic 
and regional levels, but it may be to fair to ponder whether the balance of power is really going to 
change in the Shi’i constituency. The enthusiasm of some anti-Hizbullah activists and 
personalities might be ill-fated after all. Hizbullah-friendly sources argued that, if one compares 
the posture in 2007 and 2008 with the current one, a noticeable change has taken place in the US 
embassy. This change supposedly affected the priority of the embassy and the scope of its 
involvement in local politics, in part as a result of a substitution of diplomatic personnel, and in 
part as a result of a change in attitude of the later Obama administration towards Syria and Iran. 
In any case, the outcome was allegedly a much colder attitude of US envoys towards financing 
and supporting anti-Hizbullah activism within the Shi’i constituency (Ayoub 2015). 
 
Is the Syrian war really shifting the balance? 
 
Although the research is complicated by spatial and security limitations, the outcome of current 
fieldwork does not seem to fully support the hypothesis of an increase in the resentment against 
Hizbullah among the Shia of Lebanon because of its involvement in the Syrian conflict, although 
anecdotal evidence supports the idea of pockets of discontent. The International Crisis Group 
report on Hizbullah’s involvement in the Syrian quagmire is a particularly well-referenced 





the party, both inside and outside the Shi’i public sphere. Critical voices have described the 
reputational and material harm inflicted on Hizbullah as a result of overstretching itself on the 
Syrian battleground, and they have defined its behaviour as a form of hubris that has translated 
into muscle-flexing and intimidation of dissenting voices within the Shi’i constituency. Still, the 
report underscored that “Hizbullah’s standing among Shiites in Lebanon remains strong, despite 
criticism”. While the party’s involvement might have rendered Shi’i areas vulnerable to a string 
of terrorist attacks, the very virulent nature of the sectarian, anti-Alawite, anti-Shi’i development 
of the conflict in Syria exacerbated perceptions of vulnerability and “caused the Shiite 
community to rally around Hizbullah” (International Crisis Group 2014, 10–11). 
 
The fear of Daesh and other takfīrī groups is seen as the factor welding many Shi’i men and 
women to Hizbullah, which doesn’t seem to face recruitment problems for its military operations 
in the war in Syria. On the contrary, the prospect of fighting for Hizbullah seems to remain rather 
an attractive option among the under-25 age group, and according to a poll commissioned by 
Hayya Bina (ironically, an NGO founded by Loqman Slim, one of the most prominent “embassy 
Shia”), among the Shia of Lebanon popular support for Hizbullah remains very high. This 
process is sometimes interpreted as a “community reflex” sparked by the sectarianisation of the 
war in Syria (Abgrall 2015) and the perception of an existential threat posed by Sunni Islamist 
groups based in both Syria and Lebanon. A particularly significant point is the growing 
production of a religiously infused discourse that legitimises Hizbullah’s involvement as a duty 
along the lines of the “sacred defence” narrative (Khosronejad 2013, 3–9) that largely revolves 
around the protection of Shi’i shrines, in particular of sayyida Zaynab (Abgrall 2015). The latter 





political engagement (Deeb 2005; Deeb 2006b, 217–18). This discourse also plays on messianic 
aspirations and supernatural narratives that saturate Shi’i popular religiosity (Amanat 2009, 221–
51; Kassatly 2008). 
 
Running counter to the widely held but factually incorrect assumption that Hizbullah is 
capitalising on a disenfranchised underclass detached from a Westernised, liberal-leaning middle 
class, fieldwork research (Deeb and Harb 2013: 1–11, 24–8) seems to suggest the consolidation 
of a middle class that is organically connected to Hezbollah’s discourses and practices of local 
governance, as well as the emergence of spaces of marginalisation and exclusion that are largely 





The threat to Hizbullah’s ideological thrust seems to come neither from the liberal/neoliberal 
discourse of a fringe group of politicians, intellectuals, and media personalities, nor from the 
stress resulting from involvement in the Syrian civil war. Instead, it comes from the possible 
alienation of the disinherited and oppressed it claims to represent, while the party actually has a 
broader and more complex base of support that includes swathes of the urbanised middle class. 
The question is therefore how Hizbullah will deal with social issues such as corruption, poverty, 
lack of and access to resources in the future, and whether it will continue to accommodate the 





find a way to defuse the criticism of being just another example of Lebanon’s sect-based 
clientelism, as evidenced by the street protests in the summer of 2015. 
Over the past 15 years, the symbolic borders of the Lebanese Shi’i landscape have revolved 
around two main topics: a language of piety and morality in the internal field, supported by the 
consolidation of a network of charitable associations and mobilisation efforts (Harb 2005), and a 
grand narrative of resistance against imperialism at the regional level. While Hizbullah’s position 
in the Lebanese Shi’i landscape will most likely not be eroded any time soon, the controversy 
surrounding the garbage crisis, the existence of an internal opposition, and the debate around the 
intervention in the Syrian conflict highlight an increasing tension over the legitimacy of the 
production of symbols, meanings, and identity borders. In this sense, it seems fair to question a 
certain exceptionalism that has often surrounded analyses of the Shi’i scene in Lebanon and 
perhaps pay attention to the factors of integration, inclusion, and exclusion shared with other 
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A revolution against sectarianism in Lebanon would entail a change of political 
culture and institutions. It would presuppose first and foremost a new political 
consciousness marked by and all-encompassing commitment to deconfessionalization, 
otherwise any project proposed or imposed by a Lebanese party to desectarianize the 
system would acquire confessional tones. (Fakhoury 2011, 11) 
 
Fakhoury’s reflections on a Lebanese revolution based on deconfessionalising the Lebanese 
system were written at a time in the country’s history when antisectarian activism reached a 
new peak and protests led by political activists and civil society actors flared up in the 
country’s larger cities (Beirut, Saïda, Tripoli, Byblos, and Nabatieh). Although Fakhoury 
(2011, 8) does concede that the movement had not managed to “mobilize large sections of the 
population”, she nevertheless describes the protests as an expression of preexisting 





successive waves of political protest over the past few decades. Many social science studies 
and publications have tackled the various avatars of these movements “advocating for 
universal citizenship and social rights” (Kingston 2014, 13) and the difficulties encountered in 
a regime where the political institutions, participation modalities, and mobilisation processes 
contribute to shaping political identities – confessional ones in particular (Picard 2011). 
 
In the light of these successive waves of prewar student or labour movements (Favier 2004) 
and postwar civic, ecological, human rights (Karam 2006), or alternative globalisation 
movements (AbiYaghi 2013), this chapter seeks to consider two major antisectarian 
movements in Lebanon after 2011: the isqat an-nizam at-ta’ifi (downfall of the sectarian 
system) (Meier 2015) and the garbage crisis protest in the summer and autumn of 2015 that 
initially started with the slogan, hashtag, and eponymous movement tul‘it rihetkun (“you 
stink”). This chapter will assess the extent to which the two movements – emerging and 
evolving on the already tense terrain of sectarian and antisectarian notions – help to negotiate 
and reshape “political identities” in the context of the political hegemony of sectarianism.  
 
By looking at the way in which this “reproducing sectarianism” (Kingston 2013) interacts 
with the antisectarian narrative and the mobilisation in the movements observed, the paper 
builds upon the notion of a “sectarian ghost”. This term refers to a double dynamic: On the 
one hand, most of the movements’ activists consciously adopt a clear and often militant 
antisectarian narrative. On the other hand, on an almost subconscious level, this narrative is 
often combined with sectarian approaches, discourses, and practices within the Lebanese 





antisectarian movements are not only the direct deleterious effects of the regime but also 
result from the “hidden census” at the level of individual political behaviour and perception. 
Using the term “hidden census” (“le cens caché”), sociologist Daniel Gaxie (1993) analysed 
the socio-spatial gap within the electorate to characterise the sense of powerlessness that 
keeps groups of citizens away from the polls because of unequal politicisation processes. This 
is not to say that all things are sectarian in the end but rather that attempts to build a prevalent 
antisectarian consciousness in Lebanon are inevitably caught up in sectarian and antisectarian 
realities, with such interactions and tensions expressing themselves in different ways in these 
movements.  
 
The metaphor of the “sectarian ghost” allows us to develop an approach based on political 
identities not as a starting point but as what is at stake in any political struggle or practice 
(Fassin 2008). At a time when Middle Eastern societies in general are acutely raising the issue 
of identities and their intersecting projections in the social and political sphere, identity 
politics are analysed through the lens of either the culturalist or the utilitarian perspective. We 
endeavour to take a critical distance vis-à-vis these two approaches (either Picard (2006) or 
Chaïb (2009)). We propose to analyse how identity labelling, the expression of demands, or 
more soft-spoken, identity practices are embedded on varying scales in local social 
interactions in these antisectarian movements. This embeddedness includes ordinary sectarian 
sociabilities and benchmarks. To what degree are these anchored in rights claiming and, as 
such, do they constitute “acts of citizenships” (Isin and Nielsen 2008)? Also, are they a means 
by which subjects can perceive themselves as citizens, thus challenging the perception of a 





manner in which these “identities” that are experienced, represented, and mobilised are 
subject to hybridisation processes that sometimes blur the lines. Social actors are not merely 
driven by political identities: They also contribute to the production of a narrative on 
identities and citizenship. 
 
This process is evidenced at the end of the chapter, when we take a look at the so-called 
“infiltrators” (mundassin) in the antisectarian movements. It is interesting to examine these 
social actors, including political figures, as alter egos of the antisectarian activists. They allow 
us to question their disputed role as “counterrevolutionaries”, an accusation that is often the 
product of a sectarian narrative. The analysis of such actors sheds light on how and to what 
extent they differ, sociologically speaking, from antisectarian activists, though not necessarily 
in terms of sectarian cleavages and motives. 
 
 
A new cycle of antisectarian mobilisations 
 
In the vein of the Arab revolutions in 2011, leftist parties and collectives (the Socialist Forum, 
Trotskyist; the Union of Lebanese Democratic Youth, the youth movement of the Lebanese 
Communist Party; the Democratic Collective, mainly composed of former activists from the 
Organisation for Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL) in Saïda; the Secular Club at the 
American University of Beirut) and civil society organisations (such as the Civil Society 
Current) launched the “isqat an-nizam at-ta’ifi” campaign. The campaign succeeded in 





antisectarian mobilisations in the post–civil war era. However, it quickly faced internal 
dissent with regard to the framing of the movement. Discussions mostly centred on whether 
the activists wanted “to bring down or reform the regime”, or on which “position to take 
regarding political leaders” or towards the Syrian conflict. Such issues very quickly led to the 
disintegration of the movement (AbiYaghi and Catusse 2014), which gave birth to several 
smaller campaigns that are still active at the time of this writing (AbiYaghi 2012).  
 
The “isqat an-nizam at-ta’ifi” movement was not born out of “an immaculate contestation” 
(Allal and Pierret 2013, 20) but was rather a moment that contributed to reviving previous 
causes for a wide array of activists in Lebanon. On the one hand, the country’s Left had been 
mobilising for secularism for years (Younes 2016), and on the other hand, the antisectarian 
movements that incubated mainly in the civil organisations of the 1990s (Karam 2006) and 
the “antiglobalisation nebula” in the 2000s (AbiYaghi 2013) mobilised around secularism as 
the smallest “common denominator”. Against the backdrop of such immaterial political 
demands, the #youstink movement also revives previous local collectives for material 
demands (regarding waste management policy). In many ways, the movement’s leadership 
resembled its precursors from the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000: They mainly comprised educated 
men living in Beirut (although some demonstrations took place in other towns) who were 
politically educated in strongly ideologised and disciplinary organisations (few political 
newcomers) and mainly came from Shi’i or Christian sects (Maronite and Greek-Orthodox) 
(Favier 2004; Karam 2006; AbiYaghi 2013; AbiYaghi and Catusse 2014). However, while 





journalists, etc.), today’s activists are younger and characterised by considerable social but 
often precarious economic capital.  
 
In the summer and fall of 2015, a double deadlock triggered the garbage crisis movement: 
The Lebanese government had decided not to renew its contract with Sukleen, the private 
company responsible for waste collection and street sweeping in Greater Beirut and Mount 
Lebanon, and the biggest landfill at Na‘ameh had reached its capacity and closed on July 17, 
2015. Since then, no political decision has been taken (as of this writing in January 2016) to 
resolve the “garbage crisis”.i The protest movement also clearly drew from previous political 
and social movements. The beginning of the protest movement saw the mobilisation of local 
residents and a few ecological activists as “not in my backyard” movements (NIMBY), 
notably in the small locality of Barja in the Chouf district, close to the Na‘ameh landfill, as 
early as 2014. This movement grew quickly, first on social media and then on the streets of 
the capital as people rallied behind the two main hashtags of “#youstink” (#tol3it_ri7etkun) 
and “#wewantaccountability” (#badna_n7asib). From local development and ecological 
demands, the movement grew to denounce the collusion of private interest companies 
(particularly Sukleen, the firm in charge of waste management), the Lebanese government, 
and sectarian political parties, as well as widespread corruption and a lack of accountability 
(Bekdache 2015; Dot-Pouillard 2015).  
 
While the “youstink” group (mainly formed by independent and “civil society” activists, as 
well as ecological and human rights associations, among others) primarily pushed for short-





often radical – approach, with demands ranging from denouncing corruption to criticising the 
consociational system to working to bring about its downfall.  
 
The left-leaning collective “badna nhasib” (“we want accountability”) made an explicit 
connection between the garbage crisis and the corrupt political system. Another leftist group, 
“ash-sha‘ab yurid” (“the people want” was a phrase that echoed the recurrent slogan of the 
various Arab uprisings), launched its Facebook page at the end of August.ii In contrast to 
“badna nhasib”, which tends to incorporate major political parties, “ash-sha‘ab yurid” 
consists of grassroots movements and collectives, as well as smaller political parties born out 
of different leftist initiatives and (re)configurations over the past decade (notably the Socialist 
Forum, a Trotskyist party, founded in 2010). While this group does not enjoy the same level 
of mobilisation, it has been quite active on the ground by handing out leaflets and holding 
public debates. 
 
More generally, the main “entrepreneurs” of the movement, like the “isqat an-nizam at-ta’ifi” 
movement, are activists who gained their political experience in other and/or previous 
political and civil organisations, notably the campaign to end the sectarian regime in 2011, or 
in various attempts to fight the regime and its institutions. Both “isqat an-nizam at-ta’ifi” and 
the garbage crisis movement contributed to renewing recurrent topics of contestation and 
reinvigorating older forms of activism.  
 
Through its somewhat spontaneous expression of a grievance literally affecting all the 





the capital), the movement gained sympathy among the population and succeeded in attracting 
thousands of protesters to their marches in summer 2015. In this movement, the main 
“historical” protagonists are civil society experts and political activists (mostly men) active in 
Beirut-based circles. Despite the lack of an extensive survey, but based on the sectarian 
affiliations of the movement’s main public figures, they seem to come from a confessionally 
mixed and urbanised milieu. Moreover, their geographical location and social background is 
also telling: On the one hand, the driving force of the movement came from urbanised 
Beirutis; on the other hand, there has been a considerable degree of mobilisation in the 
northern region of Akkar (#akkar_mana_mazbaleh), in the Bekaa (#hirak_ba’albeck), and in 
the Metn and Chouf districts (#Jal_el_Dib_revolution, #barja, #al-hamleh_al-
ahliya_li_’iqfal_matmar_an-na‘meh). Among other things, these were the areas where the 
garbage crisis was the most visible and where the population felt politically neglected in the 
face of the crisis. There was less mobilisation in the south and in Beirut’s southern suburbs. 
This was attributed in particular to the dominance of Hizbullah in those areas and alleged 
fears of the region’s inhabitants. It is nevertheless remarkable that there was considerable 
mobilisation in other Shia/Hizbullah-dominated areas, like Baalbek, where the establishment 
of a landfill was discussed at one point. The geographical dissemination of the different 
movements showed that confessional affiliations did not play a dominant role in creating 
modes of action and mobilisation. Rather, these were mostly influenced by previously 







While the movement gathered multiple ideological stances (mainly the radical leftist 
movements, civil movements, and socialist and/or nationalist movements), it mobilised 
around the common denominator of antisectarian narratives. These narratives go beyond 
merely criticising and fighting sectarianism. Rather, they include a critique of the confessional 
system, sectarian affiliations, and religious extremism, in addition to the repudiation of 
corruption, ineffective governance, and social injustice, and demands for public spaces, 
accountability, transparency, gender equity, etc. Finally, they also include far-reaching 
political demands such as the resignation of the government, electoral reform, and the overall 
downfall or reform of the confessional system (depending on activist affiliation).  
 
These recurring forms of activism and demands notwithstanding, the garbage crisis movement 
displayed some features that set it apart from these previous movements. Although stemming 
from the development of the trash crisis and the widespread dysfunction of public services in 
Lebanon, the movement itself was born out of the need to protest against and ultimately solve 
an immediate “emergency situation”. Therefore, the movement should be considered at a very 
specific historical moment within the state of Lebanon, when an accumulation of crises 
expressed themselves in a context of sluggish political discourse, the near-stagnation of public 
services and governance, and increasing socio-economic decline. Moreover, developments 
since 2011 seem to have accentuated older processes of decline in public services and the 
ineffectiveness of institutions in addition to a political crisis. From this perspective, advocacy 
for nonsectarian policies and politics appear as acts of citizenship (i.e. the extraordinary 
expression of shared belongings and the claims for rights anchored in a shared community), 





everyday life.  
 
In this fatalistic moment, the movement managed to mobilise people quickly, and 
participation exceeded the scope of the previous movements and the antisectarian 
mobilisation, and it probably exceeded the movement’s own initial expectations, too. The 
regime’s disproportionate reaction to mainly peaceful protesters contributed to even more 
sympathy for and participation in the movement’s demonstrations. The movement succeeded 
in bringing together many demonstrators from both sides of the existing political dichotomy 
between March 8 and March 14. However, it was not long before police brutality started to 
contribute, among other factors, to dampening the movement: Slowly, demonstrations started 
to see a decrease in participation, while the movement and its different activist groups 
experienced criticism and scepticism from many former sympathisers.  
 
In the context of post-2011 Lebanon, these recent antisectarian movements remind us that the 
devil is in the detail and more precisely how, despite the highly sectarian organisation of 
Lebanese polity, citizenship can be drawn from lived experiences, extraordinary revolts, and 
formal entitlements “in order to map out, confine, extend, name, and enact the boundaries of 
belonging to a polity” (Isin 2008, 15). Citizenship in Lebanon is not only framed by sectarian 
structures and organisations: Because it results from nonordinary practices, it also takes place 
through a series of political struggles in which the “sectarian ghost” is ubiquitous but not 
necessarily a determining factor. Contestation against sectarian structures, their mindset, and 
narratives appear in recurrent and renewed negotiations among activists and in negotiation 







The “sectarian ghost” 
 
We had avoided the problems until then, but some of us decided to put up the pictures 
of those that they wanted to topple, like Hassan Nasrallah [...] We had a big debate 
about the pictures chosen; some of us wanted to remove them. This is our big 
demonstration: We want to set a good image. And it has divided us again. Because the 
leaders (zu’ama) remained strong. There was a real battle about the demonstration. A 
homosexual also spoke in front of the camera, saying “We are for a secular (‘almani) 
system” [...] The media took advantage of this. They showed our divisions to the 
public.iii 
 
This quotation from a member of the Union of Lebanese Democratic Youth who is also a 
protagonist of the “isqat an-nizam at-ta’ifi” movement expresses the inevitable internal 
divisions and subsequent falling out over the course of the movement. He ascribes these 
divisions to the mounting disagreement among the movement’s actors as to how to address 
the sectarian symbols and expressions of the Lebanese political system during protests, on the 
one hand, and how to envision a new and reshaped political and social future for Lebanon on 
the other. These ambivalences within the movement reveal one aspect of the sectarian ghost: 
Any emerging movement attempting to overcome the prevalent sectarian paradigm is doomed 
to trip over it. The sectarian ghost exists in the outer political and social realities that the 





dimension of this ghost: the issue of how to deal with sectarian signs and manifestations poses 
the question of “who are we?” in relation to and in dissociation of these manifestations. It is 
this question that often causes the conflicts and divisions that usually lead to mutual 
accusations of being sectarian or not distancing oneself enough from sectarian paradigms. In 
this sense, the “sectarian ghost” also refers to negotiations and interactive processes inside the 
movement itself.  
 
This seems to be a recurring issue. If sectarian identities play an indisputable role in the 
primary socialisation of activists, they are also negotiated and contested in their life worlds 
and stories in opposition to other belongings and identities. This can be seen, for instance, in 
previous antisectarian movements similar to “isqat an-nizam at-ta’ifi”. Its main challenges 
and disintegration can be partly attributed to what we call here the emergence of the sectarian 
ghost. The difficulties that the activists faced in the process of framing their mobilisation 
show the underlying political boundaries’ primary belongings and identities. These difficulties 
came up during debates on whether to denounce sectarian political leaders in their slogan 
“isqat an-nizam at-ta’ifi wa rumuzihi” (downfall of the sectarian regime and its symbols), 
especially when it came to including the picture of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hizbullah, and 
questioning the issue of “Hizbullah’s arms”.  
 
Similar debates have cropped up in the movement for the downfall of the sectarian regime 
regarding its assessment of the events in Syria. Some activists saw it as a popular revolution, 
similar to the experiences of Tunisian and Egyptian protesters, while others tended to side 





possible implications for Lebanon’s neighbour. This led to their alignment along the 
hegemonic sectarian and partisan divide on the same matter. Hence, the Syrian revolution 
contributed to the resurgence of sectarian narratives among activist ranks during recent 
mobilisations.  
 
Four years later, in 2015, with the garbage crisis movement, activists seemed again to be 
stumbling over the same taboos that simultaneously constitute consociationalism’s pillars and 
inherent limitations. There were similar points of contention among the various actors of the 
garbage crisis movement. A debate over having pictures of political leaders during 
demonstrations started in August 2015. Under the inclusive slogan “killun ya‘ni killun” 
(“everyone means everyone”), one of the activist groups, which called itself “3alshare3” (“to 
the street”), put up pictures of political leaders along with a few sentences poking fun at them. 
The campaign included images of Samir Geagea, Walid Jumblatt, Michel Aoun, Gibran 
Bassil, Nouhad, and Mohammad Mashnuq, as well as Hassan Nasrallah, who until then had 
mostly been spared from accusations.iv The slogan next to his picture read: “‘There is nothing 
in Dahiyeh.’ No water… no electricity… The only tanks you care about are those for your 
wars?!”v This approach again led to heated discussions about sectarianism and corruption and 
finally the deletion of Nasrallah of the pictures.vi For some activists, the exclusion of 
Hizbullah was short-sighted, given that the party has played a big part, both military and 
politically, in the political developments of the country, and because the regions under the 
party’s control suffer from the same infrastructural problems as the rest of the country. The 





8 March coalition and were therefore reluctant to expand their criticism to that part of the 
political spectrum.  
 
A different sectarian-tinged discussion developed around the question of the 
confessionalisation of the garbage crisis itself. With the emergence of the crisis in Lebanon, 
various solutions were considered with regard to solid waste management from the state’s 
side. At first the government issued a call to various companies to draft a plan for solid waste 
management. After this plan was cancelled following internal and external criticism, the 
government approved a waste management plan drafted by Akram Chehayeb, the minister of 
agriculture, but this plan has since fallen by the wayside.  
 
Chehayeb is associated with the “golden age” of environmental advocacy in Lebanon, the 
“greening of sectarianism” (Kingston 2013, 129–81). Close to Walid Jumblatt, leader of the 
Socialist Progressive Party, he was the first Lebanese minister of environment (1996–98), 
appointed after huge protests against the development of stone quarries in the mountains, as 
well as president of the Parliamentary Committee for the Environment (2000). Although those 
initiatives produced few results, this first Chehayeb mandate contributed in the eyes of many 
Lebanese environmental activists in the 1990s to an ephemeral yet effective 
institutionalisation of “the norms and rules challenging the free-flowing and unruly nature of 
post-war clientelistic dynamics” (Karam 2004, 395–405): The activists “succeeded in placing 
their issues on the national public agenda” (Kingston 2013, 156). In many respects, the same 
can be said of the 2015 movement. While Chehayeb’s appointment to solve the crisis raised 





plan.vii Different activist groups heavily criticised it for not providing sustainable solutions, 
not taking into account environmental consequences, serving the usual politicians clientelistic 
interests, and not respecting the rights, duties, and financial prerogatives of the municipalities.  
 
The different propositions of the government also sparked a discussion not only of the 
clientelistic but also of the confessional nature of Lebanese waste management and the 
solutions to it. The geographical allocation of the landfills was soon tied to the alleged 
confessional prevalence within those areas, tied to the clientelistic way of allocating shares 
and benefits to the different political leaders and their followers. This led to a discussion 
about the confessional nature of the garbage crisis plans. Activists started to mock the 
“confessional garbage” of Lebanon by posting pictures on social media of the growing 
garbage piles with confessional references to single garbage bags like “a Shi’i garbage bag in 
Ashrafieh” (a Christian neighbourhood). While the confessionalisation of discourses 
regarding the crisis was dealt with through humour and irony, it also caused frustration among 
many of the activists and gradually seemed to poison their modes of action and discourse. In 
one of our interviews, one independent long-time activist recalled her own experience with 
this confessionalisation process:  
 
I used to go to the demonstrations with three long-time friends. It was the first time 
that we had a common political cause. They are all Aounists. And suddenly two of 
them told me that they didn’t want to go anymore. When I asked them why, they said 





the March 14 coalition and seemed to be supported by March 8. I had no idea what to 
say to this.viii 
 
These examples show not only that the movement was reiterating sectarian realities in 
Lebanon by means of various conscious modes of action – discussions and confrontations, as 
well as humour and irony – but also how such discourse often leads to dissent within the 
movement in terms of how far and which symbols of Lebanese sectarianism are to be 
incorporated into the protest, and how these symbols are addressed. This is further 
complicated in light of the fact that the dominant political discourse resorts with startling ease 
to confessional explanations for modes of dissent and protest. In this ambivalent situation, it 
seems that antisectarian movements like the ones discussed here face a kind of sectarian trap 
in which sectarian discourses appear to reproduce themselves. 
 
The discourse on sectarianism within antisectarian movements demonstrates how this 
ambivalence in terms of discourse and practice is related to questions of dominance and 
distribution of existing mobilisation resources and agency facilities within the Lebanese 
political scene. It is therefore crucial not to fall into fatalism and label everything as sectarian 
or a reproduction of sectarianism but rather to explore the dynamics of restriction, power 
asymmetries, mobilisation, domination, and entanglement within Lebanon’s political and civil 
society (Kingston 2013, 3). Instead of dealing with sectarian affiliations and political skills as 
things that produce equal kinds of political capital, we suggest taking into account the “hidden 





behaviour. In other words, we suggest that Lebanese citizens are unequally predisposed to 
raising their voice against any political issue, be it sectarian or not. 
 
Such a reactivation of identity narratives could also be observed more recently in the use of 
the term “mundassin” (the infiltrators), which brings to mind the “baltagiya”, or “thugs”, of 
the Egyptian revolution. Presented as counterrevolutionary figures in opposition to the 
“shebab” (the revolutionaries), they remind us of at least two classical political symbols and 
paradigms of depoliticised actors: on the orientalist side, the Lebanese or Syrian urban 
“qabaday”, the local gang leader and “social bandit”, himself at the service of a za‘îm, 
functional element of the sectarian and clientelistic system (Johnson 2001); on the Marxist 
side, the “lumpenproletariat”, a collection of faceless individuals, devoid of political 
consciousness, available to the highest bidder and always on the bad side. Ultimately the 
“mundassin” as antisectarian activists raise the question of how identity intersects with other 
forms of allegiance. 
 
 
Narratives of dissent on the “mundassin”  
 
A considerable amount of literature deals with social movement activists, yet very little or no 
attention has been given to social movement infiltrators or, more broadly, to social movement 
actors whose allegiances are in dispute. Indeed, as we will see in this section, the “infiltrators” 
(mundassin) have been accused of spreading dissent within the movement or even of 






It can be challenging for the researcher to study such actors, as the difficulties range from 
access, to the scientist’s empathy for more accommodating or exhilarating subject matter, to 
the sometimes recurring temptation to reproduce the conspiratorial narratives of activists. 
However, examining the role and participation of these actors should be at the core of the 
social movement literature, especially with regard to actors evolving “within a context”.  
 
The first time the mundassin appeared was not as part of the waste management protest 
movement. Activist accounts in the 1990s and the early 2000s often refer to state or party 
member infiltration through direct observation (for example, by participating in their meetings 
and systematically checking attendees lists, notably during the “Syrian presence” era) or 
repression (direct confrontation with security forces, for example). Within the scope of this 
chapter, we seek to illuminate how all these actions, allegiances, and motives are at play and 
intertwined within the frame of a protest movement.  
  
During the garbage crisis movement, the state apparatus used a wide array of means to 
contain protests in the summer of 2015: massive military deployments, arbitrary arrests, tear 
gas, activists being tried in military courts, and shooting protesters were just some of the 
coercive tools being used. Other means focused on undermining the movement by accusing 
the protesters of being drug addicts (thus forcing detained demonstrators to undertake and pay 
for their own urine tests) or of being manipulated and funded by a “small Arab country”,ix 
thus introducing the notion of “infiltrators”. Although the Minister of the Interior was trying 





foreigners (Syrian and Sudanese refugees had allegedly been detained by security forces), it 
was not long before the narrative of the so-called “infiltrators” started to be used by some of 
the activists themselves.  
 
The term emerged during the demonstrations in late August 2015, when for the first time 
large and diverse segments of the Lebanese population began to join the protests. The state’s 
rather excessive kneejerk reaction against peaceful protesters (including many children and 
elderly people) demanding basic civil rights led to an even bigger mobilisation. Many people 
joined the protesters in downtown Beirut to show their solidarity with the movement and to 
denounce the state’s reaction to it. During these demonstrations, divisions among the 
protesters started to appear. While some – mainly young men – called for a violent removal of 
the security blockades erected by the police to separate the protesters from the seats of power, 
others confronted the wall of armed police (and the army) chanting “silmiyeh, silmiyeh” 
(“Non-violence, non-violence”) to voice their disapproval of violent confrontations with the 
state. This tense situation further escalated in the evening when the sit-in protest turned into a 
full-fledged demonstration. The same young men reappeared, running bare-chested through 
the crowd and carrying empty plastic bottles to throw at the police and the army. Their 
seeming willingness to use violence as a mode of action as part of the protests took many 
other demonstrators by surprise and alienated many of them, who clearly struggled to find a 
narrative of inclusion/exclusion in response to the emergence of the “infiltrators”.  
 
Activist narratives regarding the rioters or “infiltrators” differ depending on groups and 





mobilisation was “pacifist and civilised” (hirak musalim wa hadari) and even asking the 
security forces to help them keep the infiltrators out of the demonstrations. Others reversed 
the stigma and started identifying themselves as “infiltrators” by wearing T-shirts stamped 
with “indisas” (infiltration) and mocking the exclusion dynamics and labelling of certain 
modes of protest (violence vs. peacefulness) of some of the protest groups.  
 
However, even among the latter groups, and as the presence of the infiltrators and violent 
encounters within the protest movement increased, some activists started questioning the 
hidden motivations of the rioters:  
 
Although I am totally against the dominant discourse, especially as our group 
approves of the use of violence or civil disobedience, I can’t help but wonder why 
these people are attacking other demonstrators who want to hold all politicians 
accountable, including Nabih Berri [head of the Amal party and speaker of the 
Lebanese parliament]. Why is it forbidden to say his name? I can’t help but think that 
the Amal militia sent these individuals…x  
 
All these narratives can be linked to the question of recourse to political violence and 
disobedience as a mode of action in protest movements, not a consensual issue among 
protesters, although the prevalent discourse consisted in emphasising the peaceful nature of 
the protest. Rioters were almost automatically identified as coming from the poor Shi’i 





condescendingly) perceived the political expression of their anger as “ordinary” or even 
“timely”:  
I am personally a pacifist, but I think that to have things really moving and changing, 
we need some people to shake some trees, you know? Poverty in the poor suburbs and 
areas of Lebanon and the lack of education, jobs, livelihoods, and horizons for these 
youth make violent actions a normal way for them to convey their message. At some 
point, we just need to admit that they are taking risks that we can’t afford to take.xi  
 
Hence, the issue of the infiltrators – and the question of how to address the issue within the 
protest movement - ultimately touched on many topics central to the self-positioning of the 
activists and protesters calling for demonstrations against a corrupt and sectarian system. The 
question of the infiltrators’ sectarian belonging (and the attendant political implications), 
along with their class affiliation also raised the question of patronage networks and political 
offer. Their identification as Shi’i youth from an Amal bastion automatically made them 
suspects in the eyes of a predominantly middle-class, Beirut-based circle that has been active 
in a certain entre-soi. “When they burst into the demonstration and walked in this kind of 
procession, it really made me think of ‘Ashura”, said an activist, adding “we never used to see 
them in the protests”.xii  
 
However, considering the infiltrators as a monolithic bloc (whether based on sect or class) 
strips them of any sociological background, disregards their political and social socialisation 
processes, and ultimately denies them any political consciousness. The question of infiltrators 





of the protesters themselves. On the one hand, distancing themselves from the infiltrators and 
labelling them in relation to their alleged affiliation with one of the main pillars of the corrupt 
sectarian system, namely the Amal Movement, meant giving in to the same dichotomous and 
dominant interpretation that in the Lebanese mainstream media and the politicians took up 
regarding the movement. On the other hand, the denial of this affiliation (in favour of class 
sentiments) somehow equalled a rather naive denial of the fact that sectarian affiliations can 
move along with other affiliations and that they are therefore important to address as an 
ambivalent notion. Both approaches – mainly adopted in a rather sudden way after the 
infiltrators’ arrival caught the protesters by surprise – somehow turned a blind eye to the links 
between the dominance of sectarian affiliations, ideology, and patronage networks in Lebanon 
on the one hand and the rather marginal but appealing antisectarian and demand-oriented 
protest movements and mobilisations on the other. The denial of these links shows a tendency 
to ignore the protesters’ own entanglement in these dominant structures and discourses. 
Exploring these links – in terms of conscious self-conception as well as unconscious 
exclusion/inclusion mechanisms within protest movements – can reveal how these two 
notions are at play and hinder, facilitate, and change the movement itself. Unlike qabaday and 
lumpenproletariat, both of which refer to political immaturity, the mundassin’s presence can 




In this chapter we discussed political identities in the context of a dominant sectarian political 





and moments that challenge assigned and stable definitions of identities and status. Moreover, 
we analysed the linkages between these extraordinary moments and more ordinary political 
struggles: sectarian affiliations, local forms of political and social mobilisation, or past 
sympathies with antisectarian contestations. 
 
We looked at the interplay and linkages by conceptualising the metaphor of the “sectarian 
ghost” to demonstrate that sectarianism plays a major role in the conscious strategy of 
activists with antisectarian demands. Likewise, sectarianism plays a somewhat subconscious 
role in the positioning of those activists.  
 
Still, one has to look beyond the ghost. The ghost does not inhibit the actions and practices of 
citizenship exemplified by the two movements analysed. Rather, although the ghost tends to 
pervade discourses on and within the movements, as seen by the question of the mundassin, it 
does not hinder demands for material or immaterial rights challenging something else than 
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CHAPTER 5  “The People Want the Army”: Is the Lebanese Military an 





Introduction: Does the LAF Protect the Civility of the Regime? 
 
It has become a tradition that every year on August 1, which marks the official Lebanese 
holiday celebrating the anniversary of the foundation of the army, the country’s citizens pour 
into Martyrs’ Square in downtown Beirut to chant the slogan “The people want the army!”i 
This may appear surprising in a country that has never really had a militarist tradition 
comparable to other “garrison states” in the Arab world (Lasswell 1997; Picard 2008). Since 
Lebanon achieved independence in 1943, the military has only played a minor role in public 
life. When high army officers held power, they did so as civilians and swapped their military 
uniforms for suits and ties (Barak 2006 and 2009). This story seems to belong to the process 
of the “civilianisation in the armed forces as described by social scientists (Huntington 1957; 
Joana and Smyrl 2008; Geisser and Krefa 2011). The process of “civilianisation” corresponds 
to a functioning of the military institutions that overlaps with civil standards.  
 
From this point of view, Lebanon appears to be an exception in the Arab world: Except for 
the reign of General Fuad Chehab, the founder and commander in chief of the Lebanese 





political and religious leaders have mostly side-lined military elites to the point that 
centrifugal forces have often overwhelmed and reduced the LAF to a state of chronic 
weakness. While the General Chehab’s presidency was relatively short-lived (1958–64), it has 
often been seen as a golden age of politics, a period of stability, security, and relative 
prosperity. In the context of the current institutional crisisii that is taking place across 
Lebanon, the power vacuum in the office of the president, and the prorogation of Parliament, 
Chehabism constitutes a genuine political mythology (Girardet 1990). It combines composite 
and sometimes contradictory symbolic repositories: The nostalgia for a security order 
accompanies a desire to return to a “normal democracy,” a regime that has supposedly been 
besmirched by corrupt politico-religious elites and is controlled by private interests. As 
paradoxical as it may seem, the nation’s army has been made to play an idealised civil role 
(Iskandar 2002) to compensate for the deficiencies of a civil governance system that is 
perceived to be bankrupt. 
 
Since 2011, the LAF has been at the heart of socio-political struggles, as the fallout from the 
Syrian crisis and the ever-present threat of jihadist terrorism have deepened feelings of 
political failure and insecurity among the general population in Lebanon (Geisser 2013). Yet 
the popular call for the army’s “return” to the public scene is not connected to the lasting 
power of militarist tendencies rooted in society. In Lebanon, social militarism – exemplified 
by young women dressed up as soldiers to express their support for the army or posters that 
glorify army officers and frequently cover the walls of the city centres – is no more than 
folklore and the theatrical staging of patriotism. The majority of political, religious, union, 





be fundamentally “contrary to the constitutive principles and values of ‘Lebanese 
consociational democracy’” (Picard 2001). In Lebanon, a very negative connotation is still 
attached to militarism, which is associated with the painful memory of the Syrian occupation 
and the abuses committed by Syrian soldiers. A majority of Lebanese citizens are trying to 
distance, their state from these experiences of militarism by working toward a higher degree 
of civility in the Lebanese state than is found in their “large neighbour” (Picard 2013). 
Loyalty to civilian power thus evinces a quasi-patriotic desire to differentiate Lebanon from 
the hegemonic ambitions of Syria (and of Israel): The country’s civility is also a way of 
directly or indirectly differentiating it from the supposed “incivility” of the Syrian regime and, 
more obliquely, from other Arab states. 
 
It is clear that the complex notion of the “pro-army” mythology permeating Lebanese society 
today should not be mistaken for a popular desire to restore a military regime. On the 
contrary, in the context of a profound crisis among public institutions and the general 
discrediting of partisan and religious actors, this myth of the army primarily works upon an 
imagined civility. From this point of view, the LAF is valued not for its ability to militarise 
society but mainly for its potential to “civilise” public space and state institutions. In short, in 
this chapter, I argue that in a Lebanese society continually in search of moral and political 
standards, part of the population holds up the army as a vector of civility, even of civic-
mindedness. Consequently, I reject the thesis according to which the LAF is a “sociological 





To this end, I present an innovative view of the military institution and analyse the political 
communication processes that the army utilises as a means to compensate its structural 
weakness.  
 
I have analysed the popularity of the army as an ideological construct that is fabricated, 
articulated, and legitimated by social actors holding particular interests. In the first place, the 
army itself takes an active role in producing its social image through a communications policy 
that matches the complexity and sophistication of larger Western armies’ communications 
policies. Just like in most of the world’s armies, while high army officials are constrained to a 
“duty to remain neutral,” the LAF is far from being silent in the public sphere. In Lebanon, 
the army employs a professional marketing structure aimed at the public at large (poster 
campaigns), the media (press releases), and opinion leaders (frequent meetings with political 
party, union, and religious leaders). I have gathered and analysed more than 50 images and 
videos produced by the LAF between 2000 and 2015 and used in public campaigns, strategy 
bulletins that appear three to four times a year, and official statements.  
 
The Army and ‘Its’ People: The Construction of a Patriotic Mythology in the Context of 
Permanent Crisis 
 
As political scientist Nayla Moussa (2009) reminds us, the LAF’s popularity is both a political 
and ideological construction. There is nothing spontaneous or natural about it; rather, it is the 
product of actions ordered from high up in the military institution with the goal of conferring 





the LAF requires analysing the apparatus and mechanisms through which the army 
manufactures its own image for ordinary citizens, opinion leaders (the media, political and 
religious leaders) and international actors. 
 
The Myth of the Neutrality of the Military Institution  
 
If the notion of political neutrality is common to the majority of armed forces around the 
world, and especially to those emanating from the “French military matrix” (Cohen 2008a), in 
Lebanon this notion entails a particular meaning due to “segmentarist dynamics”, that is to 
say a political and religious logic that cuts across other public institutions. In this sense, the 
LAF is an exception. Very early on, it found itself given the role of being a vector of national 
cohesion (“Making the Nation”), similar to the role assigned to the public school in France’s 
Third Republic. Since its founding in 1945, the army’s neutrality (al-jaysh al-muhayid) has 
been considered the unifying cement of the military institution and, beyond that, of the 
Lebanese nation itself. During the early years, General Chehab – a former officer of the troops 
of the French Mandate (French Forces of the Levant), an ardent Francophone and someone 
fascinated by the French military model – left his mark on the functioning of the LAF and its 
relationship with other state institutions (Barak, 2009). This Chehabist influence is so 
powerful that even today the military mythology remains mixed in with the mythology of 
Chehabism, which itself is part of the mythology of the nation:iii The Lebanese population 
frequently cites Chehab, the “father of the army” (Soubrier, 2013), as one of the founding 






Throughout the history of contemporary Lebanon, the military staff has advanced the notion 
that the army’s neutrality guarantees national sovereignty, produces social cohesion, and 
serves as the final rampart against the break-up of territorial unity. In 1958, even though 
Lebanese society was on the brink of civil war (Freiha, 1980; Barak 2009), the army refused 
to take sides. This neutrality allowed Chehab to be considered a genuine statesman; a few 
months later, he became president of the Lebanese Republic. In the 1990s, in the aftermath of 
the Taif Agreement that brought the civil war to an end, the army was petitioned to play a 
central role in the nation’s reconstruction:  
[I]n the ideological vacuum and the political disorder of the postwar period, the army 
quickly made it so that it was elevated into a national symbol of patriotism and 
integrity, which contrasted with the image of militia forces that had in the past been 
valued but finally ended up being despised, and also with that of non-Lebanese 
military officers in the country. (Dupont 1999, 66) 
 
In 2005, after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, while two hostile political 
camps (the pro-Syrian 8 March Alliance and the anti-Syrian 14 March Coalition), ready to 
resort to arms, squared off against each other, the army established a kind of cordon sanitaire 
so that the political conflict would not spiral into deadly violence. In May 2008, Hezbollah 
militia fighters entered Sunni neighbourhoods in downtown Beirut, which provoked a strong 
reaction from the 14 March Coalition (especially from the Sunnis, members of Saad Hariri’s 
Future Movementiv) and led to clashes that caused dozens of casualties, some fatal, among the 
Future partisans. The LAF high command decided not to choose sides in the conflict. Since 





the massive influx of refugees and the question of jihadist terrorism,– the high command of 
the LAF regularly delivered messages calling out against particularistic logics that insinuate 
themselves into the heart of the military institution, as well as in the heat of the political 
game: 
In more than one region, you have risen to the challenges, obstacles, and pressures 
aiming to force you off the accomplishment of your message; sometimes through 
political campaigns that have tried to affect your determination to protect your internal 
workings from external repercussions, sometimes by trying to affect the national 
immunity of military officers by provoking religious and confessional beliefs among a 
certain number of them with the goal of pushing them to adopt communitarian beliefs 
that serve neither the interest of the army nor that of all of the citizens. These 
desperate measures, whatever their results, are clearly destined to fail. The army will 
remain determined to preserving its structure in order to protect the soul of the martyrs 
and the hopes of the Lebanese people. (Direction de l’Orientation, 2012)  
 
Beyond the management of political and security crises, neutrality is also declared to be one 
of the sine qua non conditions of recruitment for the army:  
At the moment of enrolment, the candidate must resolve his or her transfer, and before 
being enrolled, the candidate must disengage, abrogate or suppress his or her 
affiliation to any party, association, or union, with the exception of professional 






However, to a large extent, the principle of army neutrality reiterated in regulatory 
institutional texts, official communiqués from the chief of staff, and public declarations from 
high military officials showcases a political mythology. In this sense, the issue is not so much 
a radical non-political behaviour but rather hyper-interventionist neutrality. From this point of 
view, the Chehabist period, which is presented as the golden age of the impartiality of state 
institutions in general and of the army in particular (Corm, 2003), more strongly points 
towards an ambivalent conception of army neutrality. Indeed, Chehab’s presidency, far from 
being synonymous with the retreat of the military institution from political life, was 
characterised by an important growth in the army’s intelligence apparatus (known as the 
“deuxième bureau”), which frequently intervened in politics and strengthened the security 
dynamics of “Lebanese democracy” through surveillance of political parties, interrogation of 
union leaders and civil society activists, restrictions on public liberties, and press censorship. 
For political scientist Oren Barak (2009, 53) the Chehabist management of public space 
belonged less to the promotion of military neutrality than to a neo-patrimonial mode of 
government, with President Chehab at times behaving like a traditional zaïm (leader), 
surrounded by young officers, the Chehab lieutenants. Calling attention to this historical fact 
puts into context the myth of the LAF’s “total neutrality” and underlines its recurrent 
interference in the country’s public life in the name of defending the national interest, without 
succumbing to the temptations of pretorianism (Cohen 2008b, 77). In Lebanon, the army 
never took over power in its own name.  
 






When it comes to the management of public speech, the LAF cuts a contrary figure to the 
French army. While about the French army it is often said that “the army does not speak, it 
marches” (Bois 1991, 523), about the LAFA one can symbolically turn the phrase so that it 
becomes “the army does not march, but it does talk.” Indeed, thanks to its strategic direction 
(moudiriyyat al-tawjîh), the LAF engages in relatively successful public communication, 
which in part consists of the classic propaganda of a political organisation and in part is made 
up of high-tech marketing by advertising agencies. At the outset, the bulletins of the 
moudiriyyat al-tawjîh were meant to broadcast internal institutional messages for important 
events or crises. Over time, however, these written notes from the commander in chief of the 
army transformed into real press releases reporting the institution’s positions and points of 
view for the public, the media, and political, union, and religious leaders.  
 
Colourful posters and banners regularly cover the urban landscape of Lebanese cities and 
villages with slogans that play up romantic, heroic, and patriotic registers: “From the heart of 
the family to that of the nation!”, “The dawn of martyrs is not absent!”, “[The military]’s hand 
brings people together!”, “Together we accomplish independence, together we come 
together!”, “Year after year, we continue to give!”, “Trust in the protecting steps of the 
nation!”, and “In the heart [of the country] and on the border!” Indeed, along with written 
communication, the strategic direction organises publicity campaigns several times a year to 
utilise giant or medium-sized posters depicting the privileged relationship between the army 
and the people (Dupont 1999). While it is difficult to measure the real impact of these 
propaganda campaigns on public opinion, it should be noted that ordinary citizens in Lebanon 





posters glorifying the military institutions are sometimes found on rear bumpers, shop 
windows, or the walls of personal residences. Following the changes in communication 
techniques, the army has more recently cooperated with Lebanon’s leading telephone 
companies (Alfa and Touch) to develop support campaigns for soldiers through text 
messages, which are sent directly to the inboxes of hundreds of thousands of subscribers.  
 
But without a doubt the most noteworthy event is Army Day on August 1. In Lebanon, this is 
a public holiday just as important in the official calendar as Independence Day on November 
22. These two events are sometimes mixed together for a number of Lebanese citizens, 
because Army Day is celebrated as a moment of national unity and as a patriotic 
commemoration, leading to popular mobilisations that will be analysed in the following 
section (Bois 1991). Unlike most countries, where the anniversary of the founding of the army 
is either not celebrated in any particular way or perceived as a social obligation (for military 
regimes), different sectors of society appropriate this anniversary in Lebanon. At a local level, 
it is not rare to see mayors and municipal councils organise public festivities and put up 
banners honouring the armed forces. 
 
This portrait of the army’s public communications would be incomplete if it did not refer to 
the martyrology that, in Lebanon, plays a major role in social life: In every locality, 
neighbourhood, village, or city, and on the outskirts of the headquarters of large public, 
political, and partisan organisations, one can see portraits of the martyrs (shahid) from 
different conflicts (Chaïb 2011). In Lebanon there is a kind of competition in martyrology, 





not free from this competition: The portraits of military martyrs are regularly put up on the 
walls of Lebanese towns. On its Internet site, the army scrupulously details the number of 
soldiers who fell in each conflict, along with their names, as if to compete with other 
organisations and to remind them that the army has a monopoly on legitimate violence and, 
by extension, on legitimate martyrdom.vi Even if this competition in martyrology is fought 
with Hezbollah (Chaïb 2014), the army is the only national organisation capable of reuniting 
all Lebanese in a patriotic commemoration with unanimist overtones: “The commemoration 
of fallen soldiers, by naming camps and courses after publishing their biographies, aimed to 
instil the values of heroism and sacrifice and portray the army as one large family” (Barak 
2009, 39). In this sense, the social function of the army’s martyrology aims to strengthen the 
primacy of the military institution over other social sectors of the society and to restate the 
belief that it is the only real representative of the national interest.  
 
The Army and Social Mobilisations in Postwar Lebanon 
 
It may seem surprising at first to consider the army as a major actor in social mobilisations, 
because observers and specialists of the military institution mainly represent it as being “in 
the background” of street movements and popular protests. In the Lebanese context, however, 
it makes sense to adopt such an analytical viewpoint: firstly, because the LAF articulates a 
discourse on the state, democracy, and society that may provoke feedback effects in the public 
space; and secondly, because the army is very visible in public demonstrations as an agent of 
order, playing a repressive role just as important as the one played by other security corps 





al-Bared turning point in May 2007, the military institution has been the subject of a “public 
cult,” which has taken the form of “pro-army” demonstrations.viii In this sense, the LAF 
should be treated as a leading actor in the postwar socio-political mobilisations.  
 
The Army and Social Movements: A Feared and Respected Repressive Actor  
 
A majority of social scientists and experts have advanced the idea of hazy borders between 
the different security corps of the state (Belkin and Schofer 2005; Picard 2008), with the 
rising privatisation and internationalisation in managing security being collateral phenomena. 
Unlike “garrison states” and military regimes from the “developmentalist” period (1960–80), 
the exercise of legitimate violence is no longer the preserve of a single force but is shared 
between different security corps that are sometimes rivals and sometimes work together 
(Belkin and Shofer 2004; Picard 2008). In Lebanon, the tendency of dispersing and 
uncoupling the use of public force is reinforced by legislation and regulations that give the 
army police powers just as expansive as the ones held by other security forces. This situation 
is not new. Since the early years of independence, as Oren Barak (2009, 51–62) notes, the 
LAF has been called upon to play the role of mediator and referee in the major political, 
social and tribal conflicts that shook the country. After the civil war, this role as intermediary 
was confirmed and even consolidated by the Taif Agreement (1989–90): “the essential task of 
the armed forces is the defence of the country, and, as the case may be, the defence of public 







In this sense, it is not in any way unusual for the army to have police functions and maintain 
order: These tasks are part of the primary missions of the LAF, in competition with or 
complementing other security forces. Far from being seen as a militarisation of the public 
space or a threat to democracy, the repressive role of the army has for the most part been 
“naturalised,” and even valued, by the majority of citizens. In Lebanon, the presence of the 
army’s khaki uniforms at public sites and during demonstrations tends to reassure the 
population thanks to its reputation for having more integrity and being more competent than 
other security corps that are thought to be more politicised, clientelist, and corrupt.ix However, 
the police mission given to the army is not without inconvenience: Despite its long tradition in 
mediating and refereeing internal affairs, the LAF is neither equipped nor trained for public 
order operations in the same way as the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS) or the 
mobilised gendarmerie in France (Monjardet 1988). As a result, during these operations, there 
are often problems that result in a number of victims within the army, as happened in June 
2013 when clashes between Salafists close to Sheikh Ahmad al-‘Asîr and army soldiers in the 
city of Sidon, the capital of southern Lebanon, caused a significant number of casualties on 
both sides.x 
 
Unlike the other actors, the army does not seem to be repressive. With some exceptions, the 
military institution is mainly spared public criticism, even from protesters.xi As paradoxical as 
it may appear, the military institution tends to draw a certain democratic, if not popular, 
legitimacy from its intervention in domestic affairs and its role in internal conflicts, notably in 
1958, and more recently in 2008, (inter-sectarian, intertribal, or political issues), escaping in 





army’s rising involvement in the fight against the jihadists at the Syria–Lebanon border 
seemed to have strengthened this popularity among large sectors of Lebanese society. The 
army’s high officers know all too well how to profit from this state of affairs; they reinforce 
their stature as public men and legitimate contenders to the supreme magistracy (political 
functions and the presidency of the republic). In the face of a tumultuous climate provoked by 
the threat of terrorist groups (Daesh and Jahbat al-Nosra), the army appears to be the 
institution that guarantees national unity.  
 
PUT Pictures about here 
 
 
Popular Pro-Army Demonstrations: Spontaneous or Inspired by Military Command?  
 
Lebanon is probably one of the few countries in the world where citizens organise popular 
demonstrations in honour of the army without the military institution or the government 
ordering them to do so. These “pro-army” rallies organised at symbolic sites like Martyrs’ 
Square or Sassine Square, or in front of the government’s Grand Serail building, are not 
uncommon: They take place on Army Day (August 1), but also during other circumstances, 
like the success of a military operation, the death or wounding of combat soldiers, the 
kidnapping of soldiers, or a devastating attack on the army. These rallies usually bring 
together several thousand people and are choreographed following an elaborate scenography 
that is repeated over the years: For the event, women dress as soldiers; the more pious among 





tattooed on their cheeks or shoulders. Children and teenagers also wear imitation military 
uniforms and sometimes even carry plastic guns. The men, flexing their chests, brandish large 
white flags with the colours of various LAF arms (crossed swords for the army, the anchor for 
the navy, and wings for the air force) surrounded by laurel and the cedars of Lebanon. At the 
forefront of the rally is the motto “honour, sacrifice, loyalty.” At the same time, loudspeakers 
several thousand megawatts strong blast out patriotic songs dedicated to the military 
institution: the “Army Anthem” by the Fleifel brothers, Nahnou al Jounoud (“We Are 
Soldiers”), Al Majd (“Glory”), Inna Loubnanou Lana (“Lebanon Belongs to Us”), “The 
Martyrs’ Hymn”, etc. At the centre of the rally, a large stage is erected. One after another, 
well-known journalists, famous actors, popular singers, leaders of civil society, and religious 
leaders (Maronite, Catholic and Greek-Orthodox priests, imams, patriarchs, and sheikhs) take 
to the stage to say how much they value the LAF and the sacrifices it makes to defend the 
country. In this patriotic scenography, nothing is left up to chance: The speeches are adroitly 
orchestrated to accommodate religious and communitarian feelings and to reinforce the idea 
that the entirety of the Lebanese people supports the army.  
 
A Consolidation of Popular Support for the Army?  
 
These popular “pro-army” rallies were resurrected after the dramatic events in the Nahr al-
Bared Palestinian camp close to Tripoli in May 2007, during which hundreds of soldiers were 
killed while fighting the radical Islamist group Fatah al-Islam. This episode can be interpreted 





institutional crisis, it contributed to consolidating the legitimacy and the popularity of the 
army for large sectors of Lebanese society:  
For the first time in their history, the Lebanese people are unanimous when it comes to 
the national role of the army, as can be seen by citizens with different political and 
religious affiliations rallying around the army, offering it their support in the discharge 
of its national missions, just like the support of Palestinian brothers expressed by all of 
the leaders of the Palestinian parties, who are at the side of the army and have rejected 
this abnormal phenomenon that harms our brothers, the Palestinian people, and their 
just cause – all this definitively ensures that this operation will not affect the other 
camps.(Direction de l’Orientation, 2007) 
 
More recently, since 2013–14, the kidnapping and decapitation of soldiers by Syrian jihadist 
groups have raised emotional responses in the country, and a number of rallies in support of 
these “martyrs of the army” and their families have taken place. Yet these mobilisations have 
been relatively limited in terms of the number of people involved; the average number of 
people taking to the streets is around several thousand people (between 2,000 and 5,000). 
Furthermore, with the exception of several public personalities, religious leaders, and political 
party activists, it seems that these demonstrations have mainly been led by the relatives of the 
kidnapped and assassinated soldiers – mothers, wives, widows, children, and extended 
family.xiii  
 
The military hierarchy has adopted an ambivalent position with regard to these popular “pro-





respect the public order, dissuading Lebanese citizens and political actors from taking to the 
street, even when they are expressing their support for the army. On the other hand, the 
military hierarchy is happy with these popular campaigns, because they strengthen the army’s 
social standing and status as an opinion leader, in conformity with its tradition of 
interventionist neutrality: In the face of the permanent deficiency of public institutions and the 
recurrent failings of the political class, the army is determined to consolidate its image as the 
final rampart of Lebanese democracy (Iskandar 2002). In the context of socio-political crisis, 
amplified by the aftershocks of the Syrian conflict, the myth of neutrality is stronger than ever 
and gives the army the role of providing “national reassurance”: The LAF reassures and 
delivers. Nevertheless, its popularity is far from being homogeneous and uniform throughout 
the national territory: In some sectors of Lebanese society, such as the Sunni pro-Syrian 
rebellion circles, the crisis in Syria has given rise to doubts and criticisms concerning the 





Most of the social science research on the LAF oscillates between two opposing 
representations. On the one hand, the military institution is considered from the point of view 
that it is a sociological exception (the army as a sanctuary). This view reproduces the 
discourse of social actors by taking the myth of the “most popular” institution of the country 
at face value and by valuing the army’s pretense of “neutrality”, which distinguishes it from 





about the “popularity” of the LAF: It is, in large part, a political and ideological construction 
produced by a long-term voluntary action from the LAF command. This creates a permanent 
reactivation of the Chehabist mythology of an impartial army, supposedly above the fray of 
political institutions. On the other hand, a number of writings tend to see the army in the 
context of its structural fragility and its inability to detach itself from the rest of society, 
permanently sapped, like other Lebanese public institutions, by religious, communitarian, and 
inner dynamics. In this sense, the weakness of the army is part of the weakness of the 
Lebanese state: “Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness.” Thus, a weak state necessarily has a 
weak army (“picture book army”), and this is even more true when its actions and 
development are limited by international actors (the United States refuses to allow a strong 
LAF in order for Israel not to feel threatened) and national actors (Hezbollah challenging its 
monopoly of legitimate violence) (Geisser 2013; Lutz 2014). 
 
My analysis transcends this double representation (the army as an exception versus the army 
as a weakness) in order to place the LAF in its socio-historical context and to display the 
interactions between the military institution and other sectors of Lebanese society over a long 
period of time (1945–2015). Thus, instead of obsessively verifying the “true nature” of the 
LAF’s popularity (a quasi-impossible task for a sociologist and, in any case, besides the 
point), this chapter has shown how the political myth of the army’s neutrality has produced 
visible social effects in terms of mobilisation and counter-mobilisations, as well as social 
legitimacy. It is not the least of paradoxes that the “popular demand for the army” in Lebanon 
in the 2010s expresses not so much a militarisation of society but rather a claim for greater 





military institution has been reinforced over the past few years in the context of a crisis of 
legitimacy of state institutions at an internal level and because of a geopolitical threat (the 
Syrian conflict and jihadist terrorism) at a regional one. More than ever before, the army 
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A large number of people working in the NGO sectors, broadly defined under the heading of 
“emergency”, are currently operating in the Middle East. A look at either conventional 
welfare services or emergency assistance poses the challenge of identifying a clear-cut line of 
separation between emergency and non-emergency agencies and programmes. In the case of 
Lebanon, what is the “official state of emergency” in a country that has historically witnessed 
a continuous transit of regional refugees, and in which internal displacement and refugee 
crises have reached chronic proportions? 
 
The recurring states of emergency resulting from a cycle of internal displacement, produced 
by warfare and regional refugee influxes (primarily Syrians, Iraqis, Sudanese, and 
Palestinians), have compelled local systems of (non-)state governance to deal with the 
international humanitarian apparatus that rushed over to provide relief. External intervention 
therefore causes local systems of care to reshape their welfare schemes, and to mobilise social 
and economic resources more rapidly in order to meet the growing needs of local 






In spite of historical incapacity on the part of the state, Lebanon does have well-developed 
service provision in the communities (Jawad 2007). In this chapter I will use welfare as a 
screen on which to project a larger understanding of human relations, identification processes, 
and social frictions in Beirut’s southern suburbs (known as Dahiye), where the international 
humanitarian technocracy, which has mostly been assisting the resident population since the 
July War of 2006, has turned its emergency programmes into long-term or “normal” welfare 
services.  
 
Dahiye is a large assemblage of neighbourhoods where life is constantly reorganised in 
relation to new or expected emergencies. It is traditionally known for being abandoned by the 
state, but also for having a well-developed network of community services mostly started by 
the major Shii party Hezbollah. Such a wide assistance network, especially during the 1990s 
(Harb 2010), practically established a social contract between local authorities and citizens 
that was almost non-existent in Lebanon at the national level. Foreign agencies further funded 
local welfare in Dahiye after Israel’s war on Lebanon in July 2006.  
 
At present, Dahiye’s social setting and systems of care are being reshaped in response to the 
Syrian refugees who have relocated there over the past five years. In this context, what 
happens in Dahiye on a societal level when international humanitarian organisations turn their 
emergency relief programmes into long-term systems of care? How have local welfare 
regimes changed with regard to their established relationship with international assistance and 
humanitarian action? And what impact does the longstanding and community-oriented 






While there is a vast body of literature on policy making and resource allocation related to 
confessional communities (Fawaz 2005; Jawad 2007; Harb 2010), the politicisation of welfare 
(Cammett 2014; Ben Nefissa et al. 2005), and the role of religion in welfare associations 
during and after Lebanon’s Civil War, the grey areas between everyday welfare and 
emergency states have been under-researched. So where on the settled/unsettled continuum is 
the critical line?  
 
Emergency has generally been studied in relation to humanitarianism, refugee regimes, and 
“states of exception” (Agamben 2008). Similarly, in the recent literature on humanitarianism 
in the Middle East (Feldman 2012), aid has increasingly been studied as a triggering factor for 
identity (de)constructions and as a source of ethnic or confessional frictions. In this regard, 
aid does not appear to differ from welfare. The tireless Lebanese search for an efficient state 
is nothing but a request for secured welfare, and, in the case of earlier refugees, an efficient 
entity able to provide protection and assistance. Likewise, both citizens and de facto refugees 
– not legally recognised as such in Lebanon, because the country is not a signatory to the 
1951 Geneva Convention – expect the state to recognise them as civic and political agents, 
and to enable them to achieve their rights. 
 
In a similar vein, welfare goes beyond service provision: It should rather be conceived as a 
lens through which to interpret people’s desires, privileges, individual and collective 
identifications, human relations, and feelings. In addition, welfare has always been an 





Hariri and Salam (the former founded the Hariri Foundation, and the latter established the 
Makasîd Foundation), which provide services to segments of the local population. The rivalry 
between the two families, born out of politics, subsequently turned to welfare competition 
(Karam 2006). However, welfare not only comprises political and ideological work: It is also 
able to shape the relations between service recipients. 
 
This study intends to draw on semi-structured interviews carried out between 2011 and 2013 
with service providers from the municipalities in Dahiye – mainly Haret Hreik, ash-Shiyyah, 
and al-Ghobeiry – and 20 local and international organisations operating in the suburbs during 
and prior to the Syrian crisis. In order to identify continuities and discrepancies between times 
of emergency and relative stability, I interviewed a sample of 30 people, mostly comprising 
local residents and longstanding migrant communities who are beneficiaries of social 
assistance, as well as earlier and more recent refugees.  
 
First, this chapter will assess the “social orders” that the humanitarian and social systems of 
care seek to achieve in a bid to maintain stability and guarantee their practices. How do these 
ideal social orders differ from each other, and where do they intersect? And how do these two 
systems co-exist, rival each other, or merge together? Second, unearthing how social and 
emergency policies have been changing in Dahiye will shed light on how this hybrid 
transnational governance – constituted by international and local, state and non-state agencies 
– is influencing the way in which the beneficiaries voice their self-perceptions, and how their 
identification processes are experienced; and, consequently, how this governance manages 





discussing the interplay between social order and identification from the beneficiaries’ 
perspective, this chapter will assess the possibilities of nationhood in Lebanon, where the 
lives of earlier refugees and local communities are becoming increasingly enmeshed, although 
their beneficiary statuses and hierarchical systems of service provision are defined in different 
ways.   
 
Social Policy and Humanitarianism on a Line of Continuity  
The qualitative exploration of the intersection between non-emergency and emergency 
policies, which is the aim of this chapter, highlights the changing politics of vulnerability and 
its societal effects, often unheeded in Lebanon’s narratives of human agency and care. The 
salient points of this intersection run through the three main themes of human relations and 
feelings, social order, and the construction of nationhood. 
 
While welfare has always symbolised community engagement and community accountability 
in Lebanon’s history, humanitarian aid increasingly became a strategy to show the impartial 
humanity of political parties and domestic communities (Carpi 2014). On the one hand, 
humanitarian assistance covers social and political problems with food aid (Agier 2010); on 
the other hand, local welfare in Lebanon is charity-oriented and not aimed at eradicating 
poverty and human hardships, nor leading to material transformations. The traditional 
approach of Lebanese welfare providers can thus be defined as mainly palliative to social 
grievance, while the central state abdicates its responsibility to end poverty and misery within 
its own boundaries (Jawad 2009; Das and Davidson 2011). Indeed, the role of the Lebanese 





over resource equality (Jawad 2007). Since apolitical international humanitarianism has never 
pursued reforms and changes in the societies of intervention, neither of the two systems of 
care proactively stimulates social change; instead, they preserve the balance that is vital to 
their own survival. 
 
Emergency-driven humanitarianism and social policy emphasise human well-being, they 
share the morals of empathy and solidarity in the name of collective identity, and they assign 
a moral value to their work. Likewise, both share a paternalistic approach to beneficiaries by 
taking mercy on a necessarily selected number of recipients. In this way, both systems in 
Lebanon pursue the preservation of a diversely conceived social order: The former relies on 
the imperative ethics of political neutrality and the latter on political accountability as a way 
to achieve social stability and secured welfare. Lebanon has become an example of a territory 
in which the “catastrophisation of political life” (Vazquez-Arroyo 2013) takes place. Lax 
states try to enhance their accountability during the state of emergency: their consequent need 
for assistance motivates the governors to adopt measures of depoliticisation in an effort to 
uphold stability and social order in a country on the brink of what could become much 
“worse”. 
 
Unlike the central state, longstanding community services have cultivated the trust of citizens 
over the years in compliance with societal compartmentalisation. Once an emergency is 
declared, non-emergency policies co-exist with humanitarian emergency programmes, which 
lack social accountability because of their ad hoc approach (Belloni 2005; Fassin 2007; 






Ultimately, the two systems of human agency and care are cultivated in the bosom of the 
Lebanese culture of “familism” (Khalaf 2002), that is to say the personal and vertical nature 
of the patron-client network also embedded in the Lebanese family unit’s social pattern. In 
fact, local welfare associations are generally created through a genealogy of kinship and 
clientelism. This also shows how emergency-driven humanitarianism, although initiated by 
the West and a colonial past, still needs to comply with local patterns in order to gain access 
to territories and be effective in practice.  
 
The Sisyphean Cycle of Resourcefulness/lessness in Lebanon  
Emergency is normally meant as a transitional state following a harmful event that is caused 
by human action (usually warfare) or a natural disaster and disrupts ordinary life. In such 
circumstances, urgent interventions are viewed as desirable and self-legitimising given that 
infrastructures, lives, environment, and health are all heavily damaged by unpredictable 
events. Nonetheless, the notion of emergency often implies muddled and predictable 
processes, instead of what the NGOs’ simplistic language suggests (Calhoun 2008). 
 
In the wake of large- and small-scale armed conflicts, popular protests and requests for 
economic reforms and political freedom, the Middle Eastern region has had to cope with a 
massive influx of refugees, especially from Syria. In times of emergency, humanitarian 
governance – formed by domestic and international non-governmental apparatuses, also 
named “non-governmental government” (Fassin 2007) – acts in the name of “moral 





intervening in the conflict-ridden territories out of compassion. Such intervention generally 
occurs in economically and politically volatile states where governmental institutions do not 
have sufficient resources to cope with emergency crises, whether endemic or as the result of a 
neighbouring country’s spillover. 
 
The neoliberal phenomenon of NGOisation takes shape in the massive intervention of non-
state providers. The popular demands advanced for social assistance and nationalisation of 
services over the past five years in the Middle Eastern and North African regions are vested 
with moral purposes that, in practice, seek to justify and strengthen the very neoliberal 
orientation (Hanieh 2015). Although non-state organisations still need the approval of local 
authorities to intervene, they often become the de facto statehood of the targeted territory in 
terms of political and technical decision-making. Such non-state entities therefore contribute 
to the phenomenon of “catastrophisation” or “emergencisation” (Ophir 2010; Vazquez-
Arroyo 2013), according to which emergency-driven programmes become a modality of 
governance and a proliferating professional sector. 
 
The Sisyphean cycle that is identifiable throughout various historical periods is the 
transformation of humanitarian programmes into long-term development projects, when 
“emergency” becomes an ordinary instrument of social policy, and the state further burdens 
non-state welfare actors with tackling emergency crises. The transformational stages of social 
policy in Lebanon from and to humanitarianism have gone underexplored, as they have 






In the process of “emergencising” societies, most of the changes that have occurred in times 
of emergency are actually identifiable and isolable (Calhoun 2008, 18) and certainly not a 
product of fate. Hence, the humanitarian structure’s ad hoc approach is shaped by the cyclical 
need to turn itself into long-term development programmes and integrate pre-existing welfare 
regimes in order not to abandon the territory of intervention. For example, large international 
organisations, which seek to remain anonymous in this study, first came to assist the war-
stricken population in the July 2006 war and then started long-term projects in Dahiye in the 
postwar period. A large part of their funds has been redirected towards aid for Syrian refugees 
in the wake of the 2011 Syrian political crisis. According to 15 out of 20 international and 
local NGOs interviewed in Dahiye between 2011 and 2013, this reallocation of funds caused a 
sudden interruption of some of their projects in order to meet the requests of their donors, who 
mostly wanted to prioritise emergency needs and repurpose their funds accordingly. 
 
Furthermore, five local NGOs asserted that, in the wake of an emergency, the cooperation 
with international NGOs allegedly strengthens new welfare systems. However, whenever 
these international NGOs tackle new refugee and displacement crises, they tailor their 
services to emergency-driven needs. Such actors prioritise newly occurring emergencies by 
implementing adhocratici programmes, taking the resources that were initially meant to 
reinforce the non-emergency system, and therefore causing a cyclical weakening of the latter. 
As a result, in a bid to survive, most local welfare regimes also address short-term needs and 
comply with the ethical tyranny of emergencies, while they give up on eradicating endemic 
poverty and deprivation and struggle to develop long-term plans. In so doing, these local 





abandoning their initial purpose of improving the condition of chronically vulnerable people 
who are not the “protagonists” of the new emergencies.  
 
In the cycle described above, social policy and humanitarian policy evidently take on a 
blurred character. A deeper exploration of this interface is relevant to understand to what 
extent social welfare regimes influence external emergency programmes, and vice versa. 
Exploring political and historical probabilities is a crucial factor to avert human hardships, 
contrary to the humanitarian priority of alleviating suffering, rescuing lives, and preventing a 
greater catastrophe. 
 
“Social Orders” in Lebanon 
Within this framework, and in order to implement their practices, the international 
humanitarian apparatus and normal welfare agencies seek to maintain a social order that suits 
their agendas. The contribution of service provision to the preservation of social order plays 
an important role in maintaining stability, guaranteeing practices, and complying with the 
political agendas that allow for implementation. So, how do these ideal social orders differ 
from and intersect with each other? How do these two systems of care co-exist, compete, or 
merge? 
 
Humanitarianism has traditionally sought to uphold human security, namely the social 
protection of the emergency victims. Meanwhile, “Western” social policy thinkers are moving 





“citizen capital” (skills, freedoms, and competences) become more significant than social 
protection (Wood, 2004). This is where the perspectives of the two systems of care coincide. 
 
However, complex dynamics point to an ephemeral balance between the different inhabitants 
of the (post)humanitarian space. After the July War of 2006, the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) started the ArtGold project in Dahiye in partnership with local 
municipalities – the first-ever cooperation between Hezbollah and the United Nations. 
ArtGold was aimed at enhancing municipal health care in the war-torn Beirut periphery. As a 
result, Dahiye’s municipalities largely upgraded their services through cooperation with 
international donors who funded the local welfare system.  
 
Nonetheless, the legacies of the international humanitarian assistance in postwar Dahiye can 
be defined in terms of solipsism and technocracy. In this regard, a UNDP officer argued:ii  
 
 The leaders require our detachment from domestic politics and provision of technical 
skills to their area. This is an excellent way of maintaining balance. […] In return for 
this cooperation, the UNDP gained the reputation of being democratic, flexible, and 
cooperative by also including Hezbollah. We’re all winners out of this collaboration, 
although we’ve often been reduced to the role of donors due to administrative 
totalitarianism.  
 
Here, the social order that the municipal governor desires seems to prevail, while UNDP 





international accountability while having no impact on the local community, which rather 
identifies new benefits insofar as their own municipalities are able to provide them, as the 
interviews with the beneficiaries proved.  
 
Maliha as-Sadr,iii head of the Imam Sadr Foundation, points to an interesting discrepancy 
between the purpose of international humanitarianism and the goals of the local charity 
organisations, which developed a specific notion of humanitarianism: “Humanitarianism for 
us is like welfare. It is charity, aimed at equality and empowerment. As such, it must be a 
continuous effort.” Welfare, charity, and humanitarianism have therefore become synonyms. 
This process blurs the lines between emergency and relative peacetime. This particular 
account stresses the solipsism and the ephemeral character of the international aid industry in 
Dahiye during the war in July 2006, and it highlights the difference between local and 
international notions of humanitarianism, consisting the latter in intervening in emergency 
states only. In this context, social orders that emerge in different temporal frames end up 
rivalling each other. 
 
The short-term effort of international humanitarianism and the ad hoc character of assistance 
in postwar Dahiye stood in stark contrast to the local way of facing adversity: guaranteeing 
services in everyday life. Thus, the international approach to aid provision failed in not 
viewing the July War as an event on a historical continuum. In this regard, Kamel Mohanna, 






The UNDP and the ‘West’ came here in 2006 only to control Hezbollah through 
humanitarianism. When humanitarian actors are at risk during wartime, you guys are 
the first ones to dash out. Westerners are all tourists. […] We’ve been taking care of 
Lebanon since 1976! 
 
He mentioned the “humanitarian scandal” when 55 UN officials and some workers from the 
International Committee of the Red Cross left during the war, because they believed Israel 
would destroy Hezbollah in three days. The departure of the UNDP ended up triggering 
greater internal mistrust towards the international aid industry and worsening the uncertainty 
already caused by warfare. On the same note, ‘Ali, a young man from ash-Shiyyah,v said: 
“Nothing dies if coming from inside. Corruption has increased because of the presence of the 
foreigners.” 
 
The social order that is desired is unlikely to be distinguished from the social order that is 
simply accepted by international humanitarianism in order to survive and continue carrying 
out its tasks on the ground. Technocracy and social solipsism define humanitarian 
intervention in postwar Dahiye, which, as seen, still ensured that the local governors received 
major credit and popular recognition for the betterment of local systems of care.  
 
Welfare as a Screen of Relations, Feelings, and Identifications  
Lebanese communities often rely on informal networks to access services, secure their needs, 





survival, without producing tangible and significant material transformations. In the long run, 
this model is oriented towards shaping and limiting the will of the people. 
 
Amid the international humanitarians assisting refugee newcomers, people are responding to 
the emergencisation of their own territory, policy changes, and the presence of the new aid 
industry rather than to emergencies per se. Assistance regimes include or exclude particular 
social groups according to their political agenda and the primary humanitarian purpose that 
attracts the most funds. These new exclusions and inclusions tend to generate local frictions 
(Polman 2011), resilience, crises of identification (Feldman 2012), or gratitude and allegiance 
among the (non-)beneficiaries.vi  
 
For instance, while Dahiye’s local middle and upper classes have come out of war more 
empowered in gentrified districts thanks to Hezbollah’s reconstruction and compensation 
strategies (Harithy 2010), the earlier refugees who resettled in the suburbs because of the 
cheap cost of living found themselves back on the bottom level of the assistance hierarchy 
once the Syrian refugees started pouring into Lebanon to flee violence and destruction. The 
refocusing of services towards a new “emergency cause” exemplifies how an assistance 
regime can be the source of societal conflict once the social space returns to being 
humanitarian. On the one hand, local communities in Dahiye have historically been neglected 
by state service providers and then excellently assisted by an articulated network of developed 
community services. On the other hand, refugees from longer ago – mostly Sudanese and 
Iraqis who had relocated to Lebanon in the early 2000s – brought about a Dahiye of ageing 





emergency products but are no longer referred to as such. Instead, they are tackled as 
beneficiaries of a flawed welfare, even while they continue to lack the means for survival. 
 
Nevertheless, some of the international and local emergency programmesvii targeting Syrian 
newcomers in Dahiye have gradually included the local population – in particular in the 
Palestinian camp of Shatila – by designing projects for different segments of residents. 
Education and cultural services for the Palestinians have been enhanced because of the 
Palestinian refugees from Syria in the neighbourhood. These moves were basically aimed at 
stifling local dissent towards the emergency-driven providers and the newcomers, and to 
manage instability. In summary, emergencisation is overshadowing the catastrophic 
conditions of everyday life in the country that have become routine (Vazquez-Arroyo 2013): a 
mix of chronic vulnerability and ageing emergencies. 
 
In this scenario, social policy and humanitarianism emerge as patterns of expression of local 
solidarity, empathy, moral obligation, disaffection, frictions, or moral adherence to a given 
socio-ethical system, in relation to official or silenced states of emergency. The construction 
of the emergency state affects local governance and normal policy making in a complex way. 
The constructive character of the notion of emergency (Calhoun 2008) served the purpose of 
rethinking vulnerability in the Lebanese areas where normal welfare for segments of the local 
population – citizensviii and refugees – is sometimes less than the aid provided to refugee 
newcomers.  
The central state and several non-state aid providers tend to overlook the heterogeneity of the 





compliance with their own political interests. As a result, those who are officially vulnerable 
in Lebanon – refugees, migrants or citizens – are those whose care feeds the political 
accountability of different political and humanitarian actors. Anything outside their political 
agenda is not considered “humanisable” (Carpi 2015). 
 
Within this framework, providers end up changing the beneficiaries’ self-perception of their 
own identity, status in society, and their political subjectivity rather than producing real, 
material transformations. For example, Bilal, an Iraqi refugeeix who resettled in Haret Hreik in 
2005, mentioned that he was now receiving free computer classes. However, he was still 
unable to purchase food and other goods, just like when he first arrived in Lebanon. What was 
the sense of making him employable in Lebanese society as a refugee produced by an ageing 
emergency and, as such, no longer entitled to the same aid as the Syrian newcomers? The 
purpose of the service provider – delivering computer classes – is to engage with the 
beneficiary’s subjectivity by making him a viable part of the “host” society. This anecdote 
illustrates how the basic needs of older emergency refugees persist, as well as how few 
tangible changes (post)humanitarian providers have actually made on the ground. Such ageing 
emergencies, like the experiences of the Sudanese and the Iraqis in Lebanon, should in fact be 
studied as unresolved political crises.  
 
The dyad between the subjectivity of the beneficiaries versus living conditions provides 
insight into how welfare systems end up changing the perception of people’s well-being rather 





sighted development is rescaled to a minimum whenever international security needs to be 
protected during threatening emergencies.  
 
In this context, what is the understanding that people have about welfare and aid? Accounts 
collected from long-time refugees residing in Dahiye indicate what it means to be the product 
of an ageing emergency that goes forgotten. Aid, as well as normal welfare assistance, 
becomes something that is “owed” to recipients. Welfare becomes something that you either 
morally deserve or do not. In this regard, Rajaa,x an Iraqi refugee from Basra, said:  
 
We deserve those services much more than the displaced Lebanese in 2006. 
Assistance is owed to us, although all NGOs pretend they’re assisting us for free. […] 
With our blood and our petrol we already paid for all of this thousands of times! 
 
The tyranny of emergency and the frustration of the ageing emergency’s subjects are evident 
in the words of Qais,xi an Iraqi refugee from Baghdad: “The internationals are greedy for new 
emergencies. And we’ve become nothing now.”  
 
Welfare provision entails hierarchical relations that are also experienced as tools of racial 
discrimination. Khaldoun,xii a Sudanese refugee from al-Khartoum, recounted: 
  
For Iraqi refugees, things are better, because they look pretty much like the Lebanese. 
And when they arrived, they obtained much more than we did. We Sudanese have a 






This account illustrates the hierarchical nature of assistance regimes in Lebanon, and how the 
subject experiences services as compartmentalised along ethnic lines and as racialising 
relationships and human struggles. This shows how refugees living in Lebanon have 
ethnicised their grievance and express their frustration about ageing emergencies and the 
decreasing assistance they receive as a result. This ethnicisation is leading to what has 
commonly been called – and feared in the international media – the “Palestinisation” of the 
Iraqi (and now the Syrian) issue. 
 
Welfare is also experienced as an asset gained through privileged status in politically marked 
spaces, generally inhabited by homogenous social groups who are ready to pledge allegiance 
to local parties. Fatma, a young Lebanese girl living in the slum of Hay al-Gharbe, said:xiii 
“Hezbollah enriches just a few families. We’ve never been the protagonists of the July War, 
and we’re still here waiting for someone to come and help us.” The illegal settlement of Hay 
al-Gharbe never appears in Dahiye’s official geography, and it has attracted an ethnically and 
religiously diverse population (mostly Dom community members and migrant workers from 
Asia and Africa). The existence of this slum proves how less politically marked spaces in 
Lebanon benefit from neither state nor non-state services. This situation occurs when local 
providers guarantee assistance to their constituencies or aim to enlarge them, and on the 
grounds that international providers partially act in areas of political interests.  
 
Hay al-Gharbe’s welfare provision ranks lower than that of the neighbouring Shatila camp, 





Refugees (UNRWA) services. Fatma’s words highlight how Dahiye’s “spotted” poverty is 
shaped by identity politics, and not only by socio-economic factors and structural poverty. 
Even if Iraqi, Palestinian, and Sudanese refugees cannot gain a legal status that acknowledges 
their vulnerability as refugees, they are still classified as de facto suitable for aid, unlike the 
Lebanese who have been left behind without access to the assistance regime (Carpi 2015).  
 
In gentrified districts, providers also use welfare as an instrument of political accountability 
and constituency enlargement. A Lebanese girl in Haret Hreik, for example, complained about 
the local municipalities abandoning needy people, unlike before the July War. Rania,xiv a 
Lebanese shop assistant, had a similar story: “Now, if you don’t have someone among your 
family members who is a martyr or is wounded because of one of Hezbollah’s wars, you’re 
screwed. They’re all charity services for particular categories, to show that the party is 
engaged and stuff like that.” 
 
By a similar token, despite the clear sense of territorial ownership among local citizens, a 
close connection between non-dominant ideas and the lack of assistance has emerged. The 
following account shows how welfare sometimes means political affiliation and recognition 
of the dominant social ethos in urban spaces. According to Ahmadxv: “Here, if you don’t fit 
[Hezbollah’s Islamic] Resistance [against Israel], you are alone, on your own. They take back 
from you what you’ve been given during times of war.” 
 
It becomes evident how ageing and new emergencies start to rival each other with the 





sometimes ethnic and community-oriented - to meet assistance. On the grounds of the 
empirical evidence provided, welfare and humanitarian aid trigger similar individual 
processes of identification and feelings. 
 
What are the Grounds for Nationhood?  
The ways in which social orders, people’s relations, feelings, and identifications interplay 
with each other in relation to the provision of services in an unsettled scenario leave open 
inquiries on the role of nationhood in Lebanon, where the lives of long-time refugees and 
local communities are enmeshed, as are the beneficiary categories they represent to their 
systems of care.   
 
Abused narratives of state weakness and passivity in Lebanon have side-lined important 
political questions, such as how services, despite the state’s abdication of its responsibilities, 
are experienced in relation to social and civic status and feelings of belonging. While 
numerous solutions are traditionally proposed in international peace building to strengthen 
state institutions, the way in which different societal components relate to each other beyond 
religious and ethnic definitions on the basis of aid and welfare provision is a relatively little-
travelled terrain. Moreover, classical conceptions of state building are not a standardisable 
response to such an independently developed network of community-oriented services. The 
Iraqi case has shown how state building, when employed as a means of peace building, can 






While Lebanon lacks a “public state” that provides assistance (Mouawad 2015), state 
governors remain the primary policy makers. Informal and fragmented statehoods across 
Lebanon secure or deny services to different groups. The phenomenon generates social 
frictions, because the provision of services and the protection of privileges cannot be evenly 
secured. The NGOisation of Lebanon contributes considerably to an undermining of the 
public state by further compartmentalising the functioning of community services. Unlike the 
central state, welfare organisations are only involved in service provision and advocacy, and 
not much at a policy-making level (Jawad, 2007) . Consequently, welfare, as an assertive 
statehood, is like a luxury for which single individuals need a mediating agency to ensure 
their access to benefits and services.  
 
States normally acquire legitimacy through their demonstrated ability to support essential 
resources, regardless of class, caste, race, ethnicity, or creed. This legitimacy is missing in 
Lebanese society because of the government apparatus’s lack of accountability, and the 
generalised disaffection towards social welfare and humanitarian providers, which was 
observed during fieldwork. The sectarian structure of the political system certainly entails the 
partisan character of service provision and the consequent conception of assistance regime as 
a token of privilege. 
 
Welfare and aid seem to pursue diverse social orders yet curb the cohesion and feelings of 
belonging to seamless collectivities that generally define nationhood. A compartmentalisation 
of services – historically developed along confessional and ethnic lines in Lebanon and 





has been adopted to better manage and discipline the different societal components. The 
official declaration of emergency, in response to the Sisyphean cycle of resources described 
above, triggers rivalry and sentiments of deprivation rather than generating “strategic 
essentialisation” (Spivak 1996), in which heterogeneous groups – Sudanese, Iraqi, Palestinian, 
Syrian refugees, migrant workers from Asian and African countries, and local citizens – 
would present themselves as a single bloc despite internal differences during times of 
uncertainty and common struggle. Such a compartmentalisation typically serves the purpose 
of governors to avert a homogenous mobilisation against the elitarian system. In Dahiye, 
where identity politics marks both privilege and neglect, it becomes an advantage for such 
subgroups not to essentialise themselves (even temporarily) as a single category. Conversely, 
they bring forward their single group identity to uphold their (in)formal memberships and an 
antagonised idea of polity, which is the only one able to avert symbolic death and guarantee 
their survival as an identity group (Hage 1996). Nationhood, in such circumstances, can be 
identified through the longevity of “the worst is yet to come” mantra.  
 
Conclusion  
In order to assess the provision of services in areas marked by the constructed notion of 
emergency and post-emergency, social order has been used as a discursive tool to identify the 
political agendas of providers, unpack the individual experiences and feelings of the 
beneficiaries, and highlight the ways in which nationhood can be imagined. This investigation 
therefore explains how welfare regimes have been experienced across Lebanon in the wake of 
internal and regional displacements. Specifically in Dahiye, the power of local authorities has 





postwar internationalisation of local welfare consecrated the sovereignty of the municipalities 
and rendered the international aid industry with respect to local people technocratic and 
solipsistic. The international apparatus’s need for local gatekeepers and domestic labour 
capital further proved this argument. 
 
This chapter has shown the complexity of how social and humanitarian systems of care 
pursue different social orders, and how people interweave relations, experience identification 
processes, and express feelings through their (non-)beneficiary status in the Lebanese social 
taxonomy of services and the cyclical prioritisation of new emergencies produced by 
predictable politics. It also assessed how nationhood can be rethought in Lebanon across 
similar social strata and common experiences of grievance. Compartmentalisation seems to 
provide a better description of how service provision and emergencisation affect individual 
and global trends in response to global politics. 
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CHAPTER 7  Syria’s Refugees in Lebanon: Brothers, burden, and bone of 
contention 




Over the past five years, the Syrian revolt has escalated into a massive humanitarian 
catastrophe with regional implications. The ‘Arab Spring’ protests began in peripheral border 
villages before spreading to major cities such as Aleppo and the capital, Damascus (Leenders 
and Heydemann 2012). As regional and international mediation efforts, short-lived truces, and 
UN-observer missions failed, the conflict intensified into a full-fledged civil war by mid-
2012. The civil war has since turned into a complex emergency that has spread to all of the 
country’s governorates and been compounded by the emergence of the Islamic State (Daesh), 
the al-Nusra Front, and other militant groups that are taking control of the eastern part of the 
country. Foreign meddling and intervention in the conflict by regional actors and world 
powers – in the form of troops, military aid, and airstrikes – has internationalised the conflict 
and made it intractable. With more than 1 million war-displaced refugees in Lebanon alone 
(Figure 1), this is now the largest displacement crisis in the world (Knudsen 2014). 
Drawing on primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that the deep political divisions 
over the Syrian revolt at first prevented Lebanon from taking control of the refugee crisis and 
caused the country’s open-border policy and non-camp approach. As the crises grew, the 
special status of Syrian brothers-turned-refugees was changed and admission and residence 
polices tightened amidst growing economic worries and security concerns. As the refugees 
settled among the country’s poorest residents, tensions rose as unemployment, the budget 





contestation and a re-ordering of national politics and relations vis-à-vis Syria but also 
necessitated a re-examination of the purported weakness of the Lebanon state, which is now 
reeling under an unprecedented crisis. Hosting more refugees than any other country of its 
size has come with high costs to the public and recurring security breaches and attacks. The 
situation has also fuelled sectarian tensions amidst a breakdown of public services. 
Nonetheless, the country’s political system has not buckled, and armed conflict has been 
averted. The refuge crisis is therefore an important case study to rethink the nature of 
Lebanese statehood (Saouli 2006), consociational democracy (Fakhoury 2014), and plural 
power bases (Fregonese 2012). 
 
Figure 1: approximately here 
Title:   Syria’s displacement crisis: March 2011–March 2015 (48 months) 
Sources: Data compiled by author from several sources: EUI; HIU, ICDM, OHCHR, SNC, UNHCR, and 
UNOCHA. 
 
Bone of contention 
Lebanon currently has the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world. Since the 
start of the conflict, Lebanon has been a favoured destination because of its proximity, long 
porous border, and the privileged access afforded to Syrian nationals (details below). Three of 
the four main hosting countries – Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq – have set up more than 40 new 
camps (HIU 2015), and yet eight out of ten refugees are self-settled, a strategy that can lead 
them to forfeit their protection rights and strip them of identification papers. Lebanon is the 
only country not to have set up formal camps. Instead, it has instituted a non-camp approach, 
which means that nearly all the refugees are self-settled and live precariously in the country’s 





history as a refugee country and the many problems linked to the militarisation of the 
Palestinian camps have made the country wary of admitting new refugees. In addition to the 
economic burden of hosting more than a million refugees, the latter skew the sectarian 
balance and increase the risks of cross-border attacks and insurgent warfare. 
At the time of this writing, Lebanon is also host to more than 60,000 twice-displaced 
Palestinian refugees from Syria (ILO 2014, 13). However, the Palestinians are refused entry 
into Jordan, and Egypt does not register Palestinians from Syria, which means they lack 
access to basic health services, schooling, and more generally, protection. Lebanon’s open-
border policy and non-camp approach towards refugees from Syria is a consequence of the 
country’s failure to ratify international refugee conventions, the state of its bilateral ties with 
Syria, and political divisions over the conflict.ii 
Since 1948 Lebanon has hosted displaced Palestinian refugees under the patronage of the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), but it has ratified neither the 1951 UN 
Refugee Convention nor its extension, the 1967 Protocol (Van Vliet and Hourani 2012, 15). 
This means that Lebanon does not have a refugee law per se; instead, its refugee policies are 
based on a Memorandum of Understanding (2003) that grants refugees temporary asylum 
under the patronage of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
(Knudsen and Hanafi 2011). Consequently, asylum is time-limited and to be followed by 
resettlement; owing to other international legal obligations, however, Lebanon has to protect 
refugees from being returned to Syria (non-refoulement).iii In general, Syrian nationals who 
have arrived since March 2011 can register as refugees with the UNHCR, but Lebanese 
authorities make decisions regarding the right to reside and work. Similar rules apply to 





followed up with a formal residence permit (AI 2015). Lebanon lacks a formal legal 
framework for refugee governance, which is one reason why its admission and residency 
policy keeps changing. In lieu of a rights-based framework, Lebanon’s refugee policy is 
charity-based.  
 
Deeply divided countries such as Lebanon struggle to police their borders effectively, fail to 
restrict illegal immigration, and lack the means to monitor those entering closely enough. 
Lebanon’s non-camp approach is not a humanitarian gesture but the result of deep political 
divisions. The country’s parliamentarians are divided over Syria, with one political bloc 
supporting the Assad regime (March 8) and the other (March 14) backing the Syrian National 
Council (SNC) and – since 2013 – its successor, the Syrian National Coalition, which also 
includes the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The most prominent opposition group, Hizbullah, has 
rejected the establishment of camps (Daily Star 2013b). While residents initially welcomed 
the refugees and took them into their homes, the mood has changed among sections of the 
populace, who now see them as a burden. Many politicians, including those opposed to the 
Assad regime, consider refugees a potential threat to the nation and advocate setting up camps 
both inside Lebanon and as collection points inside Syria (Daily Star 2013d). Although the 
government has sought to distance the country from the conflict, it has yet to agree on how to 
handle the crisis.   
Owing to the internal divisions, Lebanon has striven to remain neutral vis-à-vis the Syrian 
revolt and abstained from voting on resolutions targeting Syria in regional (Arab League) and 
international (UN) fora. In late June 2012, parliamentarians taking part in the National 





Declaration, which seeks to shield the country from the internal conflict in Syria (Daily Star 
2015a). The declaration has since come under intense pressure from the growing Syrian crisis, 
which has exacerbated internal divisions. The Lebanese parties, unable to distance the country 
from the spiralling conflict, have not only sided with their Syrian counterparts but covertly 
aided the warring factions or fought alongside the army inside Syria. In addition, Lebanese 
border villages such as Arsal have been drawn into the proxy war through abductions, border 
violations, and cross-border shelling (Dakroub 2013).  
The defeat of Syria’s Assad regime would be a major blow to the regime’s allies, Hizbullah 
and Iran, and could sever the proverbial Axis of Resistance (Mohn and Bank 2012). For this 
reason, Hizbullah has engaged militarily in the conflict to prevent the Assad regime from 
crumbling. In late May 2013, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah, confirmed that the 
movement was involved in the conflict and fighting alongside the regime. In June, Hizbullah 
militiamen were deployed alongside the Syrian Army and defeated anti-regime fighters in the 
border town of Qusair. Hizbollah’s victory was celebrated in Beirut’s southern suburbs but 
heightened sectarian tensions across the country (Foreign Affairs 2013).  
Seeking to curb the mounting tensions in his country, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman 
asked Hizbullah to end its military involvement in Syria, a precondition for its opponents to 
end theirs. However, the repeated violations of the dissociation policy contributed to the fall 
of the Hizbullah-backed cabinet when Prime Minister Mikati resigned in late March 2013 (El 
Bashsa 2013a), Since then, a caretaker government has run the country and has not been able 
to take decisive action on the refugee issue. While failing to agree on an election law and hold 
parliamentary elections, the parliament extended its term by 17 months (Al Arabiya 2013). A 





14, 2014, but the presidency has been left vacant since Suleiman stepped down in late May 
2014. This shows how the Syrian conflict has deepened political divisions present since 2005 
and led to a general paralysis in government.  
Relations with Syria have traditionally been lopsided, with treaties (Brotherhood Treaty), 
councils (Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council), and military forces (Syrian Army) establishing 
Syrian domination over Lebanon.iv The Syrian civil war has redefined Lebanon’s relations 
with Syria by forging an alliance between the March 14 coalition and anti-regime groups and 
activists in Syria and Lebanon (ICG 2013). Similarly, the ties between March 8 and the Assad 
regime have been strengthened to include direct military intervention in support of the regime. 
Increasing polarisation between the two political blocs has strengthened Sunni Islamist 
charities, parties (Jamaa al-Islamiyya), and paramilitaries.v The latter include Lebanese 
Sunnis volunteering as fighters in Syria, which further undermines the dissociation policy. 
Nonetheless, the fragmented nature of Lebanese politics have enabled the Assad regime to 
draw on an array of Lebanese allies to defend its hegemony, most importantly its strategic 
alliance with Hizbullah (ICG 2013, 26). To this end, Hizbullah has not only engaged 
militarily in Syria but also monitored refugees and anti-regime activism within its core areas. 
The army’s failure to intervene in Hizbullah’s cross-border campaign while arresting Sunni 
militants, fighters, and jihadists has called the army’s neutrality into question amidst charges 
of it being under Hizbullah’s control. This said, there are tensions between the army 
command and Hizbullah over who should control the border area.vi  
In addition, conflict spillover, car bombs, and suicide attacks have transformed the refugee 
problem from a humanitarian into a security issue. Lebanon is now reeling following repeated 





units killed and taken hostage by the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State.vii The most recent 
terrorist attacks in Beirut, popular protests, and campaigns against the government (#youstink) 
underline the general situation of state failure and the threat of destabilisation.  
Ambiguous response   
In March 2012 the magnitude of the Syrian refugee crisis forced Lebanon to take steps to 
coordinate the relief efforts and establish an inter-ministerial committee.viii The committee 
coordinates relief efforts with the UNHCR, but its ambiguous response to the crisis has 
compelled political parties, Islamic charities, and non-governmental organisations to step in to 
fill the gap (Naufal 2012, 7). The lion’s share of the relief efforts has been concentrated in the 
border areas and neglected the towns and cities that are the main destinations for urban 
refugees (Van Vliet and Hourani 2012). Many of the urban refugees have settled in Tripoli, a 
city that has become a hotbed of militant Sunni groups; some of them are involved in the 
Syrian war and fight alongside the FSA, or their members have joined the al-Nusra Front and 
Islamic State. The interaction between displaced refugees, firebrand clerics, and local 
militants has since pulled Lebanon deeper into the Syrian quagmire. 
As the number of refugees continued to grow, the cabinet agreed to start registering refugees 
with the help of the UNHCR as from January 2013. To keep track of dispersed refugees, the 
UNHCR introduced biometric (retinal) scans a year later but did not share the data with the 
government. The Lebanese authorities, however, requested that the UNHCR share the data 
with its national security agency (Knutsen 2014). While there are legitimate reasons for 
biometric profiling of refugees, such as avoiding double registration, the potential misuse of 
the data could represent a threat to the refugees’ right to protection and asylum. Thus, rather 





from refugees. To this end, immigration procedures have gradually been tightened and 
services and provisions reduced. 
While non-camp was meant as no-camp, it has in practice come to include irregular 
settlements with limited service provision, located in fringe border areas. Non-camps function 
as temporary collection centres with minimal services and militarised security in the vicinity 
of the conflict zone. The 80 percent shortfall in the funding of the Syria Regional Response 
Plan (AI 2015, 6) was an added reason for the government to institute temporary protection 
measures that privilege national security and control. In the end, this means protection space 
is privatised, and individuals take up residence and seek refuge where they can find it.  
The UNHCR has lauded Lebanon’s non-camp approach for being both cheaper for the host 
state and more humane for the refugees (El Basha 2013b). However, as the number of 
refugees multiplied, Lebanon gradually tightened border control, forcibly returned bona fide 
refugees to Syria, and denied displaced Palestinian refugees entry into Lebanon. The 
authorities have also stripped refugees returning from visits to Syria of their refugee status or 
dropped them in the no man’s land between the two countries. For these reasons, a number of 
the Syrian migrant workers did not register as refugees because it could turn out to be a 
liability. They feared being arrested by Lebanese authorities and sent back to Syria or 
apprehended at Syrian border posts, which could endanger their families still in Syria.ix   
A follow-up survey of 100 refugees in February 2013 x found that a large majority came from 
urban areas and had left Syria because of shelling and rebel fighting that had destroyed their 
houses and those in their neighbourhoods. The head of the household made the decision to 
leave, but when more families left together, the move was decided among the family and the 





even weeks to reach the border. Most of them entered Lebanon via official border posts, 
mainly Masnaa and Ka’a, while a minority chose unofficial border crossings because they 
were closer, safer, easier to access or specifically to avoid official ones. Their first destination 
in Lebanon was the Bekaa Valley, with two-thirds proceeding to cities such as Tyre, Sidon, 
and Tripoli. The main reason for relocating was safety and familial ties to relatives and co-
religionists. Upon arrival, almost two-thirds of the respondents registered with the UNHRC 
(and for Palestinians, the UNRWA) to receive benefits, send their children to school, and be 
able to work. The remainder did not register as refugees, because of a lack of knowledge, 
because they planned to return to Syria, or because they were afraid of persecution at the 
border or of family members who remained in Syria. Nearly all respondents received help 
from Islamic charities, with half getting additional support from a range of national, Nordic 
and European NGOs. Additionally, they received support from friends, the Popular 
Committees, and political parties (Hizbullah). In other words, the meagre household budgets 
were a combination of people’s own savings, cash and in-kind assistance (UNHCR, 
UNRWA), charitable donations, as well as their income as day labourers.  
 
Syrian brothers? 
Lebanon is not an asylum country; in fact, the term “asylum seeker” is interpreted as seeking 
asylum in a country other than Lebanon (BUSL 2015). Yet, while most immigrants are denied 
asylum, detained or deported, this has not been the case for Syrians. Until January 2015, they 
benefited from Lebanon’s special relationship with Syria enshrined in the bilateral 
Brotherhood Treaty (1991) that, inter alia, requires the two to harmonise their foreign policy 
and not threaten each other’s security. Based on this treaty, the subsequent bilateral agreement 





This agreement allowed Syrians – who needed only their personal ID – to reside and work in 
Lebanon without paying any fees or charges.xi The privileged status of Syrian “brothers” was 
one reason for the huge Syrian workforce in Lebanon prior to the conflict, estimated at 
somewhere around 800,000 in 2010. Because these were mainly unskilled workers, this point 
underlines the paradoxical situation that pre-war Syria, a politically dominant country, 
depended on income from labourers and workers in Lebanon (Seeberg 2012).  
When the Syrian conflict erupted in the spring of 2011, the refugees faced a number of new 
obstacles when they fled across the border to Lebanon. Those who had crossed the border 
outside the official border posts and lacked a valid arrival stamp faced possible arrest or 
detention (IRINNews 2012). Many also reported being attacked on their way to the border, 
harassed at the border, or forced to pay exorbitant visa fees. Initially, many of the early 
arrivals did not register as refugees with the UNHCR for fear of being arrested and deported, 
and also because they lacked knowledge of the registration procedures.xii At the time, the 
Lebanese foreign minister declared that refugees from Syria should avoid coming to Lebanon 
(ICG 2013, 7).  
Since then, many have been forced to regularise their stay because they have exhausted their 
savings and in order to access schooling, health service, and cash assistance. This caused an 
initial registration backlog of close to 300,000 refugees, which led to efforts to ease 
registration procedures, reduce waiting time, and add mobile registration units outside the 
major cities. Owing to a legal loophole, the Palestinian refugees displaced from Syria are not 
covered under the UNHCR’s mandate; as a result, they are especially vulnerable, and many of 
them have settled in the country’s Palestinian refugee camps. The interim solution has been to 





refugees (Daily Star 2013a). They now even form a new bureaucratic category as Palestinian 
refugees from Syria (PRS). Despite fulfilling the requirements of refugee status, neither exiled 
Palestinians nor Syrians are officially called refugees; instead, they are referred to as 
displaced (nazihin). The refugees from Syria have a limited legal status that poses a host of 
challenges, including limits on freedom of movement, access to healthcare, registration of 
births and access to justice (NRC 2014, 12). Those who for various reasons lack a valid ID, 
arrived via an unofficial border crossing, or failed to renew their residency permit face the 
greatest challenge. All of them will be regarded as undocumented (thus illegal) residents who 
are eligible for deportation.  
Displaced Palestinians were barred from entering Lebanon in April 2014. Shortly afterwards, 
preparations began to limit the number of Syrians, but there were no formal entry restrictions 
until December 2014 (BUSL 2015). From then on, Syrian refugees have been required to 
obtain a valid six-month’s visa and fulfil one of seven new admission criteria. Syrians now 
have to renew their visas every six months. The entry visa and its extension are free, but after 
one year they must apply to the General Security Directorate at a cost of $200 per person 
above the age of 15, an impossible charge for an average family. To avoid paying the 
exorbitant renewal fee, their only remaining option is to return to Syria and obtain a new exit 
visa to Lebanon. Even though they risk being apprehended at the border, around 300,000 
commute across the border for this purpose. Expired residence visas can be renewed for a fee, 
but if renewal is denied for any reason, they can only be resettled by applying for a ‘plea of 
mercy’ (talab istirham) with the General Security Directorate and pay a fine of $630 for a 
status settlement at the directorate’s discretion (AI 2014). If the plea is rejected, the applicant 





Visa regulations have gradually been tightened, and new entry visas and extensions of old 
ones now require the signing of a pledge not to work, failing which they would face jail 
(IRINNews 2015a). xiii Not only must refugees have a valid visa, their place of residence must 
be validated, too. If they are not a resident of an approved small shelter unit, collective 
shelters, or the many informal tented settlements (ITS) that have sprung up, their place of 
residence must be validated by the landlord, along with a certificate showing proof of 
ownership of the property signed by the local mayor (mukhtar). Most can neither afford nor 
fulfil these requirements, hence they do not attempt to extend their visas and go underground 
instead.xiv  
The families from Syria that I met in Tyre all had expired residency permits; fearing arrest, 
they kept out of sight and did not venture far from home.xv They rent tiny rooms and run-
down shacks and eke out a living from the UNHCR and UNRWA donations. In order to 
survive, they defy the ban on working and engage in clandestine work in the construction or 
agricultural sectors. Most dream of emigrating to Europe and join the many who have 
embarked on the perilous sea and land routes. Thanks to mobile phones and new messaging 
applications such as WhatsApp, refugees keep in touch with families in Syria and abroad. 
They have first-hand information both of the conditions at home in Syria and the prospects 
and pitfalls of migration.  
Ismael, a Palestinian refugee in his thirties hailing from the Yarmouk camp in Damascus, 
lives with his wife and two children in a single-story shack. One brother is in Sweden, while 
another has been detained in Serbia while he was trying to head deeper into Europe. Ismael 
picks up his mobile and shows me the picture of his third brother, killed by sniper fire during 





picture. Later we listen to the desperate voice message recorded on WhatsApp by his brother 
in Serbia before he was arrested by the police. Ismael’s plan is to emigrate and reunite with 
his brother in Sweden. Mobile phones and applications like WhatsApp have revolutionised 
migrants’ ability to share information, stay connected during transit, and circumvent border 
closures and high-tech barriers meant to keep them out. Increasing numbers of Syrian and 
Palestinian refugees are now leaving Lebanon by boat to Turkey from ports in Tyr and 
Tripoli. Crossing the Mediterranean Sea and then heading through the Balkans, they make 
their way into Europe. This secondary migration from Lebanon now amounts to an estimated 
100,000 people, causing the numbers of registered refugees to drop. Even war-displaced 
Lebanese families are taking this route, sometimes with disastrous results (Lupo 2013).  
Refugee burden? 
Lebanon is reeling under the costs of hosting the refugees, who now make up one-quarter of 
the country’s population. In 2013 the combined cost of the war and refugees was estimated at 
$7.5 billion (Reuters 2013), and the projected GDP growth has since slowed to less than 
3 percent. The same year, the government asked for $370 million in aid for refugees at the 
global donors’ conference in Kuwait, to be shared between the state and international 
agencies. The figure was later adjusted upwards and added to the latest United Nations 
humanitarian call, which brought the total to $6.5 billion, the largest-ever appeal for a single 
crisis.xvi In mid-March, the then-prime minister opted for camps as one of the options under 
consideration to contain the massive refugee influx (AlertNet 2013). One month later, the 
president reiterated the call for the UN to set up refugee camps inside Syria, or on the border 





leaders of Maronite political parties, some of whom also argued in favour of expelling 
refugees (ICG 2013, 15).   
The government has since pleaded for economic support from the UN, Arab countries, and 
France. There has been reluctance among both Gulf countries and Western governments to 
release funds to a government seen as being propped up by Syria and Iran. In the meantime, 
the UNHCR has advocated for setting up transit camps to aid with registration and relief 
efforts. Camps are logistically advantageous since relief is more readily distributed and 
residents controlled. At present, the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are spread over more than 
1,600 locations  (Daily Star 2013), which makes registration and monitoring a logistical 
challenge and security a nightmare for the authorities who admit they have lost control of the 
situation (ICG 2013, 8). Some of these areas could become bases of rebel activity, as 
happened in the past with the Palestinians camps. There are indications that this is happening, 
and that there is a nascent spillover of the Syrian conflict in the country’s border region.  
Over the past four years, the crisis has doubled unemployment and swelled the ranks of poor 
Lebanese amidst losses to trade and tourism (Foreign Affairs 2015). To make matters worse, 
less than one-third ($650 million) of the initial funding call from the Syrian Regional 
Response Plan has been met. On the other hand, the Lebanese economy benefits from the 
crisis in diverse ways. Since 2011, Syrian investment has risen rapidly in the real estate 
renting, purchasing, and investing sectors, which has driven up rent by 40 percent, boosted 
demand, and increased bank deposits (Ashkar 2015). Moreover, the economy benefits from an 
estimated $36 million that refugees pay in rent to the Lebanese property owners every month 
(IRINNews 2015b). Thus, one consequence of the non-camp approach is boosting the local 





However, while housing rents have gone up, along with a steep price hike, the food allowance 
(administered through the WFP) has been halved from $27 to $13 per person/month – not 
nearly enough to cover a family’s expenses.xviii In the same vein, the UNRWA and the 
UNHCR cover two-thirds of the costs for treating refugees in government hospitals, while the 
remainder is borne by the refugees, whose problems accessing adequate healthcare are so dire 
that many commute to Syria to access free health services.xix 
Lebanon’s infrastructure is struggling to cope with the massive increase in solid waste and 
electricity and water consumption, especially in the Bekaa Valley, where there are now close 
to 400,000 registered refugees. Owing to the growing need to regularise the refugees’ stay, 
tented and prefabricated transit camps have popped up along the Syrian border and are served 
by a plethora of (I)NGOs, despite the government’s ban on setting up formal camps. The self-
settled refugees are housed in ITS, mainly in the Bekaa Valley and in the Hermel District near 
the Syrian border. The border area suffers from poor infrastructure and a weak economy, and 
residents are straining under high living costs, rising rents, and dwindling jobs (mainly in the 
construction sector and quarries) in the context of a contracting Lebanese economy. Local 
security threats include cross-border shelling, border-area skirmishes, and growing tensions 
between host communities and refugees related to undercutting local labour (Christophersen 
et al. 2013). Stretched resources and growing tensions between host communities and 
refugees have on some occasions led to attacks on individuals and the torching of squatter 
camps (Al Akbar 2013).  
In the Bekaa Valley, the village of Arsal has seen its population increase sixfold, from 3,500 
to more than 18,000 inhabitants, while the population in the coastal city of Tripoli has swelled 





refugees reside in the poorest rural and urban areas among people already living below the 
national poverty line ($4). The overcrowding in Sunni-majority areas has also led refugees to 
settle in confessionally mixed towns like Sidon and Tyre. Syrian refugees are increasingly 
defined as a security threat: Salafists, warriors, and criminals are making local communities 
fearful of having camps established in their vicinity (Kullab 2014), and some of them have 
therefore imposed night-time curfews on refugees (HRW 2014). These precautions reflect a 
general prejudice towards Syrians and growing tensions between old and new residents in the 
country’s refugee camps. 
Owing to the dearth of cheap housing, Palestinian refugee camps and adjacent ‘grey areas’ 
have become temporary shelters for refugees from Syria. Tensions between Syrians and local 
residents are now on the rise and are evident in Tyr, where Syrian families have been attacked 
and forced to leave local refugee camps after falling out with one or more families.xx These 
conflicts can be trivial, like a child picking fruits from private garden trees without 
permission, but these incidents can lead to fist fights and brawls between adults. Such a 
disagreement was behind the forced departure of a large Syrian family from a Tyre refugee 
camp. Fearing new attacks, the family left and relocated to a run-down shack near the centre 
of town. Shortly afterwards, however, a male family member in his twenties was attacked. 
Brutally beaten and bruised with swollen eyes, he lay motionless on the floor after an assault 
by a group of men near Tyr’s seaside corniche, a favourite hangout for the town’s youth 
(Perdigon 2009). The incident had also affected the children in the family who faced bullying 
and taunting. As a result, they are now being escorted to school.  
The Palestinian refugees from Syria are warmly welcomed by their fellow Palestinians, who 





vacant flats and houses. They are aided by family links and ethnicity that shield them from the 
insults and racial slurs targeting Syrians. However, they also face discrimination and live in 
the poorest and most polluted neighbourhoods; for example, two Palestinian families live 
together next to a noisy diesel generator on the outskirts of a Palestinian refugee camp. In 
addition to having other family members trapped inside the Yarmouk camp, in transit on their 
way to Europe and seeking asylum in Germany and Sweden, they had lost in-laws and 
relatives in the Ghouta (Zemelka) gas attack in August 2013. Thus, the refugees have 
splintered families and dead and missing family members, and they suffer from deep 
emotional trauma and despair that they conceal behind an outward cheerfulness. Others 
struggle to cope with sick, handicapped, and mentally ill children. These families face 
additional hardships in exile, in addition to a lack of money for medicines and advanced 
treatment not covered under the current regulations (Sidahmed 2015).xxi With all the 
challenges facing refugees, it is not surprising that many now speak of nostalgia for their old 
life in Syria and an acute loss of existential meaning in Lebanon (Dot-Pouillard and Pesquet 
2015), and in this regard, their trajectory mirrors that of the Palestinians displaced in 1948.      
 
Conclusion  
Until early 2015, owing to its proximity to the warzone and the privileged access it afforded 
Syrian nationals (‘brothers’), Lebanon had been a major destination for refugees coming from 
Syria. Since then, strict immigration rules have reduced the stream of refugees to a trickle, 
eventually neither admitting nor registering new entrants. The government’s erratic response 





divisions, the country’s troubled history as a refugee host, and the lack of a legal framework 
for handling the refugee crisis.   
The government’s inability to agree on how to handle the crisis led to the provisional non-
camp approach, which made most refugees settle among poor co-religionists. The country has 
since added a number of informal camps along the border but neither revoked the non-camp 
approach nor attempted to reverse the spread of refugees from Syria across the country. The 
country’s security situation has deteriorated and will likely weaken further because of 
Hizbullah’s military engagement in Syria and retaliatory attacks targeting the movement and 
its members.  
The refugee crisis has not only led to a re-ordering of national politics and relations vis-à-vis 
Syria by setting aside key bilateral treaties but also defied the often-held notion of a weak 
state facing imminent collapse and breakdown. The state has managed to contain the political 
fallout of the refugee crisis but has faced widespread resentment over the failure to deal with 
its domestic impact. Moreover, refugee narratives of dislocation and despair testify to the 
increasingly contested interactions between residents and refugees and the consequent 
rearranging of community relations. Fear, prejudice, and resentment have grown along with 
unemployment, poverty, and the budget deficit amidst underfunded donor support. This is a 
volatile mix in a deeply divided society that is struggling to come to terms with having the 
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